

Strategic Leadership Development: International Perspectives

Edited by
**Lieutenant-Colonel
Jeff Stouffer
and
Dr. Allister
MacIntyre**

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**STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP
DEVELOPMENT**

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INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES**

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FOREWORD

I am pleased to introduce *Strategic Leadership Development: International Perspectives*. This book, being published by the Canadian Forces Defence Academy (CDA) Press, is of special significance in that it follows on the success of *In Pursuit of Excellence: International Perspectives of Military Leadership*, a product of the International Military Leadership Association (IMLA). Current membership of the IMLA includes the leadership centres/institutes of Australia, Canada, England, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States. This association was formed in November of 2005 to provide a venue to discuss and share military-specific leadership knowledge, contribute to leadership doctrine development, and, as well, explore opportunities for collaborative research. While these books represent a tangible output for the IMLA team, the informal sharing of information has enhanced the ability of the contributing nations to “fast-track” their leadership development programs. In this sense, knowledge of lessons learned and best practice identification reported by the IMLA membership have proved invaluable.

This book, like its predecessor, serves to recognize the growing desire of the contributing nations to better understand well-established leadership tenets as well as the “subtleties” associated with this construct. While *In Pursuit of Excellence: International Perspectives of Military Leadership* focused on the premises of leadership theory in four different militaries, as well as the antecedents that led to the creation of military leadership institutes, this book opens the door to discussions regarding the philosophy and processes incorporated by several IMLA member nations, through which effective senior leadership can be developed.

I expect that the reader will find the insights and experiences of the four contributing nations to be of interest and that the issues and opinions expressed in this book represent continuing

and future challenges for our respective organizations. Readers will find a degree of consistency in the challenges, experiences, and intent of our international partners in the arena of strategic leadership development. The approaches used by the nations represented in this book do vary somewhat, mainly as a consequence of force size, available resources, and nation-specific realities and goals. Nevertheless, the undeniable message that leadership development is crucial and requires serious and immediate attention resonates throughout. As such, this book permits an examination of divergent international methodologies and approaches for strategic leader development.

As envisioned, the work of the IMLA has received increased international attention. The IMLA website, “word of mouth”, and the results-orientated philosophy of this association have garnered the interest of other military leadership institutes as well as the academic communities. As a result, the IMLA membership has grown in both size and enthusiasm. In fact, a charter was recently developed to address and outline some general parameters of conduct and management of the IMLA. *Strategic Leadership Development: International Perspectives* confirms the continued commitment of the IMLA community in the pursuit of leadership knowledge and recognizes the growing desire and willingness to work collaboratively to better understand this obvious but at times elusive construct – leadership. As such, this book acknowledges the value in continued international dialogue, information sharing, and collaboration. Given this demand and the interest these volumes have generated, it is expected that additional publications will follow.

In closing, I would also like to express my appreciation to the contributors of this book for their efforts and insights. Professional senior leadership development demands our attention, research, and due diligence to ensure that the leaders of today and the future have the requisite training and experience to effectively meet current and anticipated challenges. This effort, like the inaugural publication, represents

an excellent example of the power and value of cooperation. Should you wish to discuss issues presented in this book or related areas of interest, please contact the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute at the Canadian Defence Academy or the International Military Leadership Association.



Major-General P. R. Hussey
Commander
Canadian Defence Academy

INTRODUCTION

Few topics have evoked as much consideration, emotion, thought, debate, and subsequent research attention as has leadership. While the leadership construct remains somewhat elusive, this in no way underscores the undeniable empirical links between effective leadership and a myriad of desired organizational outcomes or goals such as increased production, job satisfaction, cohesion, morale, organizational citizenship behaviours, willingness to participate in professional development, retention, organizational commitment, trust, reduced cynicism, and reduced workplace counter-productive behaviours. Without doubt, leadership is an essential, if not the key, ingredient of organizational success. In fact, case studies frequently attribute organizational success to the actions of senior leadership. However, conversely, senior leaders also serve as the primary target of blame and “scorn” when organizations stumble or planned efforts fall “off the rails”.

The leadership literature, however, can leave one with the impression that all an organization has to do to increase team or organizational performance is to hire the “right” or all “inspiring” person. That charismatic, inspiring person will bring the organization out of the darkness and put it on the path to success. Unfortunately, this speaks little of the need for the continued identification of the shifting requisite knowledge, skills, abilities, and capacities required of future leaders. It also speaks little of the need for exposure to the innumerable tangible and intangible experiences necessary to acquire the essential competencies that future senior leaders will need. Equally important, it speaks even less of the need for organizations to develop a comprehensive strategy to develop leaders. As such, organizations may minimize or ignore the requirement to create a sound strategy to develop senior leaders.

Of added concern is the tendency for organizations to assume that leader development is completed at the junior levels and

that personnel have received the necessary training and work-related experiences required to effectively lead at the more senior levels. All too often, however, this assumption is false. In fact, the leadership skills required at the more junior levels may have limited relevance and/or applicability as one advances within an organization to more senior leadership positions. For example, the application of “time-proven” competencies that had previously defined successful leadership at junior levels may run contrary or serve to hinder subsequent leadership performance at the more senior levels.

A further confounding factor is that military leaders at all levels “are insulted by the inference that they may have something to learn about leadership – after all, they live it every day”.¹ Interestingly enough, this attitude may be changing somewhat as leaders appear to be gaining a greater appreciation of the complexities of the changing workplace. Clearly, accountability may also be at work, as with increasing frequency, leaders at all levels appear to be acknowledging their accountability. They also appear more forthcoming in identifying areas where additional training and/or experiences would have augmented their ability to better tackle their senior leadership responsibilities. In addition, the contributions of recently established military leadership institutes has served to promote, with some degree of success, the need for a sober second look at leadership professional development.

These factors considered, the importance of strategic leadership development has recently evoked renewed interest and considerable debate and attention, both on the domestic and international fronts. This attention largely stems from the undeniable shifts in the international security environment and its resulting complexities, the increased diversity of threats, societal changes, changing public expectations, technological developments, and the unknown. Military organiza-

¹ Colonel Bernd Horn and Lieutenant-Colonel Allister MacIntyre eds. *In Pursuit of Excellence: International Perspectives of Military Leadership*, (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), iii.

tions must be sensitive to these changes as they have placed extensive demands on our leaders. These complexities and demands have expanded the competency profile or at least brought increased attention to the essential leadership requirements that extend well beyond the traditional boundaries previously enjoyed. Today, how a leader understands, positions him/herself, and relates to and interacts within the political, social, environmental, and economic spheres is critical (i.e., interactions with non-government organizations, other militaries, the media, dealing with uncertainty, change, and the unknown, etc). It's now about being agile, having the capacity to be adaptive and flexible, and being able to embrace change. Leaders need to understand their impact both inside and outside their organizations. It is about continuous leadership development, not static, at all levels of leadership. As such, the increasingly complex and dynamic work context demands that leaders continuously adapt, learn, and accept that their development is never complete. To this end, organizations need to provide programmed opportunities to allow leaders to develop the necessary competencies.

Strategic Leadership Development: International Perspectives highlights the growing international recognition of the importance of strategic leadership development and the need for a comprehensive strategy to develop leaders throughout their careers to ensure that they are capable of meeting the demands of today and tomorrow. This book speaks to the value of leadership in military organizations, specifically, the need to best develop, leverage, and maximize leadership assets. Readers will appreciate the complexities and challenges faced by the four militaries presented – Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, as they identify their leadership requirements and design and coordinate their professional development strategies. The nations represented in this book have identified significant gaps in their leadership professional development programs and recognize that there is considerable room for further refinement. This, combined with the realization that missing from the equation is a systematic and comprehensive framework or plan to continuously develop military leaders, has generated considerable international scrutiny.

Each nation represented in this book faces its own unique challenges in the development and delivery of their leadership programs. They also struggle to ensure that their future senior leaders receive adequate exposure to the necessary experiences deemed essential to solidify or round off their leadership development. Challenges reported include resource limitations in terms of funding and the availability of academic facilities for program delivery, the size of their respective organizations (can they adequately support and justify the existence of professional institutions), the reality of personnel tempo that minimizes the availability of personnel for training, career structures/career management realities, staff turnover (churn), and at times, the need to “sell” and “convince” their respective militaries of the need and value of this type of development. To complicate matters, each of the nations represented in this book struggle to clearly delineate and articulate the capacities required of today’s leaders.

This book focuses on the efforts of the contributing nations to identify their leadership-specific development requirements, appropriate learning strategies, and in some cases, when the training should be delivered. Definitions of strategic leadership are provided. Debate ensues over who is a strategic leader and whether or not “strategic leadership” should be associated with a specific level of command – is it the exclusive domain of the very senior leaders of an organization or does the title “strategic corporal” resonate? Initial steps taken to address leadership development are provided as well as insights into the way ahead. Although each military presented in this volume recognizes this common aim, to develop competent senior leaders, their unique constraints define the approach that is most applicable and feasible for them. Regardless of the focus of the training provided or approach taken, the underlying message is that there is considerable international recognition of the need for and the willingness to ensure that senior leaders acquire the necessary competencies.

This collaboration represents the determined interest of the contributing nations to continue to foster international coop-

eration on the study of leadership and leadership development. *Strategic Leadership Development: International Perspectives* expands the body of leadership knowledge and encourages further networking. Hopefully, it will serve to attract other militaries and academic institutions to the International Military Leadership Association as a means to contribute their expertise and opinions in the pursuit of leadership excellence. It is expected that while reading this volume, readers will gain a better appreciation of the need for organizations to build a comprehensive leadership development strategy. Experiences reported in this book reflect both new thought and lessons learned, and clearly demonstrate how the sharing of information can serve to advance the leadership development programs of other military organizations.

CHAPTER 1

Strategic Leadership in an Era of Complexity and Uncertainty*

Dr. James Warn¹

Until recently, the traditions and experiences of strategic leadership in the Australian military have been shaped by the command arrangements with coalition forces where an Australian commander was often under the command of a coalition commander. These arrangements, although serving the national interest, did not stimulate a sophisticated discussion or strong understanding of strategic command and leadership in the Australian military context. The deployment of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999 was a clear break with these past experiences as it was an Australian officer who commanded the international force and who was in direct communication with the Prime Minister. The then Secretary for Defence, Ric Smith, highlighted the strategic significance of the Timor deployment in his valedictory address:

“If I may offer a view on the most significant Australian Government decisions of [the last] 38 years in the realm of foreign and international security policy, it could be only the decision to intervene in East Timor in 1999”.¹

This willingness to take national responsibility for strategic command and leadership was displayed again with the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003. Although other recent Australian United Nations (UN) deployments have been under the command of coalition forces, the

* Disclaimer – The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not the Australian Defence College or Department of Defence

¹ Dr. James Warn, Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Defence Leadership Studies, April 2007.

Australian forces have had a direct bearing on strategic outcomes (SAS in Iraq Gulf War 2) or contributed to the national security posture (member of the coalition of the willing).

These deployments were in response to dramatic shifts in the regional security for Australia and reflected a new awareness of the changing environment. The Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable John Howard, MP, has stated that “Not since the early 1960s have we faced a more complex and uncertain region”.² The deployment to East Timor exposed the need for strategic leadership and sparked a re-assessment of the functioning of strategic leadership in the Australian defence organization. To a large degree, the events in East Timor might be regarded as part of the decolonization process that was evident since the end of World War II (WWII) rather than the product of the new epoch heralded by 9/11.

Arguably, Australia’s response to East Timor, however, would shape how Australia and her neighbours would enter the new epoch. The events unfolding since 9/11 have also shaped security thinking in Australia in fundamental ways. The Prime Minister of Australia has defined particular threats amidst

“...dramatically changing and increasingly unstable global security situation. In the current international climate made so stressful by the almost constant terrorist threats, the ultimate nightmare must surely be the possibility of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorist groups”.³

The perils of this scenario would cause a “crisis in the constitutional order” of a country. Even preparing for these threats can endanger the constitutional fabric of a country as some societies become police states and others disintegrate through disagreement. Some believe that “The September attacks can be understood as the first battle in this new war”.⁴ He sees the terrorist network as a kind of virtual state that exists outside of any national boundaries and subsequently is impervious to the classical strategies of deterrence based on retaliation that have been the mainstay of security for the nation state.

These events pose challenges of regional and global change for the Australian defence organization and highlight the need to discuss and articulate implications of strategic leadership.

Aim

The aim of this chapter is to conduct a synthesis of emerging strategic leadership actions and behaviours in order to provide a strategic leadership framework within a military context.

The Relevance of Strategic Leadership

Strategic leadership has been defined in the business context as “the ability to anticipate, envision, maintain flexibility, think strategically, and work with others to initiate changes that will create a viable future for the organization”.⁵ Clearly the strategic commander is concerned with the organization, but just as important are the impacts that a commander can have outside the organization. These concerns are captured in part by the notion of the triple bottom line where actions are evaluated on their possible consequences for the society, the economy and the environment. Business definitions can contribute to discussion of strategic leadership in the military context, but in themselves do not capture the scope of action and impact of the military strategic leader. The strategic business leader is concerned with competitive advantage whereas the focus of the strategic military leader is national security.

Business organizations have faced the same drivers of change as military organizations and also face a world of complexity and uncertainty. Strategic leadership in the business context has been defined as a process that provides direction to and inspires the people of an organization.⁶ In contrast, strategic management is about the planning and the arrangement of resources in order to ensure adaptive fit between the organization and the environment. The strategic leadership role in business was originally regarded as the province of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). In this way of thinking, strategic leadership was linked to the most senior management position in the organization. The CEO devised the strategic direction and led the way. Globalization, with its associated

competitive environment, challenged the continued usefulness of this view of strategic leadership. Initially the demands were too much for one person and the CEOs of organizations began to share the load with other senior executives. These groups became known as the top management team (TMT) and the issue of concern was to explain how these teams functioned to deliver strategic leadership.⁷ Other strategic leadership theorists question whether strategic leadership can be confined to top executives if the organization is to be able to adapt to changing competitive environments. In this sense, it is argued that strategising meant change and that strategic leadership was the exercise of involving pro-change oriented individuals from all areas and levels from within the organization.⁸ He further suggests that for the executives in the organization, the challenge is to connect with the people across the organization who can think strategically, give them responsibility for change, and direct resources to support their efforts.

Globalization and technology have heralded significant change in the structure, focus, and leadership for all types of organizations, public and private, military and civil. Organizational leaders face an environment of complexity and uncertainty. Traditional approaches to strategic planning, which rely on rational but remote plans imposed from the top, are unlikely to succeed in an environment where change is constant and often discontinuous.⁹ Organizations need to be agile and adaptive to respond to change and to seek opportunities while managing increased exposure to risk.

Related factors in the evolving understanding of strategic leadership are globalization and technology within a constantly changing world environment. Strategic leadership needs to be redefined within this context. The challenge of complexity shifts focus from the individual to the patterns of behaviour between like-minded individuals. A clear implication of this shift necessitates moving beyond seeing strategic leadership as part and parcel of a position or rank in an organization. The connectivity promised by technological change can alter the nature of information relationships in the organization. This shift in relationships amongst organizational members is also accompanied by a shift from selecting leaders to fostering and shaping a leadership culture across the organization.

Traditionally, strategic leadership in the military setting has been viewed as the province of particular senior ranks. Australian military doctrine recognizes three broad levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical.¹⁰ Strategic leadership in the military setting has typically been associated with the strategic level of war, which is concerned with the art and science of employing national power to achieve national objectives.¹¹ In the military setting, the art of the strategic leader is to provide the link between national security guidance and military operations.¹² In the Australian setting, the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) is the key strategic leader and is assisted in exercising command by the Service Chiefs, who “raise, train, sustain” the Single Services. The operational levels of war are concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns that represent the implementation of military strategy. The Joint Operations Commander is responsible for command of these operations. At the tactical level, the commander is involved in organizing and manoeuvring forces to engage the enemy in combat. Aligned to these levels of command is a distinct rank structure. By virtue of this alignment, the strategic military commander is also a strategic leader. This three-level partition has enabled a clear alignment between rank levels, scope of command, organizational structure, focus of decision-making as well as the extent of risk.

The efficacy of a tribrachic representation of warfare has been challenged to some extent by the effects of globalization, technology, ubiquitous media, a changing security environment, and in particular, the emergence of asymmetrical threats from non-state actors. Evolving Australian military thinking recognizes a dynamic connectedness between the three levels of war and acknowledges that the likelihood that the tactical influencing the strategic may be the norm rather than the exception.¹³ The three levels of war have been replaced by the three blocks of war:

“In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day all within three city blocks.”¹⁴

The emergence of the phrase “strategic corporal” reflects an aspect of contemporary military operations where a very junior leader at the very bottom of the chain of command can have a direct impact on the success of wider military strategy.¹⁵ Such an outcome prompts a reconsideration of what is meant by the term strategic leadership. Most directly, the strategic corporal challenges the assumption that strategic leadership is simply what occurs at the top of the organization and that the impact of leadership is dependent on where one is in the hierarchy of an organization. In the era of the strategic corporal, the success of a strategy can depend as much on the lowest-ranking leader as the most senior. However, closer examination of instances where the strategic corporal has had a strategic effect indicates that the significant change is that strategic risk has tumbled down to the very junior rank levels. Risk is now asymmetrical with rank.

The recognition that a military force may be simultaneously engaged in three levels of warfare, pre-modern, modern and post-modern, has shaken the traditional alignment between strategic impact actor and rank level. Hence, it is useful to consider strategic leadership without a strict connection to level of command and define the elements of strategic leadership from a behavioural perspective.

The Key Activities of Strategic Leadership

An important, even essential, element of strategic leadership is the capacity to conceptualize a new way of doing things that has significance at a wider level, probably at a national or global level. Associated with this level of impact is the time scale of the change, the span of consideration and the inter-relationships with other systems, and of activities and other networks of actors. These attributes define strategic leadership as operating in an environment of complexity. However strategic leadership has to communicate the need for change and the way ahead in a robust and persuasive way. This is the vision. Strategic leadership has to gain commitment to the vision from a range of collaborators and convert this energy into a clear direction with understandable targets for change.

The key activities of strategic leadership can be summarized as:

- conceptualize a new world;
- understand complex inter-relationships;
- communicate the vision; and
- gather the support.

These four activities may occur interdependently, concurrently and iteratively. In no way are these activities being presented as a linear check-list for strategic leadership. The activities are derived from a synthesis of current leadership thinking and provide an opportunity to examine strategic leadership in its complexity rather than being subsumed into a particular model of leadership. The key activities reflect the influence of transformational theorists and represent a way of synthesizing this important body of leadership thinking into an examination of strategic leadership.^{16, 17}

Conceptualize a New World

The close relationship between leadership and change is reiterated at the strategic level by a number of leadership researchers. In the world of business, strategic leadership is about thinking of ways to initiate changes that will deliver sustainable competitive advantage to the firm.¹⁸ Doing so requires the ability to be the architect of industry transformation and set the new rules in an industry.¹⁹ Strategic leadership challenges the status quo and redefines the manner in which the organization interacts with the environment.

Traditionally, strategic leadership models have associated the potential for change with the emergence of a forceful charismatic leader, who has the answer to solving the crisis of the time and can articulate this answer as a compelling vision. This “great man” model of leadership may be viewed as a relic of past thinking in some intellectual quarters but it still has popular appeal. The perception that the leader is a special person who sets the direction and makes the key decisions is deeply rooted in popular culture.²⁰ The military

organization with its command and control philosophy and culture of heroic behaviour and loyalty, is particularly prone to relying exclusively on the “great man” theory of leadership.²¹

Transformational leadership theories have attempted to explain how strategic leaders might behave, but these models often implicitly focus on the qualities of the leader and in effect have resurrected a variant of the great man or woman theory of leadership. Transformational leaders are viewed as special creatures – they are “twice born”.²² Transformational and charismatic leadership theories emphasize the role of the leader in possessing special understanding of the way ahead and conveying this insight to the followers by way of a vision. The transformational model has been seen to be effective in a military context and the emphasis on active leader behaviours aligns well with the command culture of the military. Faced with the critique of simply reiterating a “great man” (or woman) theory of leadership, transformational theorists have been able to demonstrate how transformational models can incorporate more active relationships between followers and leaders. However these models still present an individualist account that explains the behaviours of leaders rather than the activity of leadership.

In contrast to the transformational model, other theorists have attempted to differentiate leadership from the leader. Leadership can be defined as patterns of behaviour that facilitate “collective action towards a common goal”.²³ Leadership is distributed across a group and “it is more accurate to think of different leadership roles in a group than to think of the leader”.²⁴

The reality of the modern military organization is that there are a multitude of leaders at various rank levels across the different organizational components. However, the culture of the military is more in line with the great man model than that of shared leadership. The realities of close combat in asymmetrical conflicts have reinforced the perception that there is a need for charismatic, confident warrior leaders. Within this culture, articulation of the need for change remains the work of senior leaders rather than a shared activity across the organization.

“Strategic leadership is the front-end work, the in-depth, serious thinking by a leader and his or her team that results in the creation of an intellectual framework for the future. Without the tough up-front work of intellectual change, physical change will be unfocused, random, and unlikely to succeed”.²⁵

This top down approach to strategic leadership has been evident in the Australian military organization since the 1970s. For example, senior military leaders successfully restructured the Australian Army over two decades from a force optimized for tropical warfare to a force designed for dispersed low-level operations in northern Australian conditions. The ongoing reassessment and critique of these restructures have also been managed in a top down manner. It was demonstrated, however, that senior Australian military leaders have been active in challenging the assumptions of the prevalent security posture of the day. Even in the midst of implementing the force structure for dispersed low-level operations, a senior officer raised the concern that concentrating on short warning conflict on Australian soil threatened to erode the Australian Army’s ability to participate in future coalition operations. In another instance, in debating the value of self-reliance, the Chief of Army called for a “reassertion of the Army’s intellectual leadership of defence processes” based on fresh ideas and concepts.²⁶

In Australia, the Defence White Paper provides the strategic guidance for senior military leaders. The Defence White Paper of 2000 was heralded as the most comprehensive reappraisal of Australian defence capability for decades. It recognized the role of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in humanitarian relief, evacuations, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement and the need for Australian forces to be deployed at short notice. The change in direction was not evident to all. Air Marshal Errol McCormack, the then Chief of Air Force, argued that “the White Paper of 2000 does not signal a major change in strategic direction or intent”. Others also detected no substantial shift in maritime strategy.²⁷ However; it was others who concluded that the White Paper did pay more attention to ways of improving land capabilities and the “nexus between defence planning and broader national-security interests”.²⁸

Revisions to the White Paper were announced as Defence Updates in 2003 and 2005. The 2003 update was the result of iterative inter-agency consultation as well as consideration by Ministers. In the press release, the Bali bombings were identified as a trigger for the update. Over this period, the senior ADF leaders had been assimilating the lessons learned from INTERFET (East Timor) in 1999, Afghanistan, and Iraq.²⁹ Indeed, different lessons have been learned from each deployment. Earlier deployments to Rwanda and Somalia, although hazardous, were categorized as Peace Operations. In contrast, lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq were about the evolution of warfare and revealed the need to align experience with doctrine and with procurement.³⁰ Key features of this experience were identified by the Chief of Army as the role of “highly potent land forces” with high levels of protection that were capable of close combat. The third set of lessons learned crystallized in the experience of Operation Helpem Fren (Solomon Islands) where an Australian led multinational, multi-agency force restored legitimate civil governance. These three experiences, humanitarian relief, restoration of civil governance, and complex warfighting correspond to the three block concept and offer an extension, in which it is envisaged that all tasks could occur simultaneously on the one block.³¹ The Chief of Army has summarized his understanding of the requirements of the three blocks in the form of the “hardened Army” concept:

“The ‘hardened Army’ concept embraces a suite of measures aimed at improving the Army’s levels of armoured protection, firepower, protected mobility and networking the ADF will generate combat power through seamless links of shooters and sensors throughout the battlespace”.³²

The “hardened army” has been described as a synthesis of network centric warfare and complex warfare.³³ The concept was officially endorsed in the Defence Update 2005.

Understand Complex Inter-relationships

Complexity has two meanings.³⁴ The first is the experience of sensory overload caused by overwhelming noise and senselessness.

The second refers to systematic complexity or understanding the sense of order underlying the pattern of “human movement and decision making” within a large city.³⁵ Both aspects of complexity might be experienced by a strategic military leader. Complexity as sensory overload corresponds to the notion of the fog of war. The second sense of recognizing underlying patterns resembles more closely an attempt to practise the strategic art of warfare or perhaps the capacity to understand the inter-relationships between the elements of program management and capability building in a modern defence organization.^{36, 37}

The strategic leader attempts to work out how to proceed from one state of affairs to another. This process may involve reframing what is possible and being prepared to overturn the status quo.³⁸ Complexity for the strategic military leader arises from the requirement to link the exercise of military force to the larger political-military context.³⁹ Any exercise of power requires the strategic leader to balance possible actions and consequences along numerous dimensions. Typically, strategic leadership involves looking a long way forward and this increased time span increases complexity since additional sequences of events can occur. The leader also has to consider options along moral and value dimensions as well as instrumental criteria. Actions at the strategic level will require the leader to consider a number of dimensions of influence. Horizontal or peer leadership is required to create interagency cooperation and the leader will need to be aware of the role, functions and capabilities of these different agencies. The strategic leader has to exert leadership downwards in the organization. This may call for classical command leadership or more collaborative styles of leadership, depending on the culture of the organization. Regardless of leadership style, the leader has to comprehend the likely consequences of leadership decisions and the responses of people throughout the organizational hierarchy.

Particular trends in the contemporary environment also contribute to complexity. Lieutenant-General P.F. Leahy, Chief of Army, identified the intersection of urbanization (with its accompanying proliferation of communication technologies) and the

increased lethality and portability of modern weapons as having created complexity for military commanders.⁴⁰ The recognition that the threats arising from this intersection could take distinctly different forms is the insight encapsulated by the three-block concept. A range of trans-national threats and scenarios, including peace support operations, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, military assistance to civilian authorities, and cyber-terrorism, have been identified.⁴¹ Responding to conflict in large urban centres is viewed as inherently complex and the experience of the Australian military is that such operations will be compounded by “harsh climatic conditions and unfamiliar linguistic and cultural conditions”.⁴²

One of the more consistently drawn implications has been that complexity at the strategic level means that the problems to be solved may be outside the competency limitations of a single leader. The inference is that strategic leadership depends on a number of leaders working together collectively. There is evidence to suggest that senior defence leaders have been ready to recognize that there is a need for collective action at the senior level. Successive senior military leaders have publicly acknowledged the necessity for a multi-agency response to complex contingencies in the Australian region. Security is now a whole of government exercise. The outgoing Secretary for Defence noted that 9/11 “was probably one of the most significant contributing factors to the rediscovery of the role and importance of Government in western societies after the ‘smaller government’ fetish of the nineties”.⁴³

Another interpretation of the collective leadership inference is that complexity can be best approached by harnessing the contributions of all organizational members regardless of their position in the organization. The empowerment of subordinate leaders is well established in military thinking, or at least in those military forces that have rejected a direct control approach in favour of a philosophy of mission control. Here the “Commanders must be free to exploit fleeting opportunities, maximize their speed of manoeuvre, and avoid the use of predictable, prescriptive plans and orders”.⁴⁴ However, mission control remains an attempt to

achieve the realization of top down goals albeit in a fluid and changing environment. A more radical alternative has been outlined by Lieutenant-Colonel D. Schmidtchen who argues network-enabling technologies allow new organization opportunities that stem from shifting from central control to self synchronization.⁴⁵ He envisages a situation where commanders on the scene, and of any rank, could exchange information in a network, share understanding of the local situation, and through consensus create understanding to enable confident action.

Communicate the Vision - Share the Dream.

Being able to articulate a tangible vision that links to values and strategy has been described as a crucial skill for strategic leaders.⁴⁶ The vision provides a picture of what the organization is to become, what makes it distinctive, and provides an indication of where people's energy should be directed. Generally, the vision should relate to the future rather than being a statement of the status quo.⁴⁷

The senior leaders in the ADF have articulated vision statements. The CDF first outlined the ADF vision to the senior leadership group and again with a modified version in 2006.⁴⁸ Key changes in the 2006 version included replacing the word "manning" with "staffing", and recognition of a defence organization rather than just the force elements, and inclusion of interagency operations.

"Defence will be balanced, networked and deployable, staffed by dedicated and professional people, which excels at joint, interagency and coalition operations".⁴⁹

In expanding upon the vision, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston clearly linked the vision to identifiable practices and events within the organization. In shaping the organization, the CDF was engaging in the role of social architect. He referred to the leadership team and their responsibility as working for the welfare of our people. He also recognized the need to empower people to pursue innovation and creativity. Finally, the CDF identified the need for good strategic planning and management of resources to underpin the vision and placed these activities with a context of

values based leadership in order to achieve the strategic outcome of operational performance and preparedness.

The Service Chiefs have also released vision statements:

The Navy's vision is to be a Navy with a worldwide reputation for excellence as a sea power; a well-equipped, professional team of highly motivated quality people, serving Australia with honour, supported by a nation proud of its Navy.

The Air Force vision is to be a balanced expeditionary Air Force capable of achieving the Government's objectives through the swift and decisive application of air and space power in joint operations or as part of a larger coalition force.⁵⁰

The Chief of Army has outlined the Army vision as revolving around the elements of the Hardened and Networked Army. The aim is to empower through network enabled operations and harden the army to protect soldiers and improve survivability using more robust combined arms teams to maximize fire-power with high mobility. Under the networking changes it is envisaged that the individual soldier will gain access to an operational picture that previously was only the province of brigade commander.⁵¹

Gather the Support, Sustain and Adapt

The strategic leader needs to demonstrate both direct and indirect leadership expertise. Direct leadership is being able to influence others with whom one has face-to-face contact. The strategic leader, however, will likely have to influence a diverse range of people, often through fleeting interactions and across a broad spectrum of situations. The strategic leader will need to respond quickly to the situational cues and adapt his or her behaviour to best effect.

Much of the research into leadership has dealt with the experience of direct leadership. Broadly, the range of theories has examined the personal; characteristics of the leader, the types of behaviours that might influence followers. More recently these behaviours have been categorized into transactional and transformational dimensions. Leadership influence that is predicated on existing social arrangements and reward structures is said to be transactional and is expected to result in average performance. In contrast, in order to obtain above average performance, the leader needs to appeal to higher order values and transform followers. Recent research indicates that transformational leadership influences follower motivation through cognitive and emotional mechanisms.⁵² It is thought that this combined impact on self-efficacy and goal setting results in heightened follower motivation, which in turn contributes to higher performance.

Indirect leadership is about influencing others at a distance or through different types of media. Transformational leadership behaviours can be effective at the indirect level since these behaviours can be interpreted by followers at a distance or representations of these behaviours can be transmitted by communications technology. The strategic leader also influences members in the organization by shaping norms, values and expectations across the organization. Organizational culture refers to the shared norms and values that guide the behaviour of organizational members. These shared understandings have typically been developed over time by the group as it has grappled with adapting to external challenges and maintaining the internal identity of the organization. Put simply, organizational culture is the “the way things are done around here”.

The strategic leader is a social architect who shapes the culture of the organization and aligns it with the strategic vision. Managers do not just compete with other firms but also compete “for the hearts and minds of talented and capable people” and the manager needs to shape the organization culture that engages this talent in ongoing learning to support the strategic vision.⁵³ Conversely, failure to change the culture may lead to loss of direction and inability to realize the potential of the strategic vision.⁵⁴

Dr. Allan Hawke was the Secretary for Defence when the Defence White paper 2000 was produced. He described the White paper as the basis for pursuing a transformation in military affairs for Australia.⁵⁵ However, to achieve this change, Hawke recognized that the strategic planning needed to be underpinned and supported by a change in the organizational culture of the defence organization. To this end, Dr. Allan Hawke implemented a parallel strategic change process to transform the way Defence went about doing business. The Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force worked together to change the behaviour of the senior leadership group as they believed this was the key to implanting a sustained change in behaviour across the wider Defence organization. It was believed that Australians are more influenced by what they see their leaders doing rather than what they are saying – the walk is more important than the talk.⁵⁶

More recently, the Chief of Navy initiated the Sea Change program in order to shift the culture of Navy in relation to the way people are treated; particularly in the way they can manage their lives and careers. This is a human resource oriented program that has targeted the management of an individual's career in order to offer greater stability, certainty and satisfaction.

Concluding Remarks

The challenges of the current security environment place extensive demands on our strategic leaders. This chapter offers a model for explaining and analysing the actions of these leaders and determining whether they can be said to be performing as strategic leaders.

This year's *Defence Management Review* identified a number of areas of organizational performance and change indicating that strategic leadership has been occurring in the Defence organization and that there is a discernible impact at the strategic level. Key outcomes of significance are the operational performance of the ADF, the continued capacity for reform in an environment that increasingly demands efficiency and accountability, the shift of focus to warfighting with business functions being corporative

and even privatised, and the establishment of a strategic planning process, the government-endorsed Defence Planning Guidance, to manage the acquisition of new capabilities and set Defence goals. At the single Service level, significant indicators of active strategic leadership have been the extensive reform of the military justice system, the emphasis on aligning organizational values, the integration of organizations and processes across the Defence organization and continued involvement of ADF officers in joint education (the Australian Defence College, or other joint schools) as critical components of their professional career development.

The *Defence Management Review* also identified a number of strategic areas in which the leadership performance was deficient.⁵⁷ It discussed culture in Defence, stating that at their best, the various cultures are task-focused, team-oriented, self-confident and have a can-do attitude. It also remarked that at their worst they can be risk-averse, insensitive to cost, rule-bound and tribalistic. Principally, the focus of the Review was on the business areas of Defence and the need to reform business processes of the Defence organization. In particular: to reorganize the allocation of roles and responsibilities of senior leaders, and to rebalance the focus of the strategic leadership on the immediate demands of operational requirements with the long-term sustainability of the organization. Comment was also made on deficiencies in leadership in relation to accountability and responsibility, disconnects between strategy and capability, and the day-to-day pressures on strategic leaders.

The theme of complexity has emerged as a continual environmental variable for contemporary strategic leadership. Complexity is reflected in the nature of the challenges to be met. The Australian Defence Organization is a large, complex organization that is evolving and changing in the face of clear environmental pressure. Adaptive challenges are the norm. Strategic leaders have to continually be prepared to acquire new knowledge and adopt new perspectives (or recombinations of old ideas). The realization of discontinuous change has also unleashed critical challenges which call for a total re-framing of previous experience and knowledge. The response of strategic

leaders in the Australian Defence Force has been to affirm the importance of people, and the need to pay close attention to norms and values and to shape the organizational culture in order to meet these challenges. Emerging on the horizon, and possibly heralded by the introduction of network-centric technologies, is the challenge of reframing leadership itself within the command and control oriented culture of the military. It is suggested that we need a culture of leadership as well as cohorts of capable leaders.

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CHAPTER 2

A Professional Development Framework to Address Strategic Leadership in the Canadian Forces

Dr. Robert W. Walker¹

The changing nature of society, the global security environment, and technological innovation necessitate an aggressive Canadian Forces (CF) approach to understanding leadership, to ensuring leader effectiveness through a congruence of institutional demands and leader capabilities, and to providing continuous professional development (PD) for CF leaders. The CF, as a military organization with a profession of arms imbedded within it, and as an institution committed to mission success, needs to balance and to successfully address the integrated demands that evolve from its organizational facets and its professional responsibilities. Current and ongoing CF transformation initiatives magnify these demands, reflect the increasing challenges for military professionalism, and underscore the pronounced need for tenacity, decisiveness and versatility particularly among senior CF leaders engaged in strategic leadership.

The examination of professionalism and the profession of arms, effective leadership requirements, institutional effectiveness, and requisite leader capabilities progressed through a substantial research effort using military, professional, and generic leadership literature, as well as direct guidance from senior military leaders and other subject matter experts. This research supported the production of the CF manuals that effectively and successfully articulate the situation and circumstances of the CF and the general requirements for leadership in the CF.

¹ Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) colleagues Colonel Bernd Horn and Dr. L. W. (Bill) Bentley made significant contributions to this paper, particularly with respect to professional leadership, the profession of arms, and professional ideology. I wish to thank them, all CFLI colleagues, and all other subject matter experts who contributed.

This chapter identifies the leadership research and military initiatives that supported the creation of a Professional Development Framework for leaders of the CF. Reviews previously were conducted to enumerate the CF's responsibilities for the early 21st century. Concurrently, the organizational literature was researched to articulate generic "effectiveness" at institutional levels. Subsequently, a context-specific model for CF Effectiveness was generated, incorporating the corporate outcomes and the conduct values to serve as the institutional backdrop against which leaders would function. The CF manuals, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (2005) and *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* (2007) provide an in-depth articulation of these steps necessary to define the CF as an institution and to describe the important circumstances for the CF to be institutionally effective. Accordingly, this chapter provides only a general review of that effectiveness.

With CF Effectiveness defined, the subsequent focus became the means to ensure it, that being CF leadership and its application to challenges of war, global issues, security threats, internal order and member care. Leader characteristics, competencies, skills and knowledge, etc., were studied in order to generate frameworks of relevant leader capacities, including those needed for the CF. The result was a five-element cluster of requisite CF leader domains: ***Expertise, Cognitive Capacities, Social Capacities, Change Capacities*** and ***Professional Ideology***.

This cluster of five requisite elements then was integrated with a continuum of four leader levels (junior, intermediate, advanced, senior) to generate a Professional Development Framework. This Framework constituted a template for defining the necessary leader knowledge and capacities, and a military professionalism across the continuum of levels of leadership, as well as determining the most relevant subject matter and most effective learning strategies to develop these leader elements.

The consequence was a comprehension of the necessary *congruence* between the CF Effectiveness model – representing the

institution – and the CF Professional Development Framework – representing the CF leadership. Such congruence is a prerequisite, but not a guarantee, for CF success in various missions, initiatives and other applications, a number of which are exemplified in this article. Figure 1 is a stylized flowchart depicting the pathways to congruence of institution and leadership.




FIGURE 1. Congruence of the Institution & the Leadership

The next seven sections of this article provide details about significant components contributing to a crucial institution – leadership congruence. Sections 1 to 3 briefly address the institution of the CF. Sections 4 to 6 address the leadership. Section 7 addresses CF applications and outcomes resulting from effective congruence. The Sections address:

1. An enumeration of Canadian Forces Responsibilities in the 21st century.
2. An articulation of the literature on Organizational Effectiveness.
3. A generation of a context-specific Canadian Forces Effectiveness model as the institutional backdrop against which leaders function.
4. A definition of the means - CF leadership - to ensure CF effectiveness, and the Canadian Forces Leader Issues and challenges therein.
5. A creation of taxonomies and Leader Frameworks of generic leader capacities, including those needed for the CF, from a review of the literature. The result was the CF-specific, five-element cluster of requisite leader capacities.
6. An integration of the cluster of requisite elements with a continuum of four CF leader levels (junior, intermediate, advanced, senior) to construct a Professional Development Framework for the CF.
7. A presentation of successful CF Applications, such as CF Transformation, operational mission success, human resources systems review, and professional development of senior CF leaders evolving from the appropriate congruence between the CF Effectiveness model and the Professional Development Framework.

The Institution – the Canadian Forces

Section 1: Canadian Forces Responsibilities

In order to work with the broader concepts of institution, leadership and institution-leadership congruence, it was necessary first to assemble a thorough representation of the responsibilities of the institution, i.e., to articulate the responsibilities for which the organization takes charge and can become institutionally effective.

Prior to publication of the CF leadership manuals in 2005, Mr. Karol Wenek, an ex-CF officer and a subject matter expert on professionalism and leadership, wrote extensively on the CF, its responsibilities, and its leadership.¹ Other scholars, defence analysts and defence scientists also listed significant CF challenges for the 21st century such as Canada-United States (US) relations, emerging technology, force restructuring, resourcing for military transformation, all in a global circumstance of new security threats, failing states, pandemic diseases, migration, religious extremism and narco-cartels.²

The CF responsibilities for its leaders related to the major functions of leading people and leading the institution along the effectiveness dimensions of mission success, internal integration, member well-being and commitment, external adaptability, and in line with military ethos. The *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* manual provides greater detail.³ Leader responsibilities, of course, vary in accordance with different levels of leadership, e.g., the stratified systems theory of leadership, studied within US militaries and many large civilian organizations, identifies seven institutional levels for differentiating leadership responsibilities, roles and scopes of influence.⁴

Singularly important in the review and articulation of CF responsibilities was the research on the profession of arms in Canada (*Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* in

book and booklet/*Summary* format). The profession of arms constitutes the essence, the milieu, and the ambience in which CF leaders conduct their responsibilities.

In summary, these multiple-perspective reviews and approaches support and validate the diverse responsibilities of CF leaders. These leader responsibilities substantially guided the subsequent development of a CF Effectiveness model, a leader cluster of requisite elements and attributes, and a Professional Development Framework.

Section 2: Organizational Effectiveness

The next important step in working through the components represented schematically in Figure 1 was the focus on organizational effectiveness. This involved the identification and review of existing (theory-based, empirically-derived, current government and CF) models and frameworks for organizational effectiveness.

Wenek's research, cited above, including the examination of a particularly strong and relevant organizational effectiveness model titled A Competing Values Framework and created by Robert Quinn.⁵ In brief, Quinn's Competing Values Framework represents 30 different criteria of effectiveness in organizations, including such positive and negative variables as efficiency, quality, growth, attrition, motivation, control, information management, participation, productivity, accidents/safety, morale, conflict, cohesion, planning, satisfaction, and training/development.⁶ The statistical reduction of this collection of variables yielded two major imperatives that were integrated into Quinn's effectiveness framework. Leaders, in order to generate institutional effectiveness, must comprehend the inherent but related contradictions in outcomes necessary for institutional effectiveness, and must be sufficiently flexible to balance the competing demands. Quinn stated, "It requires a dramatic change in outlook, a redefinition of one's world view. It means transcending the rules of mechanistic logic used for solving well-defined problems and adopting a more comprehensive and flexible kind of logic."⁷

Section 3: Canadian Forces Effectiveness

Quinn's Competing Values Framework was identified as having the greatest potential for the creation of a CF Effectiveness model. Applying it as an institutional effectiveness model to the CF, the major components for CF effectiveness were identified (Figure 2): Mission Success, Member Well-Being and Commitment, Internal Integration and External Adaptability. The complexity of leadership and the challenge to military leaders was evident in these competing outcomes and priorities – getting the primary mission accomplished while maintaining the well-being and commitment of the members in the organization, generating and maintaining internal order and cohesion, and adapting to and shaping external change.



FIGURE 2. Canadian Forces Effectiveness

However, there is a significant difference between a defence organization and a professional military institution. An accurate CF Effectiveness model also needed to reflect that the major outcomes are pursued in accordance with a definable

set of individual professional values (a professional ideology) incorporated into an institutional military ethos. To do this, the CF Effectiveness model incorporates a military ethos with a pragmatic military moral value system, a vision of duty with honour, and an informing vision of social utility to Canada and its people.

In summary, the four outcomes constitute organizational effectiveness, while the component of military ethos constitutes professional effectiveness. Integrating all five aspects, the equation is:

$$\text{Institutional / CF Effectiveness} = \text{Organizational Effectiveness} + \text{Professional Effectiveness}.$$

To this point, the focus has been the CF as an institution. This chapter has addressed institutional and leader responsibilities, aspects of organizational effectiveness, and the creation of the CF Effectiveness model. The focus now shifts to the other half of the important institution – leadership congruence, effectiveness in leaders, with its components being: CF leader issues; leader frameworks or taxonomies; the creation of the Professional Development Framework; and the successful CF applications following from that successful institution-leadership congruence.

The Leadership – The Leaders

Section 4: Canadian Forces Leader Issues

The CF is experiencing perpetual transformation. Nothing is static. The predominant constant is change. The working circumstances of all members are in a state of flux. This complexity continues to increase in the roles and responsibilities of CF leaders. With this complexity comes the need for evolving leader proficiencies and enhanced leader attributes that can ensure flexibility in leader focus and leader styles whether leading people or leading the institution. The challenges to members from change seem endless:

Change at Global Levels. For the CF, the end of the Cold War, followed by the 1990s with its substantial and sequential CF budget cuts, created new and complex leadership challenges. Peacekeeping evolved into peacemaking, conflict resolution, and outright combat in regional pop-up wars. Terrorism, homeland security, and post-9/11 regional wars have followed as the foci of the 21st century. Current CF member warfighting in Afghanistan, with fatal outcomes, reflects the most recent and tragic complexities in leadership challenges.⁸ The war between Israel and the Hezbollah in Lebanon does the same.

Leading People/Leading the Institution. Another challenge for leaders is the evolving emphasis and change, or foci, of leading people and leading the institution across the continuum of leader levels. Importantly, leading people and leading the institution are not dichotomous but in fact are two, always present, aspects of a leadership approach. The difference pertains to an increased emphasis on leading the institution as one acquires greater rank and responsibilities. The purpose and the general objectives are the same up and down the continuum, however the process evolves and the specifics of the requisite attributes change.

Leadership Focus. Another aspect of change is in “leadership focus”. The majority of CF leaders are at levels of leadership where the leading of people is the predominant leadership activity, and that activity is mission-oriented. Leadership that is military task-centred, direct and face-to-face, more transactional than transformational, is most appropriate to influence followers in situations of operations, combat, and critical responsive action. For leading the institution, where more consultative, policy development-oriented, organizationally-flattened circumstances exist, a more effective leadership focus is one for influencing subordinates or colleagues in personal-(not position)-powered, knowledge-driven change-shaping, non-urgent situations, more transformational than transactional.

Leadership Style. A profound factor for CF members experiencing the transition from junior to senior leader status, either

as officers or as senior Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), is this necessary transition of leadership style. A leader commitment is needed to the evolution of a style away from people as followers in action-oriented situations to a leader style for members and others in non-hierarchical teams, collaborative groups, consultative committees and advisory units at peer or quasi-peer levels, groups that are committed to support of institutional initiatives and progress. The most senior leader, as “boss”, no longer can be expected to have all of the answers or, possibly, even a sense of the best alternatives.

Change at Work-Site levels. At the micro end of the continuum of change stands the individual member with a unique job and set of duties. But, due to rapid change, for an individual leader, the boundaries of his/her job need to be far less than precise and permanent than in the past century. Figure 3 reflects this transformation. The evolution in leader responsibilities partly is generated by the current shift in perspectives of the work/worker interface as postmodern society evolves from the modern era, from the industrial age to the information age. The “old”, 20th century, alignment between workers and their organizations, necessary to achieve institutional effectiveness, has been distorted by change and transition.

This current transformation in job-person fit from a work-orientation to a worker-orientation is one more challenge to current leaders. Responsibilities in an increasing proportion of jobs and positions are no longer only those circumscribed by the organizational chart boxes and job descriptions, but are determined as much by an individual worker's/leader's *full backpack* of capacities, expertise, characteristics, attributes and potential. Work definitions are hybrids of the job/task responsibilities cross-pollinated with the member's leader characteristics and attributes with only generally specified worker responsibilities.

To summarize, the institution of national defence in western societies is changing rapidly. Philosophies, concepts, principles and technologies are in a state of change. Importantly, the sys-

tematic elevation of CF leaders through promotion to senior leader levels adds additional requirements for leadership change and leader competency transformation. Change creates ambiguities in leadership doctrine and leadership definitions such that the cluster of requisite leader competencies, the “right stuff”, needs to capture and contain these ambiguities.

A CURRENT CONTEXT FOR CHANGE		
	Worker-Oriented	Worker-Oriented
Era	Modern	Postmodern
Toffler Wave	Industrial	Information/ Knowledge
Theory	X, Domination	Y & Z, Reciprocal Relations
Icon	Henry Ford, Fred Taylor	Bill Gates, Steve Jobs
Org Chart	Hierarchy, Bureaucracy	Matrix, Networks, Pods
Stereotype	Brawn: Assembly Line	Brains: Hi-Tech, Degrees
Job Location	Steel Plant, Factory	Software Design Offices
Job Framework	Org Chart/ Job Description	Goals, Projects, Change
Job Info/Detail	Tasks, Time x Percentages	Knowledge, Attributes
Process/Detail	Occupational/ Job Analysis	Competencies, Skills
Leader Power	Positional, Role/Rank	Personal, Exemplar
Leadership	More Transactional	More Transformational
Military Profession	Warrior + Technician	Warrior + Technician + Scholar + Diplomat

FIGURE 3. The Work Focus/The Worker Focus

Section 5: Leader Frameworks

Some Background. To determine and to inclusively define the effective CF requisite leader elements and attributes, a valid and legitimate process for creating taxonomies or frameworks

was needed. A consortium of industrial/organizational psychologists from or affiliated with St. Mary's University, Dr. Shaun Newsome, Dr. Arla Day and others, generated a sound and useful procedure for creating context- or organization-specific leader competency frameworks.⁹ They researched the processes of leader assessment, evaluation and development, and then they identified procedural steps for identifying leader competencies. These steps included reviewing existing and context-specific information, consulting with key stakeholders, soliciting subject matter experts, validating draft competencies, and finalizing frameworks of the leader competencies.

Processes outlined by Newsome and colleagues had implications for the identification of a cluster of CF requisite leader elements that could generate institutional effectiveness. Relevant generic and military literatures on institutional effectiveness exist, covering taxonomies for leader attributes, their definitions, proficiency levels, etc. An early, simple, generic, industrial-era, three-sector taxonomy of work skills consisted of technical skills, thinking skills and interpersonal skills.¹⁰ More recently, in 2001, renowned American organizational guru Dr. Stephen Zaccaro, after extensive, applied, research on military and non-military leadership, created a complete five-cluster taxonomy of characteristics or components that he labeled Expertise and Knowledge, Cognitive Capacities and Skills, Social Capacities and Skills, Personality, and Motivation.¹¹

Zaccaro's consolidation of leader domains was a breakthrough, the importance of which, depicted in Table 1, cannot be understated. His taxonomy of only five domains covers the functional expertise and knowledge required; the "intelligence" and creative and reasoning capacities; the "people skills" of communicating, negotiating, influencing and understanding; the preference to grow and achieve and improve and change, and to influence others to do likewise; and the character dispositions of openness to ideas and experiences, to exercise initiative and confidence and assertiveness, and to be trustful and courageous and stable.

Karol Wenek¹² generated Table 1 by utilizing Zaccaro's military-based, five-component taxonomy as an anchoring framework to display five other researchers¹³ approximate equivalencies to Zaccaro's leadership taxonomy. An appropriate, context-specific, leader framework for an organization such as the CF would need to be structured as a collection of the relevant leader elements or capacities, characteristics, knowledge and expertise of its effective leaders. The CF need for such a structured framework was complicated and could involve:

- generating, at a macro level, a leader framework of institution-wide, unique but interconnected, leader elements that together would constitute a leader framework;
- at the next level, each of these elements/capacities would encapsulate a set of leader attributes that also would have institution-wide application;
- at the third, micro, level, specific competencies applicable to different sets or sub-sets of leaders in specific positions, ranks or assignments would be defined and developed. Below this micro level, sub-levels with specific sub-competencies applicable to different sub-sets of leaders also could be defined and developed; and
- a dictionary of definitions, a continuum with descriptions of proficiency levels for each competency, plus activities or behaviourally anchored indicators for each proficiency level, would supplement such a multi-layered framework.

A crucial factor here is that institutional effectiveness for the CF can be achieved only through application of the capacities of *military* leaders. The important construct that is needed, then, is a *context-specific* CF leader framework of elements and attributes that, when implemented within an effective institution, will support military applications with maximum expectations of success.

Executive Characteristics (Zaccaro, 1996)	Public Service Executive competencies (Public Service Commission, 1999)	Managerial Skills & Traits (Yukl, 1999)
<p>Cognitive Capacities & Skills Intelligence Analytical reasoning skills Synthesis & mental modeling Metacognitive skills Verbal/writing skills Creativity</p> <p>Social Capacities & Skills Social reasoning skills Behavioural flexibility Negotiating/persuasions skills Conflict-management skills</p> <p>Personality Openness Curiosity Self-discipline Flexibility Risk propensity Internal locus of control</p> <p>Motivation Need for achievement Socialized power motive Self-efficacy</p> <p>Expertise & Knowledge Knowledge of environment Functional expertise Social expertise</p>	<p>Cognitive capacity Creativity Visioning Action management Organizational awareness</p> <p>Teamwork Partnering Interpersonal relations Communication</p> <p>Stamina/stress resistance Ethics and values Stable personality Behavioural flexibility</p> <p>Self-confidence</p> <p>Domain Knowledge</p>	<p>Analytical ability Logical thinking Concept formation Judgement Problem-solving skills Creativity</p> <p>Empathy Social sensitivity Understanding of behaviour Communications skills Persuasion skills</p> <p>Openness to experience Integrity, character, courage Emotional maturity Confidence & composure Flexibility & self-monitoring High energy & stress tolerance</p> <p>Socialized power motive</p> <p>Technical proficiency</p>

TABLE 1. Approximate Equivalencies across Leadership/ Management Taxonomies

Leader Attributes (Gardner, 1990)	Leadership Competencies (Tett, et al., 2000)	Managerial Competencies (Spencer & Spencer, 1993)
<p>Intelligence & judgement Planning & setting priorities</p> <p>Skills in dealing with people Understanding of followers Capacity to motivate</p> <p>Courage, resolution Trustworthiness Confidence Dominance, assertiveness Flexibility Physical vitality & stamina</p> <p>Need to achieve Willingness to accept responsibility</p> <p>Task competence</p>	<p>Problem awareness Short-term planning Strategic planning Creative thinking Monitoring</p> <p>Motivating by authority Motivating by persuasion Team building Listening Oral communication Public presentation Developing self & others Tolerance Cultural appreciation Directing Decision delegation Co-ordinating Goal-setting</p> <p>Compassion Co-operation Sociability Politeness Political astuteness Assertiveness Seeking input Dependability Initiative Urgency Decisiveness</p> <p>Task focus</p> <p>Occupational acumen Productivity</p>	<p>Analytical Thinking : sees implications of situations : analyzes issues systematically : anticipates obstacles Conceptual Thinking : sees non-obvious patterns : notices discrepancies : rapidly identifies key issues</p> <p>Impact & Influence : uses data or information : appeals to reason or logic : uses examples Teamwork & Co-operation : improves morale, resolves conflicts : involves others, solicits input : gives credit or recognition Developing Others : gives constructive feedback : reassures after difficulties : coaches, suggests, explains : gives developmental assignments Interpersonal Understanding : knows others' attitudes & needs : reads non-verbal behaviour : understands motivation Team Leadership : communicates high standards : stands up for group, gets resources Relationship Building</p> <p>Initiative : seizes opportunities : handles crises swiftly : pushes envelope of authority : shows tenacity & persistence Self-confidence : confident in abilities & judgement : enjoys challenging tasks : questions/challenges superiors : accepts responsibility for failure Assertiveness : sets limits : sets standards, demands quality : confronts performance problems Information Seeking : gathering information systematically : curious, asks diagnostic questions</p> <p>Achievement Orientation : sets goals : measures progress & performance : improves efficiency/effectiveness</p> <p>Organizational Awareness Technical Background</p>

Toward the CF Context-Specific Framework. CFLI researchers Alan Okros, Karol Wenek and Robert Walker conceptualized a draft macro-to-micro CF leader hierarchy of leader capacities.¹⁴ It was determined, however, that for creating a CF leader taxonomy and context-specific leader structure reflective of the rapidly changing times and militarily unique professional practices, recently published research and generic literature were inadequate. The literature had not kept up with evolving leadership challenges. As examples of the shortcomings in the literature, aspects of the research preceded much of this current, explosive information era, the “learning organization” phenomena, and leadership of emphatic change on a hostile globe.

The earlier leadership research and resulting literature of the industrial era and the Cold War period that ended just over 15 years ago, had explored generic and military leadership mostly as position-based and interpersonal transactions with relatively static organizational backgrounds of situational variables – a reflection of Henry Ford’s time rather than Bill Gates’ era. Only recently has leadership been redefined for its transformational emphasis and impact on both people and institutions through a leadership of inspiration and change within a learning-organization setting. This project enhanced existing literature and research by addressing these factors.

Additionally, the generic “industrial” literature has not addressed the concept of professionalism nor dealt with profession-integrated or profession-dominated institutions such as articulated in *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. The Canadian military’s profession of arms has its own unique characteristics of expertise, responsibility and identity, characteristics that demand specific and unique leader attributes not addressed in generic taxonomies and frameworks. The internalization of the military ethos, its beliefs, values and expectations, is fundamental to a military life and career with its unlimited liability, spirit of self-sacrifice and dedication to duty in life-threatening situations and theatres, without regard to personal fear or danger. That ethos includes a fighting spirit with the moral, physical and intellectual qualities to achieve success in military operations, an

adherence to a personal and professional discipline to achieve objectives through unit cohesion and a high emphasis on teamwork that maximizes individual cooperation.

The challenge, therefore, was to develop an effective leader framework that would surpass all current frameworks as one that fully accommodated the evolving and increasingly effective leader practices needed in the CF, including the unique leader attributes of an internalized ethos and moral reasoning of a professional ideology, and learning/change capacities. Through modification and tailoring of Zaccaro's five-element taxonomy (See Table 1) created from extensive research of military and non-military leadership, and with due consideration of a number of other leader-qualities taxonomies, a CF leader framework was created.

Wenek previously articulated how the classic taxonomy of technical, cognitive and interpersonal skills had evolved into a taxonomy of five categories – moral, technical, interpersonal, cognitive, and adaptable.¹⁵ In more recent writings, Wenek grouped the elements into five general categories: knowledge and skills/expertise, cognitive abilities, social capacities, personality/adaptability, and motivation/values/professionalism.¹⁶ Zaccaro's five categories and Wenek's five-class taxonomy have strong and justified similarities. The amalgamation of requisite CF leader capacities relied heavily on these consolidations by Zaccaro and by Wenek, as well as on guidance from other sources.

The Requisite CF Leader Elements. Consolidation of the findings in the literature on requisite leader competencies, and on structuring taxonomies to best reflect the interdependent and interactive clusters of necessary leader attributes (Table 1), confirmed that effective leaders, as they acquire experience and advancement, especially require: strong cognitive/thinking capacities; flexible and articulate social/behavioural capacities; capacities to respond to and shape change in learning-organization settings; and technical expertise and institutional knowledge; all integrated with a professional ideology that supports a mastery of the profession of arms.

<p>A FRAMEWORK OF 5 LEADER ELEMENTS</p>	<p>16 ATTRIBUTES (IN BOLD) WITHIN 5 ELEMENTS ACROSS THE LEADER CONTINUUM</p> <p>The focus, scope, magnitude of Competencies for responsibilities related to the leader attributes will vary with rank, leader level, position, etc., and usually increase with time in CF, rank, seniority and credibility.</p>
<p>EXPERTISE</p>	<p>Expertise consists of Specialist (Military Occupation Classification) and Technical (clusters, e.g., combat arms, sea trades, aircrew) proficiencies, an understanding and development of the Military and Organizational environments, and the practice and eventual stewardship of the profession of arms, with the capacities to represent and transform the system through applications at the Strategic and Institutional levels.</p>
<p>COGNITIVE CAPACITIES</p>	<p>Cognitive Capacities consist of: a problem-solving, critical, Analytic, “left-brain” competence to think and rationalize with mental discipline in order to draw strong conclusions and make good decisions; plus an innovative, strategic, conceptually Creative, “right brain” capacity to find novel means, “outside the box” ends, and previously undiscovered solutions to issues and problems.</p>
<p>SOCIAL CAPACITIES</p>	<p>Social Capacities consist of a sincere and meaningful behavioural Flexibility to be all things to all people, combined with Communications skills that clarify understanding, resolve conflicts and bridge differences. These capacities are blended with Interpersonal proficiency of clarity and persuasiveness, Team relationships that create coordination, cohesion, trust and commitment, and Partnering capabilities for strategic relations building.</p>

<p style="text-align: center;">CHANGE CAPACITIES</p>	<p>Change Capacities involve Self-development, with risk and achievement, to ensure self-efficacy, Group-directed capacities to ensure unit improvement and group transformation, all with an understanding of the qualities of a CF-wide Learning Organization, applications of a learning organization philosophy, and the capacity of strategic knowledge management.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY</p>	<p>Professional Ideology consists of an acute awareness of the unique, theory-based, discretionary body of knowledge at the core of the profession with an Internalized Ethos whose values and beliefs guide the application of that knowledge. The discretionary nature of military knowledge requires keen judgement in its use and involves Moral Reasoning in thinking and acting, shaped by the military ethos. Professional Ideology underpins a leader exemplar with Credibility/Impact who displays character, openness, assertiveness and extroversion that ensures the necessary effect by and from the leader.</p>

TABLE 2. The Leader Framework – 5 Elements, 16 Attributes

Therefore, by consolidating and incorporating this supportive leadership literature into a systematic and sequential categorization process that included the context-specific dynamics of a profession of arms institution, five leader elements were identified as collectively constituting a CF leader framework – *Expertise, Cognitive Capacities, Social Capacities, Change Capacities*, and *Professional Ideology*.

Brief descriptions of the leader elements and their attributes are provided at Table 2. A total of 16 attributes required of all CF leaders are nested within these five elements. Each attribute in turn would consist of a collated grouping of position-

level-, and role-specific competencies which are not yet identified. They would, however, be in line with human resources systems needs, i.e., performance assessment, succession planning, promotion, etc.

Important to this leader framework development were some practicalities – for the framework of leader elements and attributes to be sufficiently extensive as to be thorough and useful, but not to be so complex as to be incomprehensible and useless in its application. The 16 leader attributes within the taxonomy of 5 leader elements have been constructed accordingly, so as to constitute the *minimum, finite but sufficient* number of such leader components for all military members engaged as leaders, regardless of level, rank, role, goals or responsibilities. The framework design is based on the understanding that the 5 elements and 16 attributes will support competency profiling for the primary leader roles and all other leader roles subsequently determined.

The 16 attributes represent the *fundamentally necessary, but not necessarily sufficiently specific*, detail for all leadership. These attributes also reflect the “chronology” of some of the elements. For example, Expertise evolves through a career from technical/specialty finesses to a comprehension of military/organizational wherewithal, and on to a sophistication with experience and seniority of strategic and institutional leader roles and responsibilities. In contrast, Professional Ideology needs to be “front-end loaded” as new CF members are introduced abruptly to military norms and expectations of behaviour, of values, of respect and commitment, integrated with technical skills training, all as a foundation for worth and professionalism.

The inter-relationship of the five leader elements are best depicted as an assembly of joined puzzle pieces in a schematic that visually represents the interconnectedness and interdependency of the leader elements. Only collectively would the elements make effective leadership possible. Figure 4 reflects that inter-relationship.




FIGURE 4. A Leader Framework: 5 Leader Elements – 16 Leader Attributes

Readers familiar with leader-element taxonomies will recognize the motivational, concise, three-element framework used by the American military: “Be, Know, Do”. This “motto” reflects the crucial components of dedicated leadership at all levels for the US forces. As one template for comparison, it dovetails appropriately with the CF leader elements. Figure 5 (page 42) represents that comparison.

Section 6: The Professional Development Framework

The Professional Development Framework (Figure 6), with a “quartering” of the continuum of leader levels – junior, intermediate, advanced and senior levels – undertaken for explanatory purposes, represents the full template for identifying, defining, and professionally enhancing the leader elements. Figure 6, however, even with a hypothetical progressive professional/leader development process stretched across

its frame, is but a skeletal schematic of the leader elements and leader levels of the Professional Development Framework. Table 3 provides substantially more information.



 USA	 CANADA
BE	To <u>be</u> and to function as professionals through PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY
KNOW	To <u>know</u> how to analyze and to create through COGNITIVE CAPACITIES.
	To <u>know</u> how to relate and to explain through SOCIAL CAPACITIES.
	To <u>know</u> how to evolve and to shape change through CHANGE CAPACITIES.
DO	To <u>do</u> specialist, technical, military, organizational, strategic and institutional EXPERTISE.

FIGURE 5. American and Canadian Military Terminology: Leadership

Table 3 reflects that development at the more expansive leader levels – advanced and senior – is founded on development at the less expansive leader levels – junior and intermediate. Additionally, the foci reflect the transition in leadership from a predominantly leading-the-people emphasis at junior

and intermediate levels, to a predominantly leading-the-institution commitment at advanced and senior levels.

The content of Table 3 is even more readily comprehended when supplemented by additional descriptive material in this chapter. This text contains several examples and related information relevant to leadership that were extracted from the reports and initiatives of other nations' militaries, and that are crucial as components for a CF Professional Development Framework.

	Expertise	Cognitive Capacities	Social Capacities	Change Capacities	Professional Ideology
<i>Senior</i>	Strategic	Creative Abstract	Inter-Institutional	Paradigm Shifting	Stewardship
<i>Advanced</i>	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
<i>Intermediate</i>	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
<i>Junior</i>	Tactical	Analytical	Inter-Personal	Open	Internalize

FIGURE 6. The Professional Development Framework

Expertise has a natural chronology. Early careers are spent with a training focus on military occupational specialties of technical knowledge and expertise. Such specialties are clustered into navy, army and airforce groups such as sea trades, combat arms, or aircrew. With increased leader responsibilities, the relevant expertise must expand into strong military and organizational knowledge, education and information. At advanced and senior leader levels, the expertise is all about strategic wherewithal and institutional wisdom necessary for functioning in a global, multinational security environment while concurrently understanding the machinations of government, political parties, other government departments, as well as the differences between the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

At these top leader levels, for example, Expertise predominantly consists of the capacities to transform the system through institutional and strategic activities. Knowledge is continually acquired through advanced-level courses at national and international institutions, complex self-development and slow-growth, but crucial career experiences. Senior leader expertise would generate consequences such as the necessary operational capacity being met through resource allocation or force structuring, mastery of civil-military relations, and CF-wide transformation oversight. Such Expertise, being knowledge-based, needs to be integrated with cognitive, social and change capacities, and a professional ideology, in order to ensure its effective utilization.

Cognitive Capacities, consisting predominantly of analytical and creative attributes, would require exceptional abilities to analyze, create, diagnose and envision, especially at the most senior leader level. In one relevant study, Australian Eric Stevenson, while examining conceptual complexity capacities across leader levels, researched the differences in mental models, sometimes called cognitive maps, frameworks or mental constructs, between transformational and transactional leaders across the Australian Defence Force “trainee, middle and senior” officer levels.¹⁷

Stevenson proposed that mental models were constructed differently, in terms of structure and sophistication of ideas, between effective and less effective leaders. His study established a significant and positive correlation between effective military officers and well-structured mental models. The content of the mental models differed between transformational and transactional leaders.

Social Capacities for effective leaders include behavioural flexibility and strong communication skills needed at interpersonal, team, and organizational/institutional levels, levels which in themselves represent a continuum of increasing complexity. Factors that contribute even more to this increasing complexity are CF engagements in volatile national and international arenas, with multicultural participants, non-military partners, CF members with well-being concerns versus unlimited-liability

responsibilities, and culturally diverse civilian partners as well as CF recruits. Leaders need the social capacities to be flexible in their leader roles, always with authenticity and sincerity. That flexibility in roles would allow differentiation needed to work with different groups, cultures, nationalities, but that flexibility also must be sufficiently consistent so that a syndrome of imposture or deception is not perceived in error.

An example of current research on social capacities was conducted by American researchers Michael Mumford and colleagues.¹⁸ They studied social skills and cognitive skills over six grade-levels of US military officers in order to create an organization-based model of skill development. They established that it was insufficient for leaders to just solve ill-defined and complex organizational problems. Leaders required as well, the social capacities to formulate solutions in complex organizational environments that were workable in accordance with the multiple constituencies represented by diverse people. They coined the term “complex organizational wisdom” for the social capacities that could be developed through mentoring by senior leaders, novel assignments, solving problems requiring the respondent’s autonomy, risk-taking, sequential and updated environmental assessments, and long-term solutions for the multiple subsystems.

Change Capacities for leaders include the first step of self-development to ensure self-efficacy, non-risk-aversion and experimentation, even before any leader takes initiatives to transform and improve a team or unit, or to attempt learning-organization applications at organizational and institutional levels. A cluster of West Point-affiliated leadership experts, George Forsythe, Paul Bartone and others¹⁹ utilized Robert Kegan’s²⁰ theory of identity development to study how much officers understood who they were as military professionals. They explored the way that officers think across junior to senior levels, how they “make meaning”, particularly with respect to the American “Be, Know, Do” framework for leader development, and how they evolve from single perspectives at young ages, to multiple perspectives with maturity, on to simultaneous multiple perspectives and, at the fourth Kegan stage, to have constructed a personal perspective on

		EXPERTISE TACTICAL TO STRATEGIC
LEADER LEVEL	SENIOR	<p>Security Expertise</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scope and content moves from knowledge to expertise with accompanying expansion to a strategic understanding of the domain of security. • Shift from knowledge to expertise requires ability to apply the philosophy and principles that govern the generation and employment of military capacities (knowledge + philosophy = expertise) and strategic, institutional co-existence among peer ministries, foreign defence agencies. • Expertise at this stage clearly is dependent upon the complementary development in Professional Ideology, a full understanding of the Profession of Arms.
	ADVANCED	<p>Defence Knowledge</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From information to knowledge, incorporating a broad understanding of CF and defence as a key component of security and government functions. • Shift from information to knowledge requires additional perspective of understanding the rationale and purpose of intended actions; the generalized outcomes, which are to be achieved (information + purpose = knowledge).
	INTERMEDIATE	<p>Military Information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How MOC contributes to larger formation capabilities. • Understanding not only what to do but the context in which this occurs (data + context = information) • Examples: Effects-Based Operations, context of incremental information on democratic systems, international law, civil control of military.
	JUNIOR	<p>Technical & Tactical Procedures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learning standard Military Occupation Classification (MOC) and sea/land/air procedures. • For initial leader roles, acquiring an overview of such standards and procedures, small group tactics.

TABLE 3. The Professional Development Framework

		COGNITIVE CAPACITIES ANALYTIC TO CREATIVE/ABSTRACT
LEADER LEVEL	SENIOR	<p>Knowledge Creation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Able to generate, organize and manage the theory-based body of knowledge applied across the profession. • This goes beyond the analytic, creative and judgement capacities needed to adapt the profession to the external environment, and expands to include the obligation to update and extend the profession's unique body of knowledge to ensure that the profession is discharging all of its responsibilities to society in the most effective manner. • Strong parallel to cognitive capacities at advanced academic post-graduate levels – masters the particular academic discipline but also generated new knowledge.
	ADVANCED	<p>Mental Models</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inductive and deductive reasoning skills to create, adapt and generalize knowledge both from one's own previous learning & experiences as well as other domains such as professional literatures. • Conducts abstract reasoning and draws on appropriate professional orientation to be able to understand desired outcomes. • Aware of assumptions embedded in the 'military' way of framing issues, testing working hypotheses, operating within the academic discipline of 'military thinking'.
	INTERMEDIATE	<p>Theories & Concepts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Able to reason, moving from the concrete to the abstract, from procedures and rules to principles.
	JUNIOR	<p>Theorems, Practical Rules</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reasoning at this level is intended to identify the appropriate task procedures using simple theorems, practical rules or established scientific principles/laws. • Interacting, interconnected with Expertise, the two elements represent a 'cookbook' approach to problem solving and task accomplishment with limited capacity for innovation.

		SOCIAL CAPACITIES INTERPERSONAL TO INTER-INSTITUTIONAL
LEADER LEVEL	SENIOR	<p>Strategic-Relations Building</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relations to the concept of Leading the Institution, relies on secondary and tertiary influence processes for the senior leader to communicate institutional priorities and strategic intent across organizational systems. • Builds open teams such that immediate subordinates can contribute novel ideas and can critique taken-for-granted assumptions. • Externally focused capacities pertain to building and maintaining strategic relations with others engaged in the broad security arena and related national/governmental initiatives.
	ADVANCED	<p>Group Cohesiveness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At this level of larger or multiple unite/team/groups, is involved in aspects of Leading the Institution, applies broad influence processes to ensure internal cohesion, fostering commitment and supporting subordinate leaders while also engaging in effective boundary spanning activities especially in joint or multi-national operations.
	INTERMEDIATE	<p>Individual Persuasion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social skills for Leading People, particularly the abilities to effectively influence others 'one-to-one' or small-group, using some range of influence behaviours appropriate to the characteristics of the situation, the followers and the individual leader.
	JUNIOR	<p>Team-Oriented Followership</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aware of group norms, minimum leader style flexibility. • Moderate communication capabilities applied through baseline interpersonal skills reflecting an awareness of basic influence factors, group diversity issues and non-prejudicial self-behaviour.

		CHANGE CAPACITIES OPENNESS TO PARADIGM SHIFTING
LEADER LEVEL	SENIOR	<p>Multi-Institutional Partnering</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus is external, on changing others' understanding of the military as a strategic political capacity, and internally on implementing internal change initiatives. • In this latter regard, there is an emphasis on the initial stages of anticipating change, effectively contributing to the change, and monitoring and adjusting initiatives over the change period. • Senior leader initiatives exist to transform and improve a team or multiple units, or to attempt learning-organization applications at organizational and institutional levels.
	ADVANCED	<p>Group Transformation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Able to adapt and align groups or sub-systems to the broadest requirements of the institution while ensuring the tactical proficiency and effective integration of individuals and small teams/sections within the larger formation.
	INTERMEDIATE	<p>Self-Efficacy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacities at this stage are focused on the individual's abilities to monitor self-efficacy, engage in self-reflection, make early commitments to self-development, and adapt one's behaviours to the social environment/context in which one is functioning.
	JUNIOR	<p>External Awareness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimal expectation in change capacities would be a generalized orientation and awareness of changes occurring external to the CF, and the CF transformational efforts, as means of signalling the importance of practicing openness to externally-driven change.

		PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY INTERNALIZING TO STEWARDSHIP
LEADER LEVEL	SENIOR	<p>Stewardship of the Profession</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Core capacities are related to managing collective professional identity – the key issue of articulating what the profession is, what it stands for and what it believes in. • Able to engage in very abstract reasoning, exemplifies at the highest stages of moral/identity development, in particular, the capacity for independent judgement of the profession’s core philosophy, ideology and principles. • This capacity is integrated with acquisition of related capabilities in Cognitive and Change Capacities.
	ADVANCED	<p>Cultural Alignment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guides framing of problems, interactions with others, to apply leader influence to shape or align the extant culture to be consistent with the ethos. • Contains some of the most complex challenges in achieving competing Institutional Effectiveness objectives – mission success versus member well-being; internal synchrony and stability versus external adaptability and experimentation.
	INTERMEDIATE	<p>Self-Regulation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts basic self-regulation, avoiding obvious ethical violations and not displaying behaviours which erode the reputation, image or credibility of the profession; essentially a journeyman stage of professionalization. • Abides by the principles of the Defence Ethics Program. • Capable of serving as an example.
	JUNIOR	<p>Normative Compliance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understands the concepts and practices of the profession of arms at an introductory level. At a minimum practices military group norms, adheres to discipline demands. • As an <i>ab initio</i> professional (apprentice), looks externally (to supervisors or codes of conduct) for guidance as to the appropriate behaviours in specific circumstances. Internalizes values minimally.

relationships and societal ideals. They observed that this fourth stage of Kegan's Identity Development scale (a self-authored system of values; personal perspective on relationships and societal ideals; independence from the existing institution) may be required to truly lead a profession, as opposed to being just a member imbedded within it.

Professional Ideology occupies a privileged position in the Professional Development Framework. The other four elements of the Framework – Expertise, Cognitive Capacities, Social Capacities, Change Capacities – are present in most effective organizations. Only when these elements are shaped by a Professional Ideology (depicted in Figure 6 as concentric rings, like an old-fashioned sonar burst) do all five elements coalesce into a collective, interdependent, “Rubik's Cube” of effective leader elements needed for achieving complete institutional effectiveness.

Significantly, Professional Ideology claims a unique, discretionary, theory-based body of military knowledge authoritative in a functional and cognitive sense, along with a military ethos that guides and adjudicates how that knowledge is used. The theory-based knowledge consists of the General System of War and Conflict comprising policy, strategy, operational art and tactics. The military ethos consists of three components: Beliefs and Expectations about Military Service; Fundamental Canadian Values; and the Core Military Values, as articulated in *Duty with Honour*. Professional Ideology demands doing good work over self-interest, and effectiveness over efficiency. A professional ideology stands in contrast to a bureaucratic ideology with its “ethos” of managerialism and a market ideology with its “ethos” of entrepreneurialism.

The Outcomes – The Successes

Section 7: Applications and Feedback

Referring once more to Figure 1, the confluence within the flowchart of the institution, as depicted by the CF

Effectiveness model, and the CF leadership as depicted by the Professional Development Framework, has generated the institution-leadership congruence required and pursued for successful CF Applications. With leadership becoming increasingly complex as the 21st century progresses, effective CF leadership requires strong and diverse capacities and attributes. The relevance of the Professional Development Framework to generate these capacities and, therefore, to ensure the institutional effectiveness of the CF, is best exemplified through real-time and current applications.

To demonstrate that the Professional Development Framework is relevant and applicable at all levels of the institution and the leadership, six current CF Applications, consisting of micro through macro examples, are described in detail, below:

- The applicability of 360° assessment feedback to individual leader development;
- The senior CF leaders' contingent's professional development needs and challenges;
- Effective professional development methodologies and learning strategies;
- Review and reform in the CF's current human resources/personnel systems;
- Evolving operational leader challenges in warfighting, while nation building;
- CF Transformation, six Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Principles, and the Professional Development Framework.

360° Assessment Feedback. The argument is that institutional effectiveness for an organization can be attained if the requisite leader capacities necessary for institutional effectiveness are present and applied. Leader capacities do benefit from professional development, of which one methodology is self-development.

(Self-development is a foundational attribute of the Change Capacities element of the Professional Development Framework.) One outcome of self-development is self-awareness, and one means for acquiring self-awareness is valid feedback from a variety of “stakeholders”, of professional colleagues, which in the CF would be superiors, peers, subordinates and other working colleagues inside and outside the CF. One effective means for acquiring valid feedback on leader behaviours, strengths and shortcomings, is a well-designed and well-conducted multi-rater 360° feedback process with professional debriefs and appropriate follow-up, support, and guidelines for personal/professional development.

As an example, the Canadian Forces College (CFC) has utilized self-report assessment processes with senior officers to enhance their self-awareness and focus on personal development. In 2003, CFC expanded student assessment processes to include the completion of 360° assessment feedback inventories and provision of developmental feedback. The procedures became a course requirement for officers attending the annual Command and Staff Course (CSC).²¹ A context-specific 360° feedback instrument, adequately encapsulating the Professional Development Framework’s five leader elements, was specifically designed for the CSC mid-level leaders.

Senior Leader Professional Development. The professional development needs of senior leaders were identified through a substantial research effort, including a thorough analysis of the suite of 2020 CF documents, other military sources, and the generic leadership literature. Recent interviews by CFLI with senior officers and NCOs underscored the need for ongoing development,²² but also revealed unique challenges for senior leader professional development.²³ Contrasted with valid and well-founded needs articulated by senior military members for increased breadth, depth and time for senior leader development was the absence of availability and time among these same senior leaders. Any learning initiative, therefore, needed to be convenient and succinct, with no time wasted and limited time “lost” at the office. Solutions

would exist only through selection of the most beneficial subject matter and the most appropriate learning strategies.

Not surprisingly, the areas for professional development for senior officers identified by CF senior officers fit appropriately into the Professional Development Framework. As examples, for advanced and senior leaders focusing on institutional leadership, increased emphasis on adult-learning strategies would be most appropriate to develop top-level leader elements in the Professional Development Framework. Examples are professional Expertise related to institutional and strategic capabilities (e.g., understanding and influencing “how Ottawa works”), Cognitive Capacities (e.g., complex organizational wisdom, innovative thinking), Social Capacities (e.g., leader flexibility, effective communication when partnering with international organizations), Change Capacities (e.g., learning-organization information-sharing applicable to simultaneous warfighting and nation building), and Professional Ideology (e.g., proactively, beyond osmosis, becoming exemplars, custodians, stewards of the profession, using moral/ethical reasoning, balancing autonomous thinking with conformity to team norms and membership, etc.). Subject matter that would pull together these learning foci could include: Stewarding the Profession, “Understanding Ottawa” and “Working the Town”, Visioning, Leading & Implementing Change, Being a Strategic Leader, Integrating the Major Internal Systems, Advancing Member Well-Being & Commitment, or Creating the Effective Institutional and Strategic Leader.

With extensive senior service and significant experience also comes the need for professional development to establish a deeper, inculcated and complex Professional Ideology. This Professional Ideology, having been important from the outset of a military career, needs to be expanded and continued throughout that military career in line with the increasingly more senior responsibility for institutional and strategic roles.

Professional Development Strategies for Leader Capacities. Until recent years, through the industrial era and until the end of the Cold War, leadership research and leadership development had focused almost exclusively on generally circumscribed and static leader-situation-follower scenarios. The pedagogical approach – teacher-centred information dissemination – for the professional development of these leadership circumstances reflected this restrictive focus.

With a more complex world has come a more complex perspective, one with great expectations for senior leaders to manage and shape perpetual change in a professional manner. The need is for dynamic solutions through leading that change, leading the institution, and influencing the external environment. As Figure 3 indicated, the transition from the industrial to the information eras has included a worksite transformation from a work orientation to a worker/leader orientation, this being one major cause behind that expectation for dynamic solutions. These are the circumstances of the new information era, for which expanded and effective CF leader development strategies and methodologies are crucial.

To address the challenges of successful strategic leadership by senior institutional CF leaders, this current and urgent need for improved learning strategies and methods exists to support the acquisition by CF leaders of superior leader capacities. With leadership having been described as a taxonomy of clusters of interconnected requisite capacities, the enhancement of leadership as an institutional requirement is best addressed through a variety of leader developmental methodologies. Proven “best practices” for learning systems and strategies are needed now.

CF Human Resources Systems Reform. The importance of reform of CF HR systems was addressed extensively in Chapter 7, “Ensuring Effective Succession of Institutional Leaders”, of *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*. The subject will be reviewed briefly here in relationship to the relevant application of the Professional Development Framework.

Senior leaders are policy overseers, strategic decision-makers and executive communicators, utilizing their sophisticated awareness of human capacities and human resources (HR) systems to ensure that these systems are current and effective. Examples of such systems are the recruiting/selection system, performance appraisal and promotion, HR management and career management, and succession planning.²⁴ The Professional Development Framework, as the instrument for categorizing the requisite human/leader capacities, can act as a conceptual foundation for reviewing and restructuring current HR policies, programs and procedures, hence the Framework is important to leaders of the institution. Applying this framework of capacities to the different HR programs and procedures would improve them and increase their relevance.²⁵ Some of the broader HR policy implications can be:

- Recruiting and Selection. The existing CF entry-level recruiting and selection model is based primarily on identifying those most likely to complete initial technical training, using previous academic performance and general learning ability, as well as previous “reliability” behaviours to screen out those unlikely to adapt successfully to military training and lifestyles. The Professional Development Framework supports a more comprehensive model for recruiting and selection through incorporating, and assessing, moral reasoning, identity development, balancing autonomous thinking with conformity, and assessing the propensity to inculcate a professional ideology.
- Performance Appraisal & Promotion. Performance appraisal, when used for promotion decisions, is simply another selection process applied to the eligible internal population of contenders. The Professional Development Framework provides a broader conceptual basis to identify significant and meaningful discontinuities in capacities from one rank to the next or one leader level to the next.

- Career Management. The Professional Development Framework is applicable in circumstances demanding significantly different leader attributes and capacities, such as situations with competing institutional outcomes, e.g., mission success versus member well-being, and internal organizational stability versus shaping change to ensure external adaptability. Career management systems would need senior members and administrators capable of identifying and discriminating among the crucial qualities and capacities of senior leaders. (As stated elsewhere, think cool Colin Powell versus Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf, Gulf War I, 1990s! Think, too, of the dynamics of leadership, if these two individuals had, instead, the responsibilities of each other's positions!)
- Succession Planning. An integrated "leading the institution" philosophy is mandatory in the effective coordination of any organization's succession planning requirements. Only with complete development of upcoming successors in the leader domains identified in the Professional Development Framework can an HR succession planning system work. That system must ensure that the very best institutional leaders will inherit the responsibilities to effectively transform the CF and lead it further into the 21st century.

Effective leadership, as captured in the Professional Development Framework, is possible through the presence of current, interconnected, requisite expertise and capacities. The leader's professional ideology, being far more than a sense of right-mindedness and a list of positive attributes, will pervade leader expertise and the cognitive, social and change capacities. Ensuring that the right members are in the right positions at the right levels with the right responsibilities is achievable and implementable through modernized and flexible HR processes that incorporate the Professional Development Framework.

Operational Leader Challenges While Nation Building. As stated in Section 4, Canadian Forces Leader Issues, current CF

member deployments in Afghanistan reflect the most recent and tragic complexities in leadership challenges. CFLI's Director, Colonel Bernd Horn²⁶, through research in Afghanistan, identified unique tactical, operational and strategic leadership challenges evolving from the singular characteristics of leading soldiers in an Afghan version of the "three block war" – warfighting, conflict resolution, and nation building through humanitarian endeavours. Horn described:

- tactical level leadership as requiring a mix of the maintaining of a fighting spirit and a sustained morale, facing the realities of fleeting and deadly attacks unable to be proactively anticipated, sustaining a healthy outlook among soldiers toward the general population while difficulty exists to breach the cultural barriers, and overseeing action-oriented tactical leadership while also continually improving upon working relationships with the host nation's forces and citizens;
- at the operational level of leadership, the challenge begins with generating a comprehensive understanding by all members of the nature of fourth generation warfare (which Horn defines as a nonlinear, asymmetric approach to war in which agility, decentralization and initiative are instrumental to success) and, specifically, the nature of the insurgency that grips Afghanistan, complicated by the reality that the resolution of political and economic issues being far more critical to success than purely military action; and
- the achievement of strategic goals only through the vehicle of an effective campaign plan that in itself is a difficult balancing act requiring agile thinking, flexible conduct, distributed leadership and decentralized initiatives, and with a culture among military members/followers of similar adaptability, agility of thought, and timely decision-making, all in an ambiguous, complex and lethal environment. Simultaneously, strategic leaders must ensure national support from a

Canadian public, maintain a sustained war effort without alienating taxpayers nor losing their support as casualties increase, and adopting the 3D diplomacy-development-defence approach at a national level.

Afghanistan represents the volatile, unpredictable, complex and multi-layered challenges of an ambiguous operational theatre for CF leaders at all levels. These challenges demand truth, duty and valour in its individual leaders leading people, and tenacity, decisiveness and versatility in its leader corps leading the CF institution. These challenges demand highly developed leader capacities as represented in the Professional Development Framework – newfound expertise for a 3D theatre, cognitive capacities that respond to the flexible and immediate demands for decision-making, flexible social capacities to communicate this complexity to the fighting forces and to respond with alacrity to the cultural, political and diplomatic requirements of the job, and a professionalism of character and morality that reflects Canadian and CF values. Once again, this Framework has substantial relevance to institutional effectiveness for the CF, in this case in a foreign operational warfighting arena demanding exceptional tactical, operational and strategic leadership.

CF Transformation, CDS Principles and the Professional Development Framework. The Professional Development Framework was designed for applicability across the micro-to-macro CF circumstances of leadership. At the macro, institution-wide, level, the Framework has substantial applicability for the current CF Transformation (2005 and on)²⁷ in which the CDS' vision includes changing the way the CF is structured and equipped, and its members trained and educated to execute military missions.

At the heart of this vision is a new focus on Canada as an operational theatre like any other operational theatre, organized and commanded by one joint force commander as opposed to a number of command arrangements from previous historical developments. Within this strategic context, the CDS has identified six key principles applicable to the transformation efforts

and to guide the success of this mission of transformation.²⁸ These principles will guide the reshaping and renewal of CF culture and will create a shared ethos fundamental to a CF that is relevant, responsive and effective in an increasingly unstable and complex strategic environment. Not surprisingly, recently created CF professional and leadership doctrine in CF manuals *Duty with Honour* and *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* fully supports this new agenda. In addition, the Professional Development Framework substantiates a system of professional development to meet the CF professionalism and leadership requirements for this CF transformation to ensure mission success in an ever-changing and deadly battlespace.

The six principles identified by the CDS are:

- Canadian Forces Identity. The first loyalty is to Canada. Service personnel must look beyond their environments and unit affiliations to identify with the CF “wholistically” and to serve Canada with commitment.
- Command Centric Imperative. To establish a distinct and unambiguous chain of command that integrates strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making throughout the CF, and clearly separates line and staff functions.
- Authorities, Responsibilities, and Accountabilities. Commanders receive a clear articulation of their assigned authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities. In turn, they can provide equal clarity in their guidance to subordinate commanders.
- Operational Focus. Operations and operational support has primacy over all other activities within the CF, particularly at the strategic level where departmental, corporate and CF priorities intersect.
- Mission Command. In essence, mission command articulates the dynamic and decentralized execution of CF operations, guided by a clear articulation and

understanding of the overriding commander's intent. Permits discretionary powers within the commander's intent at the lowest levels in the battlespace.

- An Integrated Regular, Reserve and Civilian CF. Encourages a more integrated effort where CF structures are closely interconnected and interdependent, to ensure the best utilization of appropriate skills and experiences at every level.

CF leaders can accomplish these ambitious plans for transformation through leadership effectiveness and its development as identified in the Professional Development Framework. The Framework fully supports the transformation principles by substantiating initiatives that include broadly based leader development to address the technical expertise and military developments that require cognitive capacities such as accelerated decision-making, more innovative initiatives, and coordinated but individualistic creativity highly valued across the spectrum of operations. Distributed leadership doctrine and the social capacities of leaders to ensure such leadership will improve the probabilities that every member will accept responsibility for the mission and the effectiveness of the team, the unit, multi-units and, ultimately, the CF. The change capacities in the Professional Development Framework are crucial to timely and effective responses to volatile current battlespaces and to shaping change in order to generate more favourable circumstances in future battle sites and support networks.

Feedback. Section 7, Applications and Feedback, identified six successful outcomes following from the effective congruence of the CF as an institution with its leadership. These applications are successful examples of the model and structure of Institutional/CF Effectiveness on one side of the Congruence equation, and effective leadership represented by the Professional Development Framework on the other side of the Congruence equation (Figure 1). The six applications ranged from micro to macro examples – individual 360° feedback, senior leaders' professional development, learning strategies and methodologies, human resources systems reform, battlespace leader challenges, and CF transformation.

Feedback is crucial to the perpetual improvement of transformations, CF missions, operating systems, unit or team capacities, or individual capabilities. Accordingly, the schematic described at Figure 1 includes feedback loops that follow from the Applications and influence the other components of the flow chart. The CF will be in a state of perpetual flux, regardless of current or future transformation initiatives, due to its need for survival through its external adaptability, its successful fine-tuning and internal integration of its components, its investment in its members' well-being and commitment, and its life-or-death investment in the success of its missions.

Summary

Effectiveness for any institution has the potential to be achieved if certain specifics are addressed. The roles and responsibilities of the leaders of an institution need to be articulated. The leader capacities necessary to achieve those roles and responsibilities need to be identified. For the CF as an institution, those capacities have been integrated into a construct of leader elements and leader attributes. Further, these leader capacities have been stretched over a continuum of leader levels, from junior to senior, to reflect the evolution of such capacities with evolving responsibilities.

The Professional Development Framework consists of a table of 5x4 cells representing the five leader elements over four leader levels. When, in addition, the most effective learning strategies for these elements and levels are integrated and utilized, the Framework becomes a comprehensive model for expanding the depth and breadth of leadership, professionalism and leader development. The Professional Development Framework supports a shift from a pedagogical sufficiency ("pass") model of development to a mastery ("excel") model of performance, human resourcing, professionalism and leadership. This shift supports the identification of the professionally developed military leaders with the highest potential, rather than simply those military members fundamentally suited for their next appointments.

The overriding and continuous theme for the CF is *Transformation*. This transformation needs to be, must be, accomplished by a focus on its people – members in the CF professionally enhanced in their leader capacities sufficiently to master all of the challenges of the 21st century.

The Professional Development Framework is a crucial linchpin for this overall effort.

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- 25 Alan Okros, "Applying the CFLI Leader Framework", (Kingston, ON: Royal Military College, Department of Military Psychology and Leadership, 2004). Unpublished Paper. Dr. Okros' ideas are paraphrased here with his permission.
- 26 Horn, "Outside the Wire".
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- 28 CFLI is initiating the production of a book, *Inside CF Transformation 2005-2007*, for publication in 2007. It will be a historical review of the restructuring of the CF. This case study, in addition to providing a general, historical overview of institutional development and change, can serve as an instrument of professional leader development through dynamic learning simulations, future after-action reviews, and "lessons learned" syndicate exercises in the CF. This publication also can serve private industry and government departments as they engage in comparisons of institutions undergoing transformations.
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CHAPTER 3

Leadership in the Dutch Armed Forces*

*A.L.W. Vogelaar, Lieutenant-Colonel C.E. van den Berg
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Introduction

During the Cold War, the defence and protection of national and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) territory was central in the Dutch concept of military operations. In hindsight, this period can be characterized as relatively stable. At the end of the Cold War, however, the situation became more complex and dynamic and the Dutch Armed Forces (DAF) had to reorient themselves on their mission, their task, and their leadership. Since then, the DAF have become more clearly an instrument that supports the strategic interests of the Dutch society as a whole. The three tasks of the DAF as set by the Dutch government are: the protection of the integrity of national and NATO territory, including the Dutch Antilles and Aruba; promotion of international legal order and stability; and, support of civil authorities in their maintenance of law and order, disaster management, and humanitarian aid, both in the Netherlands and abroad.¹ These tasks, which are claimed to be of equal importance, have to be performed in a fast-changing security environment and in a globalizing international community.

The most profound challenges in this perspective, as identified by the DAF, include: changes in the security environment as most clearly exemplified by the changed worldview since 11 September 2001, strategic changes in a world with quickly developing economies like the BRIC-countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), new developments in the production and distribution of weapons of mass destruction, and ongoing conflicts

* The views that are expressed in this paper are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Ministry of Defence.

which cause the mass movement of people. These are some of the international challenges for which the DAF have to be prepared. In addition, a number of events within the Netherlands (such as the murders of the famous politician Fortuyn and controversial filmmaker Van Gogh by a young Muslim terrorist), have enlarged the scope for the Armed Forces.

Other challenges also require attention. For example, it is recognized that the DAF cannot perform all the possible tasks that the strategic environment demands. As such, the DAF is organized to work in coalitions and has started the process of cooperation between the different services within the DAF (joint cooperation) and with the armed forces of NATO, the European Union (EU), and Partnership for Peace (PfP)-countries (combined). Furthermore, since the DAF have transformed from a conscript force to an all-volunteer force, public opinion about service life is high on the priority list of senior military leaders. Finally, technological developments, which have large financial consequences and possible operational and tactical consequences that are difficult to foresee, demand timely decisions. A recent example of such a decision process is the replacement of the F-16 fighter plane by the Joint Strike Fighter.

Military strategic leadership should deal with the above topics. Strategic leadership refers to the way leaders link ends, ways, and means to deal with the environmental challenges. Thus, the essence of strategic leadership is to determine the ends, choose the best ways, and apply the most effective means. As the strategy is the plan, strategic leadership implies the thinking and decision-making required to develop and execute the plan. One must then question what is expected of these leaders. In the *US-Army Field Manual* strategic leadership has been defined as:

“To start with, strategic leaders apply the core leader competencies, while further adapting them to the more complex realities of the strategic environment. While leaders at the operational level have a more near- and midterm focus, strategic leaders must con-

centrate on the future. They have to develop a clear vision, position their organization for long-term success. Next to that, just forming a vision is pointless unless the strategic leader shares his vision and gains widespread support for it. They have to persist in pursuing goals and objectives to realize their vision. Achieving commitment for this is by far more effective than forced compliance. As the strategic leaders represent their organization, they have to achieve commitment from their soldiers, civilians, other organizations, public officials and the media. Communicating effectively with these different groups is vital for success.”²

The above description indicates that strategic leaders function at the top of the organization. For several reasons, however, it could be said that strategic leadership is necessary not only at the top but also at other levels in the organization. Senior leaders are recruited from within the organization (as will be explained later); therefore, they should have the potential to exhibit strategic leadership. Nevertheless, it is important that mid-level and junior leaders realize the possible strategic implications of their decisions. That strategic leadership is not the exclusive domain of brigadier-generals and higher officers is also emphasized within military centres for leadership: “General officers clearly need such skills, but company commanders and field grade officers must also be aware of the strategic implications of their actions in a complex Contemporary Operational Environment”.³

In this chapter, we describe the way the Dutch military develops leaders at all hierarchical levels. For clarity, it should be noted that the DAF has developed extensive policy on command and leadership in general, yet there is only a recent focus on the competencies of senior leaders for selection and management development purposes. The development of senior leaders in the DAF is the result of the integrated general view on leadership and the performance of officers in different positions. In this chapter, we first describe a number of background topics that are important for the way the Dutch armed forces

think about military leadership: i.e. doctrine and military power. Second, military command will be described. Third, we explain the philosophy of leadership and the way military leaders are developed. Finally, we go deeper into the topic of Human Resource Management (HRM) and strategic leadership.

Military Doctrine of the Dutch Armed Forces

As stated in the introduction, strategic leadership is based on the way leaders determine their ends, choose the best ways to meet those ends, and apply the most effective means. This implies a way of thinking that has been defined as military thinking. The basics for military thinking have been stated in the DAF doctrine series. In the 1990s, all DAF services started to develop their own doctrines. The Army based their doctrine publications⁴ on the most recent NATO-doctrines and on those of their most important allies (United Kingdom and Germany). The Air Force published the first version of their doctrine in 1996.⁵ The Navy concentrated on the development of maritime doctrines, tactics, and procedures in a NATO-context.⁶ After the turn of the century, however, it was felt that a more joint approach was needed. Therefore, in 2005, the Dutch Defence Doctrine appeared. This publication serves as a 'doctrine base' from which new service-oriented doctrines were to be derived and developed in the future.

An important part of the joint doctrine is the description of military power. Military power can be defined as the capacity to perform military operations. It has been built on three mutually related components (see Figure 7):

- Conceptual component: principles of operations; doctrines to structure the way of military thinking; and procedures.
- Physical component: operational capacity of personnel and materiel in terms of quantity and quality.
- Mental component: the motivation to perform the tasks as good as possible; effective leadership; and responsibly organising the use of available personnel and material.




FIGURE 7: Components of Military Power

The basic assumption for the execution of operations is the manoeuvres approach. In this approach, the focus is not the elimination of enemy combat power (its personnel and materiel), but on breaking the coherence of the enemy and its will to fight. Therefore, the effort of military power is directed at the vulnerabilities of the enemy. Important characteristics of the manoeuvres approach are momentum and speed. This approach requires a mental attitude in which unexpected, quick, and original actions are combined with a will to succeed.⁷ It also requires leaders at all levels to assess their operational situation and to think of possible actions that could advance the operation.

The Dutch doctrine describes a number of general principles that serve as basic rules for the use of military means at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations (see Table 4).

The basic assumptions behind these rules are that the today's operations rarely have fixed patterns and that custom-made operations are prevalent. Custom-made operations require flexible forces. The area, the coalition forces, the composition

<i>Preservation of morale</i>	It is acknowledged that morale of personnel is an important factor for the success of an operation.
<i>Security</i>	It includes physical protection, but also preventing information about one's own means and operations from becoming available to the opposing forces.
<i>Concentration of effort and effects</i>	The capacity for concentration depends on an efficient and effective command system and the ability to move quickly.
<i>Purpose</i>	All effort should be directed at a goal that is unambiguous, clear and attainable.
<i>Economic use of means</i>	Using as much means as is necessary for the operation.
<i>Unity of effort</i>	All means and efforts that are available for one goal should be fitted towards each other.
<i>Simplicity</i>	It is assumed that simple plans and clear orders during the execution of an operation improve the chances of success.
<i>Flexibility</i>	The commander should be able to adapt to the situation in the achievement of the goals.
<i>Initiative</i>	The purpose is to act earlier and quicker than the opponents.
<i>Offensive acting</i>	The attitude to take and retain the initiative. Also in defensive operations, the commander should seize every opportunity to attack the enemy and regain the initiative.
<i>Surprise</i>	Engaging the opposition in a place, time, or way that they do not expect.
<i>Sustainability</i>	The deployed forces should be able to continue an operation until the goals have been attained.

TABLE 4: Doctrinal rules for the use of military means at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations.

of one's own forces, the opponents, the attitude towards the local population,⁸ the values of the local population,⁹ and the desired effects as in effect-based operations¹⁰ are topics of continuous attention for commanders at all levels. These aspects are therefore topics for the education and training of military commanders at all levels.

Military Command

While doctrine supports military thinking, command can be described as leading and managing a military organization in order to realize its goals. Command is the authority that is granted to an individual – the commander – to lead units, to make decisions about the deployment of personnel and material means, and to see to it that the plans are executed. In the Dutch doctrine, command is seen as a conjoint of decision-making, execution of the plans (control), and leadership (see Figure 8). The figure shows that leadership is a concept that pervades decision-making and control. The style of decision-making and control will be affected by the style of leadership and vice versa.




FIGURE 8: The aspects of command

The DAF has chosen a system of Mission Command (also called “Auftragstaktik”) in order to guarantee speed of operations in ambiguous and fast changing conditions. Furthermore, the system should ensure effective command when small units are deployed or when units are dispersed over a large area. Mission command implies that commanders at all hierarchical levels can determine how they will execute their assignments. Mission command implies delegation of authority for the execution of all military operations. It guarantees that local commanders take decisions based on the most accurate data. According to the doctrine, the more variable the situation, the lower the level of decision-making should be. The system is based on the following conditions:

- Commander’s intent: a commander ensures that subordinate commanders understand his/her intent, their own assignment, their aims and the broader context of the operation;
- Provision of sufficient means for the assignment;
- Delegation of authority to subordinate commanders: Giving autonomy with respect to the way the assignments are accomplished;
- Indivisibility of responsibility: despite the delegation of authority the superior commander still remains responsible for what happens. Therefore, Dutch doctrine prescribes that the superior commander should follow – at a distance – the execution of assignments, and if necessary intervene;
- Mutual trust: the subordinates should trust the integrity and capabilities of their commanders and the commanders should trust the capabilities and the willingness of their subordinate commanders to work according to the commander’s intent;
- Mutual understanding: On the one hand, commanders should understand the problems that subordinate com-

manders are occupied with. Conversely, subordinate commanders should understand their superiors' command intent; and

- Timely and effective decision-making at all levels: Commanders at all levels should make use of the opportunities that arise during the operation.

A fundamental prerequisite for mission command is that the higher commanding officer has a vision on the ends, the ways to meet these ends, and that he/she is capable of conveying this vision to his/her subordinate commanders. Although it is said that the system should be robust and pervade all operations in the military, a caveat is offered. That is, in some cases it may be necessary for higher hierarchical levels or even for supreme command to determine exactly how the assignment should be executed.¹¹

The practice of mission command was investigated in a number of studies. It was discovered that commanders find it hard to delegate the required authority to their subordinate commanders, probably because they remain ultimately responsible.¹² In a recent article, it was shown that superior commanders are not ready to delegate in a way that mission command prescribes.¹³ First, military leaders are generally inclined to think they should make firm decisions and be the strong and confident leader. Second, mission command requires that subordinate commanders contribute their opinions at a time when orders can be discussed and changes are still possible. However, most military leaders are not used to independent and critical subordinates because military culture prescribes that subordinates follow orders. Third, mission command requires self-leadership, which implies that subordinate commanders learn from their efforts in a supportive and empowering climate. It requires a relationship that is built on mutual trust, where commanders know that their subordinates are up to their tasks and where subordinate commanders know that they will be supported when they make a mistake. When a trusting relationship is absent,

control and the prescription of procedures necessarily have to be the main coordinating mechanisms for commanders. Finally, mission command requires that the role of the commander should be perceived realistically. Although commanders are responsible for the execution of the operation, they cannot, and should not, be seen as being fully in control of the situation. If commanders feel relieved of this pressure, they will be able to relax their need for control. Consequently, these findings show that a mission command where the commander creates the conditions for leaders at lower levels to act autonomously in their volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment is not natural behaviour per se. To develop mission command, strategic and operational leadership needs continuous attention, coaching and mentoring.

Leadership Philosophy and Leadership Development

As has been said, military leadership is considered one of the three aspects of command. Moreover, military leadership can be seen to pervade decision-making and control, as the commander has to lead these activities. However, Dutch doctrine publications devote limited explicit attention to military leadership. In the Dutch Defence Doctrine, leadership has been defined as "...those activities that are focused on influencing the behaviour of others in order to perform their tasks in the right way".¹⁴

The four services of the Dutch Armed Forces all have their ideas about leadership. In its vision statement, the Army defines leadership as: "Consciously influencing the behaviour of others in order to attain the specified goals with full effort".¹⁵ Three pillars are seen as the base for army leadership: mutual trust, autonomy of action, and mutual respect. The leadership vision statement acknowledges that leadership should be able to cope with circumstances that can be characterized by risk, chaos, and norm violations. The leadership that is required should therefore be inspiring, because subordinate commanders have to be able and willing to make

decisions in line with the commander's intent. This description refers to a large extent to the dimensions: "inspirational motivation"; "intellectual stimulation"; and "individualized consideration" of the theory of transformational leadership.¹⁶ This focus on leadership is in line with contemporary discussions on strategic leadership.¹⁷

Whereas transformational leadership is seen to play a central role in the leadership philosophy of the Army, both the Air force and the Navy have focused on situational leadership,¹⁸ although the Air force is reshaping this vision into what they call "coaching leadership", therefore putting a greater emphasis on the autonomy of subordinate personnel. In this theory of situational leadership, the leader should fit his/her leadership style towards the maturity (competences and commitment) of his/her personnel and be focused on the development of the maturity of his personnel so that tasks can be delegated. Finally, the Marechaussee (Military Police) focus on empathetic leadership. With empathetic leadership, the leader should show passion, inspire, and remain oneself. Besides that, the leader should create a safe working environment, provide trust, seek connection with others, and support the employees wherever possible.

In 2002, the *Handbook of Military Leadership*¹⁹ was developed for the Army. The philosophy of this handbook is that it should provide unity of understanding for the education and training of (future) leaders. The handbook is based on the definition of leadership as developed for the Army. It contains chapters on leadership theories, power and influence, motivation of soldiers, morale and mutual trust, diversity in teams, and team building. In summary, it provides an overview of relevant theories that are related to the leadership philosophy. Although this handbook is primarily used for junior officer-training and NCO-training, it can also be used by experienced leaders.

One of the topics for advanced reading is military ethics. In order to develop morally competent service personnel and

military leaders in particular, a greater emphasis has been put on military ethics training and development since the late 1990s. In order to construct a foundation for the development of moral competencies, two volumes on military ethics in the Netherlands Armed Forces were published.²⁰ While the first volume focuses mainly on a theoretical foundation of ethics in the military, the second volume is based on the application of ethics in the military. These volumes are in use at all institutes for the development of military leaders.

The great importance of military ethics was recently acknowledged following a series of incidents dealing with sexual harassment and the misconduct of service personnel.²¹ The strategic leaders of the DAF responded positively to these events by introducing a new behavioural code for the DAF.²² This directive both re-established the confidence of the Dutch society in the DAF as a morally fit organization and functioned as a catalyst for the redefinition of military values. In addition, this new behavioural code stresses the importance of leadership as an important measure to prevent and deal with misconduct of service personnel. The Committee Staal mentioned “social leadership” as the real challenge for leaders.²³ Social Leadership, though not defined explicitly by the Committee, closely resembles the aspects of individual consideration as one of the four dimensions of transformational leadership. Leaders should have the social intelligence and the wisdom to solve possible crisis situations.

Human Resources Management (HRM) and Strategic Leadership

As the framework of leadership within the DAF has been defined in the previous sections, attention will shift to the process of the development and selection of leaders in general and strategic leaders in particular. For many years, the Dutch armed forces offered life-time employment for the core of their military personnel. There were only a few designated entry points where officers and NCOs started their careers in

the DAF; the Royal Military Academy, the Royal Navy Institute for officers, and the Military Schools for NCOs. Consequently, the senior ranks for both officers and NCOs were filled by people who had started their careers as junior officers or junior NCOs. Therefore, the armed forces could be classified as an Internal Labour Market. In their careers, officers and NCOs typically fulfilled various positions, of which a number were classified as essential for further promotion. In this process, they acquire organization-specific skills and knowledge that builds throughout their careers. Furthermore, a high degree of loyalty towards the organization and its personnel was stimulated in this process. The system provided senior leaders with the knowledge of the organization and of their subordinates' positions. However, there were also a number of downsides of promoting from within: the system was insular and did not always promote the people with the best qualities for strategic leadership. This was further compounded as there were no objective tools for assessment of performance and consequently, judgement on promotion and career paths. As such, the development of military leadership in the DAF has been restructured since the year 2000. It was felt that there should be more attention to selecting and developing strategic leaders with an explicit focus on competencies. A number of HRM-policies supported this focus on competencies.

The State Secretary of Defence reshaped the previous employment of officers and NCOs into a so-called "flexible HRM policy", better known as "up-or-out". In short, in their mid-thirties, officers or NCOs will be selected out when they are not selected up. From the organizational perspective, this system has been developed in order to promote an optimal career policy in which the preservation and development of the most competent service personnel is endorsed. This flexible HRM policy is based on the assumption that officers and NCOs will fulfil several challenging positions during which their competencies for strategic leadership can be developed and tested. This principle is especially valid in the DAF since most officers have to fulfil

staff positions and field-unit positions during their career. This means that most officers from the level of captain or higher are already confronted with mid-term planning processes and might at mid-career level already be involved in strategic planning processes.

During this process of guidance, development, and testing, three perspectives can be distinguished. First, there is a focus on performing well in the present position and in future positions within one's field of expertise. Second, there is an interest in selecting personnel for positions at a higher rank. Finally, there is a focus on the development of specific career paths for (top) management in the DAF by the management development program. Management development is seen as the process of detecting, selecting, developing, and mentoring talented officers in order to prepare them for the highest levels of management functions or strategic leadership. Because the further integration of the several services into a joint organization is high on the agenda in the DAF, the management development policy is focused on possible strategic leaders in a joint process and context, at least for colonel and higher ranks. This process of harmonization and integration should be completed in 2007.

The focus on competencies also implies a huge change for the selection and development of mid-level officers. In the development of leadership, the long tradition of merely relying on the commander's judgements of subordinates was redesigned. The process of assessment, tracking and tracing of potential strategic leaders now starts at mid-career level at the transition from captain to major. Before that transition point, the competencies are used in order to focus on the performance in the present position and future positions within one's field of expertise or promotion to the next higher rank within this field. The competencies that are in use can be found in Figure 9. The figure shows that different competencies are the focus of attention at different points during one's career.

Selection competencies	Competencies at initial MD selection	Competencies during top management MD
Judgment Vision Courage Interpersonal sensitivity Delegation	Judgement Vision Courage Interpersonal sensitivity Delegation	Judgement Vision Courage Interpersonal sensitivity Delegation
Flexibility Communication Conviction Situational awareness Organisational awareness Planning and organising Result oriented	Flexibility Communication Conviction Situational Awareness Organisational Awareness Planning and organising Result oriented	Flexibility Communication Conviction Situational Awareness Organisational Awareness Planning and organising Result oriented
Analytical Integrity Self-learning management Responsibility Cooperation Initiative Development of co-workers	Analytical Integrity Self-learning management Responsibility Cooperation Initiative Development of co-workers	Analytical Integrity Self-learning management Responsibility Cooperation Initiative Development of co-workers

→ Time

FIGURE 9: Competencies that are used for the assessment and development of officers

Assessment of service personnel within this competency framework is achieved by administering the Occupational Personal Questionnaire (OPQ) to all possible candidates for Management Development (MD) selection, followed by an interview by MD staff personnel, and finally, an interview with a former superior commander on actual observed competencies. After this initial detection and selection process, additional assessments of the candidate's talents are conducted at the lieutenant-colonel and colonel levels. In this process, some of the MD candidates will remain in positions at the colonel or even lieutenant-colonel level, and some will be developed and coached in order to reach top positions within the DAF.

Discussion and Conclusions

Rapid changes since the end of the Cold War in the strategic environment of the DAF have resulted in an increased need to put effort in the assessment and development of strategic leadership of the DAF. The security environment, changes within the Netherlands as well as technological developments, demands capable strategic leaders that are sensitive to these developments and that can take decisions that are – also on a longer term – in the interest of the Dutch society, the DAF, and their allies. Since the nature of operations often implies challenging and frequently unpredictable and varying demands on the DAF and its personnel, leadership at all levels should be prepared for more strategic thinking. Therefore, military leadership should include important parts of transformational leadership, such as a focus on vision, inspirational motivation, and intellectual stimulation.

A number of steps towards a systematic development of strategic leaders have been taken. Officers from mid-career on develop a broader perspective of the DAF due to a move towards a more joint organization and due to the policy of alternating positions at field units and staff departments where armed forces policy is developed. In order to detect and select military leaders who carry with them the potential for reaching the strategic leadership levels, the management development policy has been radically adjusted towards a more transparent system in which several methods are used to assess competencies and the potential of military leaders. Moreover, the development of strategic leadership skills and competencies itself needs attention. Although MD candidates must have completed the Higher Defence Course to be accepted within the MD-program and the Course for Top Management of the DAF, these educational programs have only recently started mentoring and coaching the required competencies. The results of these developments have not yet been investigated and will be subject to future attention and evaluation. Participation within a network of military leader-

ship centres where different approaches, processes and programs are discussed might add to the development of strategic leadership of those who join this initiative.

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CHAPTER 4

Professional Development for Senior New Zealand Defence Force Officers

Colonel David Russell and Squadron Leader Murray Simons

The New Zealand Defence Force faces many current and future challenges. In order to meet them, we need a modern force – a Defence team that can respond to increasingly dynamic and complex situations. Most critical to us is having trained and motivated people who are able to deliver on what is asked. Our future force will therefore be increasingly flexible, multi-skilled, innovative, willing and able to continue learning, and adaptive to change. Ongoing professional development will ensure that our people will be fully prepared to meet the leadership challenges facing us.

Air Marshal B.R. Ferguson
Chief of Defence Force
August 2005¹

Like most Western countries, New Zealand has seen a significant shift in its Defence policy since the end of the Cold War. Strategic uncertainty has resulted in greater diversity in threats, roles, and public expectations. Coupled with this has been a subtle yet definite move away from traditional first-world alliances and an increased awareness of national identity. In New Zealand, there has also been an increasing awareness of our unique geo-strategic environment and a corresponding desire for more New Zealand-centric professional military education (PME).

For New Zealand, senior professional military education has always involved sending selected officers to overseas institutes. While the standard of teaching and the benefit of executive networking is undeniable, returning New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) officers have often felt unprepared for engaging with the higher levels of the New Zealand political scene. Studying

in the United Kingdom (U.K.), US, or even Australia, is no longer providing complete professional military development (PMD)² for our senior echelons. Consequently, a number of recent studies have argued for greater domestic input into this important task.

This chapter highlights the dilemma of a small nation attempting to deliver a product that vexes even the largest of Defence Forces. It will begin with an overview to the background of this problem before exploring current initiatives and possible future directions. As with all the nations represented in this book, the NZDF's senior leadership development program is a work in progress. In fact, it is more than that, it is embryonic. While a higher defence college has recently been stood up, it has yet to articulate any endorsed direction. The contents of this chapter therefore, are drawn from a proposal paper that began as a New Zealand Army report and has been modified to capture the essence of the joint NZDF College's direction.

Background

The aim of the professional developmental process must be to provide senior personnel with the generic and specific job related knowledge, skills and behaviours required to enable them to effectively undertake the range of senior officer tasks and roles throughout the NZDF. These roles and tasks must be embedded at the strategic level to effectively operate within the complexities of the public sector environment. A strategic level professional development framework for the future should provide a best possible balance of learning opportunities (education, training and career learning experiences)³ to achieve and sustain the highest professional standards of performance and behaviour. An examination of the required competencies of a senior officer to operate in this strategic environment is essential to preparing a professional development framework.

As a result of concerns raised by senior NZDF officers regarding professional development, the Chief of Defence Force established Project APTUS in 2002. One of the early project outputs

was a brief review of the current professional development programmes, which showed that most of the elements have been developed from single Service initiatives, and in the absence of a coherent centralized NZDF policy. The review further revealed a need to examine each element of the current education and development programme against the NZDF Competency Framework to establish the degree of alignment and priority.

In 2003, interviews were conducted and questionnaires administered to collect information on the broad requirements for professional development and on present system deficiencies.⁴ There was general agreement that the lack of an NZDF professional development policy and management structure was a serious deficiency. The most significant observations were:

- Professional development at Lieutenant Colonel (E - equivalent) and above was not structured, and only some officers gained adequate exposure;
- While development of professional military skills was considered good up to mid level, skills required for the strategic non-military “Head Office” and the joint environment were not well developed;
- There was a pressing need to establish a central policy and structure to manage professional development, and align single Service developmental activities; and
- There was a diversity of views about when skill development should occur, and in the relative values placed on particular skills and qualifications (this being reflected in differing Service practice and priorities).⁵

From the interviews, senior officers further noted that, at best, their preparation for the following competencies was only fair:

- Working in a strategic environment;
- Dealing with problems with no clear-cut solutions;

- Innovation and policy initiation;
- Assessment/planning for future whilst executing present;
- Thinking conceptually, strategically and creatively;
- Advising political leaders on the use of military forces to achieve national objectives; and
- Understanding how political direction is translated into force capability requirements.

Respondents considered that the NZDF was missing opportunities to develop its senior personnel at a tri-Service and a whole of government level. Many officers felt that they had a lack of experience and knowledge to operate at this strategic level. They did not understand the machinery of government, and the constitutional role of the public service in developing policy for the government of the day. Professional development needed to broaden senior officers' understanding and skill sets in undertaking consultation with other government departments and NZDF's involvement in the governmental committee process.

The lack of an organized pathway was noted as an inhibiting factor in development. In general, this was put down to there being no cohesive framework on which to construct or implement professional development. This also raised questions about career management being supported by an effective performance management system. Many respondents considered that there was no assessment process to identify, and more importantly report, on what competencies senior officers either lacked or possessed for senior NZDF appointments. Then, as a logical developmental step, the process should provide a series of opportunities to allow senior officers to develop these required competencies.

There was also a strong sentiment for the need to improve career management in order to promote alternate pathways for

advancement, to make people available for development in a way that lessened the strain on them and their colleagues, and to have a flexible approach to developing people. In addition, many respondents emphasized that there should be an identifiable link between development and the performance competencies required for higher-level NZDF appointments. Selection procedures are needed to ensure the right people are placed in the right appointments. Some respondents saw the need for an assessment centre-type process that identified shortcomings in a person's competencies to assume a particular appointment. Professional development opportunities would then be targeted to rectify these deficiencies in preparation for the assumption of these duties. There was an identified need for alignment between career planning and skill sets required. There was a case to provide some developmental training to everyone and then additional training in skill sets required for particular areas. Several respondents offered the solution for senior officer development that there needs to be some specialization, probably in-depth professional development coverage of one employment area such as Human Resources, strategic commitments, resources, development and familiarization with one further function possibly of a similar employment area.

Respondents recognized the need for professional development programmes that prepared senior officers for the articulation of military advice to government, and the liaison, interaction and representation of the NZDF to other Government departments, the wider state sector and the New Zealand community. Also, a need was identified to provide a sound understanding of the budgetary, political and economic mechanisms, procedures for policy development, financial administration and resource management at the strategic level. The interaction at the New Zealand political level requires political "nous" and higher-level communication attributes.

Senior NZDF officers need the ability to assimilate and interpret considerable quantities of information and must have the skill sets to translate this information into ideas, concepts, courses of action and ultimately decisions. A senior officer

must develop the personal skills of appraisal, negotiation and facilitation at the strategic level. An important point to note here is many of these attributes should already exist in the senior officer cohort given their military experience and development to date. It is how these tools are refined to maximize their effectiveness in a strategic setting – with significant and in many cases unfamiliar, external influences and demands – that will be the developmental challenge. There was an acknowledgement that there were certain competencies that were required as foundation skills, knowledge, personal attributes and associated behaviours that all senior officers must possess or be developed in to be effective as senior officers in today's strategic environment. The challenge is in identifying these competencies and understanding how to develop them.

As identified in a number of the NZDF senior officer responses to the Project APTUS questionnaire, many officers considered that they had received no formal training, preparation or indoctrination into the senior officer political “nous” required to operate in the strategic environment of Wellington (New Zealand's capital and the euphemism for Defence Head Quarters). Whilst a significant number of officers had a previous staff posting in Wellington at the Major (E) level, which gave them some understanding of Defence central, the previous appointment was often in a completely different area (e.g., single service staff as opposed to the higher HQ NZDF). Therefore, whilst generic competencies for the strategic environment have been gained, specific competencies for a particular employment stream may not. There appeared to be no recognition of previous strategic level experience or consideration of streaming officers as a career management function.

With the demise of the Joint Services Staff College Course (JSSC) in Australia, the limited places at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College, and the inability of the NZDF to get places on the US War College, there are very limited overseas higher defence studies opportunities for senior officers after their staff college course in the rank of Major (E). A selected number of senior officers par-

ticipate in higher defence studies, however, this is effectively only one Colonel (E) each year to the 11 month CDSS Course at the Australian Defence College in Canberra and one Colonel (E) to the UK Royal College of Defence Studies in London annually. In addition to the lack of overseas places for higher defence studies, there is the criticism of these overseas courses providing regional, national or alliance biases which are not necessary in line with the New Zealand Government's defence policy. This further reinforces the need to progress New Zealand based professional development opportunities to provide senior officers with the job related knowledge, skills and behaviours required to enable them to effectively undertake the range of higher-level NZDF appointments.

Project APTUS Recommendations

Having conducted an international scan, consulted with specialists, and interviewed senior officers, the Project APTUS team concluded there was a need for a domestic senior officer development program. This solution was designed to complement ongoing overseas opportunities with an enhanced local program managed by a new organization – the New Zealand Defence College (NZDC). Subsequently the Project APTUS Review proposed implementation phases as:

- **Phase One.** Creation of an initial Defence College structure to bring together existing NZDF education resources and provide a home for the PMD Framework;
- **Phase Two.** Production of the PMD Framework;
- **Phase Three.** Identification of delivery options for the PMD Framework;
- **Phase Four.** Development of delivery mechanisms; and,
- **Phase Five.** Implement delivery and ongoing maintenance of the PMD Framework.

At the time of printing, the NZDC was working on Phase Two, although parts of Phases Three to Five were already underway from legacy ad hoc PMD arrangements. It should also be noted that the above solution is not considered a panacea. There are still many challenges ahead for senior PMD in the NZDF.

Whilst the introduction of a NZDF Defence College has many advantages, the economies of scale of a small defence force must acknowledge that the NZDF is unable to implement an ambitious defence college programme like larger Defence Forces. The best that can probably be achieved in the shorter term is to utilize the January to May period of each year, before the NZDF Command and Staff College Course commences, to undertake senior officer professional development modules. During this four-month period a series of higher defence training modules could be delivered, utilizing institutions like the local School of Government at Wellington's Victoria University. This approach would provide professional development opportunities to senior NZDF officers, under the mandate of a NZDF College and utilizing the NZDF Command and Staff College facilities.

What is Professional Development?

Professional development must provide a strong focus on the preparation of senior leaders who can command at the operational and strategic levels, operate with Government and the wider state sector at the strategic level, and manage people, resources and processes to deliver NZDF outputs within the regulatory and accountability frameworks.

Professional development requires the recognition of future leaders who are valued and who are offered challenging assignments that provide opportunities to demonstrate abilities and learn from on the job experiences. Professional development programmes must be big-picture, long-term programmes, not narrowly focussed short-term efforts, and be aimed at all levels of the leadership ladder as an essential

part of the organization's success. Professional development programmes must develop a strategy that includes:

- An assessment of the individual's strengths and weaknesses;
- Specific coaching and mentoring plans;
- Assignments that offer different learning opportunities; and,
- A targeted curriculum to fill in any gaps in knowledge or skills.

Professional development is a process that is integral to ensuring an organization's success by making sure it has the human resource capacity to meet future demands. It involves employees undertaking developmental activities designed to maintain or enhance their knowledge, skills and abilities. This can be initiated by an individual or by an organization, though increasingly, organizations are getting involved in planning professional development for their employees.⁶

Key Themes for Professional Development

A review of the literature on professional development revealed a number of themes about the way professional development is currently conducted in organizations. This review also provided guidance on the ways in which professional development should be conducted to optimize the benefits to individuals and the organization. These include the necessity to integrate an organization's professional development strategy with their business strategy, and align it with other human resource processes.

Professional development programmes should be developed in line with the organization's strategy to ensure that there is a rationale behind why the development is occurring. Specifically, development should take place to ready the workforce to meet future demands so that personnel are equipped with the necessary skills to meet current and future require-

ments.⁷ This is important as in a fluid environment the job requirements can change and new skills may be required. All personnel decisions should be tied to the business strategy, which involves having the right people in the right places, with the right skills to make the organization's goals a reality.⁸ This means that organizations need to have knowledge of their workforces' current knowledge, skills and abilities, and the requirements to meet targeted outputs. It also requires knowing the requirements for each position, and ensuring that the person whose skill matrix most closely matches that position is in place; as well as identifying future candidates for positions, and undertaking succession planning.

Assessing individual employees' skills and abilities and comparing these attributes with the competencies required for successfully performing in their current role (and those roles they may be promoted to in the future) is a vital first step in ensuring that the professional development provided is appropriate. In senior management roles this is especially important, as these roles are highly complex, and the development required are likely to be highly unique to the individual, according to their experience, education, and role.⁹

The process by which an individual's strengths and weaknesses are identified can take a variety of forms, but the most common approaches tend to be driven by performance reviews or by using an instrument like 360° feedback.¹⁰ The predominant philosophy about what training to deliver has focused on building up weaker areas, as well as maintaining areas of strength. However, some professional development advocates recommend limiting intensive development to those employees who were identified as scoring highly on the majority of criteria traits, who would then participate in activities designed to further strengthen these skill sets.¹¹ Similarly, others reinforce the importance of determining what an employee does well and focus on getting them to build on those strengths "...as it only takes strength in a few attributes whilst being average in the rest to achieve a high probability of being seen as a great leader".¹²

There has been considerable research in the area of how an individual's characteristics can affect the successful completion and subsequent use of training, especially in the areas of intelligence, personality, cognitive ability and attitudes such as self-esteem and self-efficacy.¹³ While these are important considerations, the primary concern here appears to be that individuals are consulted and involved in the process of creating developmental plans. This creates the opportunity to discuss what the individuals' priorities are, and to ensure that the proposed development plans fit with their own future aspirations. This consultation process should ensure that the individuals involved are committed and motivated, which dramatically increases the chances of a successful outcome.

Various sources recognize that the responsibility for professional development is in fact a partnership between the organization and the employee. Career planning and development should be important to every employee. Career experts consider that employees "who take time to invest in their own development find increased job satisfaction and a new feeling of control over their lives".¹⁴ Others suggest that employees need to analyse their situation, identify their career objectives and establish developmental action steps to achieve their aspirations.¹⁵ If employees adopt a passive stance and ignore their responsibility for self-development, they give up control of their career, limit their future employability and reduce their chances of achieving their career goals.¹⁶ Equally, there is recognition that the HR managers must be fully aware of the organization's future HR needs, appointment openings, and training and development opportunities in order to promote career planning among employees.

NZDF Defence Force Order 17/2000 states that one of its principles of career management is an *acknowledgement of partnership*. As a result NZDF career management practices are to ensure that:

- Individual aspirations are balanced with the organization's requirements;

- Individuals have input into their career development through opportunities for dialogue and access to information on the career management process;
- Careers are recognized as an important investment to an individual, and as such the onus is placed on individuals to take responsibility for their own career as much as they are able with the constraints of the Service needs; and,
- Career management decisions do not compromise organizational capability.¹⁷

As discussed previously, it is helpful if there is a guiding philosophy behind the way professional development programmes are structured and it is imperative that individuals are able to be compared to roles in terms of the knowledge, skills and abilities they have, and those that are needed to perform optimally. A significant number of literature sources identify that competency frameworks provide an excellent mechanism for this – not only do they enable different people to be evaluated for a particular role, but they also enable different position requirements to be compared which is equally relevant when making placement decisions.

There is significant attention to professional development in the management literature, with much interest being taken in the best methods to deliver development and align development to corporate strategy and other human resource processes. There is general agreement that by identifying development criteria from a competency model, the process can be tied in with other processes, such as performance appraisals, selection, placement and succession planning. Regardless of which employees are chosen for development and what training they receive, it is particularly important that the training undertaken is evaluated to check whether it is effective and whether it is continuing to meet the needs of the organization and the individuals.¹⁸

Key points that should be considered in designing a professional development framework include¹⁹:

- Develop leaders based on the organization's vision;
- Invest in your best talent and their future with the organization – through well targeted professional development opportunities;
- Develop staff organizational knowledge;
- Give staff the tools to invest in and have accountability for their individual development;
- Make proactive career development choices with employees – by suggesting learning opportunities and offering resources as part of your overall performance management process;
- Make it a priority for employees to learn new skills – that will help them in their current job and prepare them for new positions; and,
- Promote a workforce that talks openly about career growth, opportunities and promotion.

NZDF Professional Military Development Policy

The core NZDF philosophy of “Three Services as one Force” brings together the knowledge, skills and ethos of the three Services. Generally the NZDF will not match the range or technological sophistication of the equipment capabilities of the larger nations with whom it operates. Its utility and reputation for providing a credible contribution are based on the flexibility and competence of the human component of its capability. The NZDF HR vision is “Capability through People” and the main focus of all HR activity has been directed as the enhancement of the human component of NZDF capability. As identified earlier in this chapter, the Project APTUS working group presented a draft

policy statement on professional military development.²⁰ The intent of this policy was to describe professional military development of NZDF military and civilian personnel that prepares:

- Effective, adaptable military and civilian personnel, people with genuine utility to their organization, society and country;
- Personnel who can successfully complete tasks in support of national interests, who are strategic in their thinking and actions, and, therefore valuable to the nation; and,
- Personnel whose performance enhances New Zealand's international standing, and who can provide leadership capable of performing at a level that ensures Government trust and confidence.

The policy detailed that professional military development was to have a strong focus on the preparation of leaders who can command at the strategic and operational levels, operate with Government at the strategic level, and manage people, resources and processes to achieve Defence outputs and outcomes. In constructing a professional development framework for senior officers, the following key principles from this policy statement need to be used as a guide to the establishment of this framework:

- Professional development will make the most of the potential of individuals in order to maximize capability;
- The intent of NZDF professional development is to prepare effective, adaptable officers with genuine utility to the NZDF, society, and to New Zealand as a whole;
- NZDF professional development will provide a strong focus on preparation of leaders who can command at the strategic and operational levels, operate with Government at the strategic level and manage people, resources and processes to achieve NZDF outputs and outcomes;

- Where professional development opportunities must be limited for practical reasons such as finance or availability, allocation will be based on NZDF's need and individual merit determined through the personal evaluation;
- Professional development is the responsibility of both the individual officer and the NZDF. Individuals must be prepared to take the initiative to satisfy their career aspirations. The NZDF will provide guidance, feedback and assistance to allow officers to have the opportunity to achieve their potential;
- Professional development activity is to focus on achievement of the competencies defined in the NZDF Competency Framework;
- The total resource invested in senior officer professional development is to be carefully managed. The overall framework is to have a futures focus and be subject to continuous review and improvement. Its performance and outputs are to be measured objectively;
- Where external service providers are used to provide senior officer professional development, they are to be provided or contracted on a tri-service and joint basis where possible; and,
- Senior officer professional development is to have emphasis placed on developing strategic leadership and technological awareness, as well as research, evaluation and analytical skills that will, in turn, encourage officers to acquire knowledge, help them deal with complex processes and situations, and improve their ability to communicate.²¹

The NZDF's PMD Framework

As already explained, the NZDF is still developing its PMD Framework. The Defence College, which is tasked with devel-

oping the architecture, is currently collating existing models, examining best practice from outside Defence and overseas, and seeking civilian consultant input into a tailor-made product. The current products from related single Service projects and the Project APTUS Competency Framework provide a useful starting point, but there are still gaps in terms of development strategies. Current thinking is to employ an updated version of the Competency Framework as the end state goal but to adopt the Canadian Forces' Professional Development Framework (16 Attributes within 5 Elements)²² and concentric circle model²³ as a structure for linking both existing and new PMD opportunities, the latter model having been turned into a 3D version. This new cut away *wedding cake* construct not only emphasizes the permanence of military ethos in all levels of professional development, but also the relative influence of core versus corps development (to use the Army vernacular), or right-arm, left-arm (in Navy parlance).




FIGURE 10: Wedding Cake PMD Model

The NZDF version of the Wedding Cake PMD model (Figure 10) shows how training is primarily conducted at the lower levels of learning professional expertise but this still involves a degree of education. As personnel mature in terms of military progression, their PMD becomes more education-centric while the military ethos (professional ideology) permeates all levels. The Education ring is divided into cognitive, social and change capacities. These in turn are considered in terms of more specific competencies

Senior Officer Competencies

Competencies represent the behaviours that define effective performance, and distinguish outstanding performance, in an organization. They include skills, knowledge and attributes that are observable, and can be measured. Competencies are often not task specific and therefore are transferable between jobs and positions. In their most generic sense, they are what make people effective (or not) in a variety of situations.

For an organization, a competency framework identifies the generic competencies required across all employment levels and categories. Another product of Project APTUS was the production of an NZDF Competency framework, which provides links between organizational capability and all aspects of human resource management. These competencies provide a common language for aligning HR processes and can be used as part of an integrated organizational approach to:

- Clarify job and work expectations;
- Improve selection and recruitment;
- Manage performance and provide performance measures;
- Improve succession planning and identify superior performers;
- Identify behaviours for performance appraisal;

- Identify professional development requirements; and
- Communicate desired behaviours to facilitate change.²⁴

Professional Development Implications

From the literature review, several observers concluded that senior officers should display creativity and originality, have high intellectual capacities and the ability to deal in depth even with unfamiliar subjects. They need to be able to develop an independent capacity for high command and advice to Government, which takes into account both of the broad directions of national strategy and the economic, political and constitutional parameters of Government decisions. They will need analytical ability, a capacity to cope with change, and political awareness.

At the most senior leadership roles in the NZDF, senior officers are required to guide the national military strategies to achieve strategic objectives in light of those political and resource constraints. The senior NZDF officer needs to be developed in the conceptual, technical and interpersonal competencies required to operate effectively in the strategic environment. It requires an officer who has had experience at the tactical and operational levels both in unit command and in joint appointments which will provide the platform from which to develop these strategic skills. The senior officer in this strategic environment needs to have:

- A sound knowledge base of the political, social, logistical, technological, geographic and intelligence dimensions of strategy;
- Sound analytical attributes supported by the research ability to identify and incorporate the key contribution of specialist experts into policy development;
- An in-depth understanding of the technical parameters of the profession's capabilities and deficiencies, and knowledge of technological and managerial developments;

- An understanding of current political realities as well as being attuned to constitutional and other major institutional constraints when offering guidance to government;
- A sound knowledge of capability and readiness states of force elements;
- An ability to make innovative and efficient use of technology and resources to deliver capability; and
- A highly developed situational awareness, a comprehensive picture of the strategic environment and be adaptable to political direction and influence.

Possible Options for Senior NZDF Officer PMD

The following options highlight avenues being explored for future senior officer development. They represent a combination of the four aspects of PMD – education, training, character development, and Career Learning Experiences (CLEs).

NZDF Defence College Sponsored Modules. These one- or two-day modules would be sponsored by the NZDF College and could be conducted at the Command and Staff College between January and late April of each year. This would be in the period outside the Command and Staff College's seven month residential course. These modules would be made available to selected Lieutenant Colonel (E) and Colonel (E) with attendance being managed by the respective HR Managers based on feedback from the previous year's Promotion Boards. The actual delivery of the modules could be a combination of HQ NZDF and Ministry of Defence providers and the use of external tertiary institutions.

NZDF's Membership of the Leadership Development Centre. The New Zealand State Services Commission introduced the Leadership Development Centre (LDC) in 2003 to provide advice and services to senior managers in the New Zealand Public Service to support them in the development of leader-

ship skills for current and future roles. The LDC replaced the Management Development Centre of which NZDF had been a member of since 1995. The LDC's focus is now clearly on developing the capability of senior management at the top levels of the Public Service. The LDC offers a range of services to Public Service Chief Executives, "nominated managers", other managers and specialists.

An added advantage to participation in any of the LDC programmes is that potential senior officers are interacting with senior leadership from other Government departments and potentially building their strategic networks. The two current senior executive programmes at the LDC (Executive Leadership Programme and Leadership in Practice) are worthy of consideration for future senior officer professional development. These two programmes are a central part of the Government's senior leadership management and development strategy and are overseen by the State Services Commission. Notably, entry into the Executive Leadership Programme requires a Gateway assessment selection process involving tests and an interview. Successful candidates will have access to a range of development options, once their starting position has been established through the various assessment tools. The LDC will construct an individual development plan that best suits the candidate to develop those strategic skills required for advancement within their organization in the public sector environment.

Secondments to other Government Departments. Senior officers are valuable resources that are difficult to release for secondments to other Government Departments where the other Government Department is getting much of the immediate value of the professional development activity. An alternative may be to arrange shorter (several days or one week) exchanges/placements in other government departments where senior officers get exposure to the workings and processes of another Government Department. These secondments would be reasonably easy to arrange as the host department is still gaining from the experience at limited cost to their own operation. Departments that have particular rel-

evance for professional development of Army's senior officers are: Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, The Treasury, State Services Commission, Customs Department, and New Zealand Police.

Mentoring Programmes. Based on a NZ Army project, there is scope to develop a NZDF-wide mentoring programme. In December 2003, the Chief of Army (CA) initiated an Army Senior Officer Mentorship Programme for selected General List Colonels. The programme was to complement other senior officer development opportunities. Whilst tangible outcomes may not be apparent, it remains CA's hope that the programme will aid the development of senior officers who will make decisions with cognisance of strategic and political imperatives. At this stage, only ex-senior Army officers have been invited to participate as mentors. The mentors are not sponsors; rather they are sounding boards who are capable of providing professional advice and guidance based on their experience and professional knowledge.

Currently, Assistant Chief Personnel is looking at options to establish a tri-Service mentorship programme for Brigadiers (Equivalent) based on non-military mentors. This programme would be designed to assist "One Stars" (Equivalent) to interact with a senior executive from the public or private sector that has significant strategic experience, understands the demands of stewardship of an organization, and is able to provide professional advice based on his or her experience. In both mentoring programmes, it will be about the mentor and protégé establishing a rapport; it is a professional relationship that could develop into a personal relationship. Both programmes have an added bonus in that they provide wider exposure of the NZDF to the senior New Zealand community and broaden the strategic network for the NZDF.

Use of Commercial Providers. The NZDF currently utilizes a number of commercial providers to deliver professional development opportunities. In recent years, however, some

providers have been put out of business or their programmes have lost the value to achieve what is required from the professional development objectives. Employing stand-alone commercial providers does create a risk that these providers will not retain a contemporary up-to-date development mechanism which meets the demands of the NZDF. These ready-made executive development programmes can be too rigid and often provide unquantifiable outcomes or return on investment. Whilst commercial providers will always have their place, there is a need to regularly evaluate their value and ensure that the providers employed are flexible enough to be able to adjust their programme to support the organizational requirement for development.

To date, the NZDF has not considered online learning as a viable developmental option. A scan of PMD literature however, gives clear indicators that this method of professional development delivery should be a part of a self-development programme. New technologies, improved instructional design and sophisticated content management systems have contributed to making online learning and development experiences a more development friendly environment. The recommended approach to engaging online education and development is to look to a recognized commercial learning consultant that has the expertise and appropriate contracts with leading worldwide providers of online resources.

It is acknowledged that the subjects currently offered online may still be focused on the big demand customers such as business, management, information systems and resource management. However, it is recognized as a growth industry for distance education and there is a strong expectation, from the literature review conducted for this paper, that soon the online opportunities will be available in all professional development areas. Another challenge for this professional development framework is whether the NZDF should embark on online education of its own or consider the employment of an outside agency to provide some support for the delivery of this development framework.

Conclusion

The expectations of the military profession on its senior military officers, in comparison to other professions are unique. A senior officer is expected to be an effective military commander, political advisor, diplomat, educator and mentor, accountant, resource manager, strategic leader, procurement manager, industrial negotiator and military strategist. This chapter has identified a suitcase of competencies to meet this expectation that can be very hard to lift, let alone master, as an officer strives for recognition in senior level appointments in the strategic NZDF environment. A senior officer professional development framework needs to focus on developing joint knowledge, culture, skills and competencies to prepare senior officers for contributing to a joint-focused defence force in this demanding strategic environment where state sector governance regulations, and political influence and direction prevail. Professional development must provide a strong focus on the preparation of senior leaders who can: command at the operational and strategic levels, operate with Government and the wider state sector at the strategic level, and manage people, resources and processes to deliver NZDF outputs within the regulatory and accountability frameworks.

When an officer reaches the senior ranks there is an expectation and in fact a mandate that he or she is responsible for the stewardship of the profession of arms. The senior officer is now responsible for operating in a strategic environment where the focus is shaped on the influence of political direction, whole of government pressure, resource demands and public influence. Stewardship requires the ability to garner support from all variants of strategic stakeholders, maintain interest from a broad spectrum of external groups and to preserve unbridled internal support for the vision articulated. These stewardship objectives are achieved through visionary leadership, genuine and zealous portrayal of the required outcomes, and a strong communicative relationship with all stakeholders to achieve NZDF's strategic goals. This is a strong challenge that requires a professional development programme that will prepare and grow senior officers to be effective and driven stewards of their profession.

This chapter has highlighted the lack of a coordinated professional development framework in New Zealand that prepares senior officers for this strategic environment. After completion of Staff College there is a significant gap in any developmental activities for the Lieutenant Colonel (E) who is or will shortly be employed in Defence HQ. If the status quo remains unchanged, an increasing proportion of potential senior officers, who are currently entering the Colonel (E) rank cohort, will not have participated in the development experiences which are crucial for effective performance at the higher level defence appointments.

This chapter has suggested that not all senior officers will require the same skills and knowledge to operate within the strategic environment. There should be some flexibility in how development programmes are delivered and to whom. Therefore the establishment of a professional development framework must take into account the common skills and knowledge needed by all senior officers, various opportunities to develop officers through appointments to be held, career planning requirements and some specialized professional development relevant to likely employment streams combined with the use of on the job learning.

The New Zealand Defence College is currently working on a Senior Officer Professional Development Framework which will give visibility to the required rank and appointment competencies to be developed, combined with the professional development elements against which professional development activities can be matched. This Framework, when combined with the additional career management tools, will provide a palette with the appropriate paints from which the individual officer, his or her commander and the career manager can construct the developmental picture that best suits the officer's likely employment and advancement potential. This is a considerable step forward on the path that the NZDF must take to meet the strategic leadership challenges that will be faced now and in the future.

Endnotes

- 1 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) 2006, Strategic Human Resource Plan 2005 - 2010: *Capability Through People – A Strong, Satisfied and Successful Force*, released 17 April 2006, CDF's Foreword.
- 2 Professional Military Development is a collective term used in New Zealand to capture Professional Military Education (PME), training, character development programmes, and targeted postings—typically referred to as Career Learning Experiences (CLEs).
- 3 As per note 2 above, career learning experiences are defined as opportunities where learning takes place “on-the-job” through performing assigned tasks and duties.
- 4 The interview series collected the opinions of 37 senior NZDF officers whilst the questionnaire process collected the views of 42 senior NZDF officers. This represented more than a 70 per cent rate response from the total number of Colonel and Brigadier equivalents across the NZDF.
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- 18 L. Bjornberg, “Training and Development: Best Practices”, *Public Personnel Management*, 2002, 31(4), 507–16.
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- 20 NZDF Professional Military Development Policy, NZDF 4500/EPM/2/2, 18 Nov 2004.
- 21 Ibid, 58.
- 22 For more on the Canadian Model, see Chapter 2 of this book.
- 23 Lyle Spencer and Signe Spencer, "Central and Surface Competencies Model." In L. Spencer and S. Spencer, (eds.) *Competence at Work*, (New York: John Wiley, 1993), 11.
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CHAPTER 5

Nature, Nurture, and Leadership Culture or “It’s the Backswing, Stupid”

Dr. Nick Jans*

Military people are more enamored of leaders than of leadership.... We concentrate – particularly in dissecting activity at the more senior levels – more on what happened than on how or why. [Emphasis added]¹

General Walter Ulmer, US Army (Retired) and late-CEO of the Center for Creative Leadership
North Carolina

In showjumping there is a moment before the jump where the rider momentarily hesitates and pulls the reins in, and the horse tenses up for the spring; and then it is the horse, not the rider, that takes the jump. In the same way, a senior leader has to build a constituency of change so that the people demand change, a mechanism for building the desire to “go”.²

ADF Brigadier

Life is like giving a concert on the violin while learning to play the instrument.

Samuel Butler

Introduction

On leaders and leadership

Quite early in my career, I was lucky enough to spend some years in the defence bureaucracy in Canberra. I did not think

* Disclaimer – This paper reflects the views of the author and not the Australian Department of Defence or the Australian Defence Force.

this was lucky at the time, because the bureaucracy in the early 1970s was a ponderous and dispiriting place in which to work. I was particularly struck by how many officers whom I knew from personal experience to be competent and dynamic in the regimental environment had become quite different kinds of people in the bureaucracy. Decisions dragged on for months and even years, and many important issues were neglected.

Another curious thing was that so few people shared my view that this was an important organizational performance issue. My colleagues, even those much more senior than I, seemed resigned to the situation. Sometimes I wondered whether I was operating in a kind of parallel universe.

In later years, when I returned to Russell Offices as a senior staff officer and then as a civilian observer, very little seemed to have changed. By this time it was evident to me that the key factor in all of this was not the leaders themselves, but the environment in which they worked – what we now call the “culture”.

This prompted me to reflect on three questions: What was it about the environment of the defence bureaucracy that had turned these “men into mice?” What was it about the regimental environment that had enabled the same men to have been as effective as leaders in that particular context? And why did people seem to accept the situation so readily?

A few research projects later, the answers to these questions and some principles to guide the development of leadership culture are beginning to emerge.

My thinking was helped when I became aware of the current approach to the traditional “nature versus nurture” debate. Geneticists have moved beyond what they regard as a false dichotomy to the more sophisticated concept of “nature *via* nurture”. To use an everyday example of this concept, we can readily see that a person with great talent and potential in, say, football, is unlikely to become a *great* footballer without the support of training, team-mates, progressive feedback

and many other kinds of enabling mechanisms. It is the putting together of all these enabling factors – the nature *with* the nurture – that creates a champion.³

Even more importantly, the nature via nurture concept tells us that people with certain dispositions (such as the desire and talent to be a sportsperson) thrive in the kind of environment in which they can express these dispositions. They become twice the sportsperson they could have been. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

It is the same with leaders. Military organizations invest an enormous amount of attention to the selection and training of leaders, but this investment will be maximized only when as much attention is given to the *context* in which these leaders operate. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is rich in leadership talent, and it owes it to itself to organize things so that these leaders can perform to their potential, at all career and organizational levels.

This chapter is about that context: about what leaders at all levels can do to strengthen (or establish) the enabling factors that will help them and their organization perform well. It will have achieved its aim if it makes you think differently about leadership and if, as you advance towards senior rank, it helps you to critically examine and learn about the leadership process in your service and in the wider defence environment.

Outline

The argument is presented as follows:

- we begin on familiar territory, introducing the essentials of “leadership culture” by reference to four major factors that assist leaders in operational units to be effective.
- next, we explain the theoretical basis of these four major factors and how they affect leader performance.
- then we show how this relates to leadership culture at the more senior levels of the military organization, and

how, at that level, many aspects of the four factors are as much dis-enabling as enabling.

- we close by drawing a parallel between leadership and golf, concluding that, in both cases, success lies in first recognising that “It’s the backswing, stupid”.⁴

This chapter contains a mix of theory and case studies. The case studies are mainly contained in the three embedded “exhibits”. The first of these is a true-life account of how an ex-service officer used his experience as a leader in the service to develop an appropriate leadership culture in a highly competitive business environment. The second exhibit summarizes the major changes that you can expect to find as you step up from the operational level of leadership to the strategic level. The final exhibit summarizes what the Royal Australian Air Force did to develop a strategic leadership culture by confronting the need to make significant breaks with traditional practice. Scattered throughout the chapter are a number of extracts from interview notes taken during the “Once Were Warriors” research and other projects.⁵

Why We Should be Interested in Leadership Culture

We are used to thinking about strategic leadership in terms of important and long-reaching decisions about capability investment, deployment, civil-military relations, and all the other stuff familiar to us from military history books. But strategic leadership is also a process by which leaders set in place performance-enhancing features that make their jobs and those of leaders at all levels easier.

People tend to overplay the importance of “the leader” in the leadership process. This is nicely captured in the opening quote from Walter Ulmer, a retired general who was both a senior field commander and later the head of a prominent academic leadership research institution. This is a particular problem for the military institution because it depends so much on the performance of its leader at all levels.

Having good *leaders* is not the same as having good *leadership*. Focusing too much on the leaders makes us overlook the other important factors in the leadership process. As a consequence, too many problems are misdiagnosed, or seen as lack of leader skill or will, when they are really due to performance-inhibiting features in the situation, particularly “cultural” ones.

In his dissection of the “Cult of the CEO” – the assumption that changing the head person in a corporation is the necessary first step in turning a company around – Australian journalist Gideon Haigh shows that the only real beneficiaries of this approach have been an elite corps of well-remunerated, internationally-mobile CEOs. Although this may suit the mood of a society “where we look one another right in the wallet”, Haigh demonstrates the patchy record of such a strategy by pointing to the growing number of CEOs leaving office because of failure to fix the problems they were hired to address (the number more than doubled between 1995 and 2001). The debate about the role of CEOs in turning companies around is one-dimensional, Haigh concludes, because “in its fixation with the CEO’s control of corporations, it overlooks the *degree to which the corporation controls its CEO*”.⁶

There are two major implications to this perceptive conclusion. First, the factors that influence executive behaviour are often so well embedded in its culture that they are difficult to diagnose, especially if they have become “the way we do things here”. In such cases, strategies like bringing in a new CEO or giving the senior leadership team some additional skills (the latter being the usual ADF approach to fixing senior leadership performance problems) are flawed from the start, because they begin with the wrong premise.

Second, even if the problem is accurately diagnosed, it is the nature of strong cultures that they find difficult to change.⁷ We can become so conditioned to seeing the world in a particular light that we just do not recognize issues that have implications for our futures. This is illustrated in Jared Diamond’s *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive*.⁸ The word “Choose” in the sub-title says it all and, while Diamond deals with the societal

level of analysis, his argument is just as applicable to organizational situations. By choosing to ignore or defer important strategic decisions, societies/organizations often unwittingly contribute to their own demise. For example, in the great corporate shake-up that occurred in Australia during the 1980s, many businesses failed because they either couldn't see what was coming or couldn't bring themselves to change until it was too late.⁹

Thus, there are many traps for even the experienced in choosing a strategy to improve organizational performance. Happily, the leadership culture concept serves as a simple but valid and powerful model to guide the practitioner through the growing complexity of ideas on contemporary military organizational leadership.

None of this, by the way, suggests that leaders are irrelevant in the leadership process: far from it. However, the leader's job can be made harder or easier by the extent to which the organization has established an appropriate leadership culture, with performance "enablers" that assist the leadership process. In this sense, leadership culture is a force multiplier.

Leadership Culture and the Military Institution

Leadership Culture at the Operational Level

Imagine this. You are on your way to take up an operational command appointment at the lieutenant-colonel (or equivalent) level. Chances are that you are feeling apprehensive; but you will also probably be excited and confident. Ask yourself this. What is it about the nature of this impending career opportunity that makes you feel so positively towards it?

Here are some of the points you may have jotted down in response to this question:

- Leadership
 - You will have been well trained in the theory and practice of both leadership and your professional function.

- You are likely to feel competent and confident in yourself and you will be eager to put all your skills into practice.
- You have every reason to feel confident that all of these factors will make you the kind of person whom people in your unit will want to follow.
- Followership
 - Subordinate leaders in the unit are likely to be imbued with the ethos of “followership”. They will be ready, willing and able to give support and assistance to you as the person in charge – not just because they know that their careers may depend on doing so, but also (we’d hope “mainly”) because they believe that what the unit does is worthwhile.
 - Everyone else in the unit, (especially your subordinate leaders), is likely to be competent in their professional function. Unit members will have the total suite of skills needed to support you and make your unit effective.
- Institutional architecture
 - The unit’s command infrastructure, in the form of technology, well-established operational and communication procedures and the like will help you make things happen quickly, and accurately.
 - The unit’s NCO “parallel command” structure and informal communication system network allows them to monitor performance and help their officers understand what is going on.
- Social capital
 - It is highly likely that the unit will have a strong sense of cohesion, trust, mutual respect and teamwork. People will speak the same language, and the key members of

the unit will have a shared view of the world, having been through similar formative career experiences.

The above situation – in which you are willing and able to lead, your subordinates are willing and able to follow, and the organizational and social structure will help you lead – is a good example of a “leadership culture”. Notice that most of its components are not really about the leader. Certainly, without the leaders’ contribution, things would not get done but, equally, leaders would find it difficult to “lead” without the support of the enabling factors.

Most of these factors evolved as the results of experience across centuries, and are now so much part of our “conventional wisdom” that we wouldn’t expect military units to operate effectively without them. However, if this is so self evident that it scarcely needs stating, we might wonder at the attitude that allows the ADF to blithely tolerate at the higher levels of the organization, where obvious dis-enabling factors have hampered strategic leadership performance for decades. We will get to this issue shortly.

The Benefits of a Strong Leadership Culture – and the Problems Associated with a Weak One

The benefits of having such a leadership culture are evident in contemporary ADF performance. A striking example is the ADF’s recent operational performance, beginning in East Timor in 1999 and continuing in various parts of the world since. Despite a long fallow period following the withdrawal of the ADF from Vietnam, during which there was very little opportunity for units and even many individuals to gain operational experience, the brigade-group that was deployed into East Timor performed with impressive skill. Furthermore, if the lack of operational experience showed itself in some major logistic difficulties, it certainly had no discernible effect on the performance of the three services in the field.

To a large extent, the foundation of this success was due to the way that the ADF perpetuated its unit-level leadership

culture during the low-activity years following Vietnam. Much credit is due to the efforts of a generation of senior- and middle-level leaders, who had continued to maintain professional standards in an era when many Australians and even many government leaders paid little attention to defence issues and, in some cases, even regarded the ADF as close to irrelevant. These leaders ensured that the elements of an operational-level leadership culture were so strongly embedded in the ADF professional way of thinking that they became “a way of life” that was robust enough to withstand the erosive effects of a long period without operational practice.

A less flattering example relates to the ADF’s persistent failure to address long-standing personnel strategy issues. Analysis of Australian demographic trends in the mid 1980s had identified an almost inevitable decline in the numbers of young Australians available for military recruitment, a decline which had been forecast since the early part of the new millennium. But even with such a long lead time, the ADF (particularly the Navy and the Army) prevaricated on the issue for the best part of two decades, right up to the time when the “people drought” was beginning to affect capability. The problem was compounded by long-standing retention problems that, again, were tackled in a piecemeal and half-hearted way, even though the ADF had repeatedly been shown the way ahead by each of a long series of major studies.¹⁰

Although the current Chief of the Defence Force has indicated that the recruitment/retention issue is now the ADF’s “biggest strategic challenge”, civilian observers must wonder why the institution could not energize itself much earlier.¹¹ We will see shortly that the reasons for this had much to do with long-standing dis-enabling cultural factors that were – and to a large extent still are – impeding performance at the strategic level.

The Key Elements of a Leadership Culture

As the earlier example of your own career experience shows, a leadership culture is essentially an organizational and social

environment that enables leaders to get things done. One of the key tasks for strategic leaders is to create and manage the factors that will strengthen the four key elements of leadership culture for all levels of leadership.

To recap, the key factors that comprise a leadership culture include:

- Leadership per se (i.e., leaders who are willing and able to lead);
- Followership (i.e., subordinates who are willing and able to follow);
- Institutional architecture (i.e., organizational and procedural mechanisms that facilitate decision making, communication and action); and
- Social capital (i.e., shared meaning and understanding, teamwork, cohesion and trust).

The best kind of leadership is that which generates followership. As the second quote to the chapter reminds us, it is the willing horse that takes the jump, not the rider.

While there is a multitude of ways by which a leader can generate followership, the principles are fairly simple. If you want to get people to come out of their comfort zones, to significantly change their way of operating, and to reach extraordinary levels of performance, you have to engage them in the process. A major part of this is to make them interested in what you are interested in.

A case study of the development of leadership culture in a non-military organization is presented in Exhibit 1. This presents a real-life example in which a leader established a culture of followership, institutional architecture and social capital, in order to achieve corporate goals. It was not rocket science and it probably seemed like common-sense to the leader in question. Nevertheless, it did not arise by accident and would not have happened without that leader giving much thought and

attention to what was needed to develop the kind of organizational, social and cultural infrastructure that would help him get the best leverage from his leadership skills.

Exhibit 1: The Leadership Culture at White Mountain

When Colin T, a former service officer, took over as general manager of the White Mountain ski resort, his board gave him three years to make the operation profitable. At the time, this seemed like a big task. White Mountain was a small, newly established resort in an area dominated by two big operations, both of which had the advantage of extensive skiing terrain. Fortunately, Colin already had decided what his strategy would be. The market was changing, with a growing number of families coming to ski each year. Colin aimed to present White Mountain as “the family-friendly resort” and to compete with the larger resorts by offering improved customer service.

Colin’s biggest challenge was “followership”. The active and willing cooperation of employees was crucial, because ‘customer service’ involves a host of minor interactions with resort staff. However, the traditional approach of operational employees in the Australian ski industry to the skiing public was one of polite condescension. The large majority of resort employees were casuals, turning up each year on their own volition, often driven as much by the opportunity to ski as to work. As such, they had no particular incentive to treat the skiing public any differently this year just because the boss said so.

In order to make his strategy work, Colin had to get his employees to see their role in a different light, and then to behave in accordance with the interests of the company.

Colin approached this in three main ways:

- First, he let it be known that employees who performed well each season would be given assistance finding jobs at overseas resorts during the off-season, and were guaran-

teed a job at White Mountain during subsequent seasons for as long as they wanted. In this way, he created a longer-term incentive for people to commit to the future of the business and to change their behaviour accordingly.

- Second, he built employee awareness by conducting pre-season team training in which teams explored what the group could do to improve overall customer service. The emphasis in these sessions was for the employees themselves to identify their own solutions to the overall goal. Colin explained to them that they knew their local situation much better than management, and he was looking to them to define and use appropriate practices. In this way, employees came to realize that behaving differently would not involve much more effort, and would possibly be more rewarding in terms of improved interactions with the public. Their involvement in the process built a sense of engagement.
- Finally, he encouraged people to feel like part of the company team, by conducting weekly social sessions in which milestones and personal events, such as birthdays, were celebrated and, most importantly, weekly progress indicators were revealed. At these sessions, Colin would often talk about positive incidents he had observed during the week (during what he called his style of “management-by-skiing-about”) and about feedback gathered from skiers as they left at the end of the day. These sessions allowed Colin to establish a mechanism for regular communication and feedback, during which employees at all levels came to see themselves as part of the corporate whole, and as a group of colleagues rather than a group of employees.

As the season progressed, the change in the mood of the resort was noticeable. Skiers felt more comfortable and staff felt greater engagement and satisfaction. As group cohesion improved, and as lift-hands, food-outlet servers and ticket-sales staff grew accustomed to focusing on customer service, White Mountain’s customer numbers climbed while those of their competitors remained flat. At the end of the season,

despite comparatively poor skiing conditions across the region, White Mountain had its most profitable year ever.

The success of the program was shown in a number of ways. White Mountain continued to do well, relative to its larger competitors. In fact, four years later, its nearest competitor made a successful takeover bid. Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the notion of “customer service” became the norm in the Australian skiing industry. Colin has moved on from White Mountain but his legacy remains.

The White Mountain resort manager used two main strategies to encourage employees to share his goal of improved customer service. To begin with, he provided extrinsic incentives (the promise of future employment/career opportunities) in order to build good-will, trust and a sense of security. But that was only “Step One”. The extrinsic incentives associated with this kick-start were supplemented by the positive reinforcement of being treated as part of a team that was engaged in a purposeful activity. With this foundation, the manager was able to engage employees in reaching for different ways of operating. That is, people were gradually enticed out of their comfort zones, by small steps early in the process that made them ready and able for larger steps later.

This was probably an almost subliminal process and, after only a few weeks into the ski season, most employees would have felt that any extra effort involved in customer service was more than compensated for by the gratification of feeling part of a group endeavour, engaged in a worthwhile goal (even if they saw it largely as beating their rivals on the next mountain). But in all likelihood, few would have given this conscious thought. One of the most powerful features of a leadership culture is the way that it shapes the “right” kind of behaviour by means of cues and reinforcement mechanisms that are embedded in the social and organizational structure.¹²

In terms of the development of a spirit of followership, military institutions have certain inherent advantages over civil-

ian organizations. Career socialization will have instilled a sense of loyalty and duty, and the organizational structure of the military unit, with its formal and informal chains of authority and requirement for junior leaders and NCOs to be alert to the welfare of their people, means that you can usually take a certain degree of followership for granted.¹

But leaders need to build on this useful foundation, by managing their people in ways that increase commitment even further. The way to do this is through sensible and time-honoured practices, such as treating people and their contribution with respect, allowing them to operate with a certain degree of elbow room, giving them opportunities to use valued skills, consulting them in appropriate matters, letting them know how they are performing, keeping them in the picture as to progress and outcomes, and so on.

However, followership is not just about people being *willing* to give support; it's also about their being *able* to do so. A leader will get better support from followers with strong professional and technical expertise than from those who are new to a field, however keen and loyal they are. (If this sounds like a truism and a situation that no sensible organization would want to risk, we will see shortly that this is a common condition at the top of the military organization.)

Fortunately for the Australian military, its officers take naturally to a “follow-me” or “Captain-Coach” approach to leading. This is a direct and directive “managing-downwards” style that works well in situations where prompt decisive action is needed, where followers expect direction, and where teamwork is already established. The leader's direct involve-

¹ Military people often do not realize the importance of followership until they go into an organization that doesn't have it. An organization where everybody wants to be the boss and/or where nobody wants to take responsibility for doing anything to help the appointed leader is an immensely frustrating place to be. Many officers find this a source of considerable frustration when they make the transition from service life to a civilian career.

ment facilitates control and makes hands-on guidance and communication relatively easy.

It is not surprising that the captain-coach approach tends to build cohesion, turning the “I” into the “We”. In the Australian national culture, with its egalitarian values, people respond positively to such a style, and leaders find it a comfortable style to practice. One of the strengths of the Australian military institution is that it produces junior leaders who are competent in the nuts-and-bolts of their craft – in “the professionalism of small things”, the mastery of a myriad of routine and minor details, each perhaps petty in themselves but profound in their combination. This gives such officers the wherewithal and credibility to assume the captain-coach role.¹³

But if leaders spend their formative career years engaged in the captain-coach leadership style, they can become too dependent on taking charge and being in control and can be slow to adapt to circumstances that are less conducive to such an approach. In particular, they may flounder when they are thrust into the much more complex work environment at the top of the defence organization, where they will need to rely on other methods of influencing people.

Leadership Culture and Senior Leadership

Stepping Up to the Strategic Level

Earlier, you were invited to imagine your feelings and expectations as you headed towards a command position at the lieutenant-colonel level. Imagine now that you are headed for your first experience as the head of a policy-oriented staff division within defence headquarters of your service.

It would not be surprising if your feelings about this more senior career opportunity were somewhat different to those you had about earlier leadership appointments. Chances are that, whatever positive can-do attitude you bring to your career, you will be expecting this more senior policy-oriented

appointment to pose much more of a challenge, and even to be somewhat less fulfilling, than the career appointments you had in the early stages of your career.

“Exhibit 2: Stepping up to the strategic level” discusses some of the factors involved.

Exhibit 2: Stepping Up to the Strategic Level

People moving up to the senior leadership career level find themselves engaged in an appreciably different professional role to those with which they successfully dealt with earlier.

To begin with, the professional focus is much, much broader. Whereas a unit leader’s focus is on the here-and-now and on the immediate environment, the focus of senior leaders is often on organizational possibilities and long-term plans. The scope of their concerns is regional and global, reaching into national and international political, social and economic issues. They deal with a host of other internal and external contacts and stakeholders, including Government and other non-government agencies, allies, and major contractors. All such stakeholders can be expected to have varying perspectives on goals and priorities and varying preferences on how these should be pursued.

Second, decisions are made in quite different ways and on the basis of quite different criteria. Leaders in units make decisions relatively quickly, often on the basis of doctrine and thought processes that have been ingrained by training and practice. In contrast, leaders at the top of the Defence Organisation must take account of often uncertain and usually varied political and financial/economic factors. It is not surprising that decision-making and policy development are often torturous and protracted.

Third, the functional organisation at the top – in the sense of how business is *really* done, as opposed to how a structure might be depicted on paper – is very complex. While the structure is notionally hierarchical and there is a strenuous

attempt to be orderly and prescriptive, the strategic-level organisation functions very much as a network. In such a situation, organisational responsibilities and lines of influence often cut across and between different programs. Many find it useful to think of the organisation at the strategic level as a system of political coalitions in which individuals and sub-groups vie for power and influence. Professional achievement in such situations requires people who are alert to the possibilities presented by alternatives, who have the ability to “get above” a problem to appreciate the perspectives of different stakeholders, and who can exercise political sensitivity and pragmatism. Above all, it requires the ability to be influential even in situations where they lack the formal trappings of command appointments, such as superior rank, greater experience and the legal authority to act unilaterally.

Fourth, an often-depressing degree of “process” and bureaucracy surrounds even seemingly minor decisions at the senior leadership level. While there is little direct evidence of the so-called “learned helplessness” syndrome, there is still a tendency to accept too readily “that things will take time”. It is true that public accountability and fiscal discipline *do* demand adherence to procedures and checks on financial commitment and expenditure, but this neither explains nor justifies the persistence of the “bureaucratic culture”.

Finally, senior officers are concerned that they, their colleagues and their support staff often lack deep expertise and practical experience within their respective functions, mainly because of a job rotation policy that keeps almost everybody in motion. Analysis in 2003 using official data provided by the Directorate of Senior Officer Career Management showed that the average senior military officer had been in his/her job for 1.2 years, with only 12% having been in their current appointment for two or more years, and their immediate reports were no less mobile. In contrast, a recent Australian study found that corporate employment tenure tends to be fairly stable, with the average Australian business executive spending around 5 to 6 years in each significant job.

Even on the civilian side, where the Defence Public Service executive group once provided a degree of stability and “corporate memory”, the Senior Executive Service is now driven by a generalist career philosophy every bit as powerful as that in the armed forces. Although they are not as mobile as their service counterparts, job mobility among senior bureaucrats was still high by community standards, with Defence’s civilian executives having a median time-in-current-job of 1.9 years, and with fewer than half (46%) having been in the current appointment for two or more years.

While many maintain – with considerable justification – that they must be doing a lot right, because otherwise why would Australia’s comparatively small defence force be performing so well, others point to just how much effort and time it takes to get many things done and how many issues get shelved indefinitely.

All of this is a challenge to the military professional new to the strategic arena, not to mention a serious set of impediments to effective organisational performance.

Stepping up to the strategic level involves a professional transition which is markedly different to the relatively seamless transitions between the earlier levels of leadership. Tables 5 and 6 summarize some of the differences between leadership at the two levels.

Leadership at the operational level	Leadership at the strategic level
Getting things done	Setting things up
Dealing with today	Preparing for tomorrow
Leadership that you can see	Leading from the shadows
Captain-coach	Commander, senior bureaucrat, tribal chief, builder/improver/change agent
Leading people	Leading the organization

TABLE 5: Leadership tasks at the operational level versus at the strategic level

	Organizational culture in units: “Tightly-focused professionalism”	Organizational culture at Defence: “Dealing with the BIG issues”
Professional focus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The concrete, immediate environment • The here-and-now 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The wider social and political environment • Future possibilities, strategy and uncertainty
Decision-making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decisive • Professional judgement, tradition and doctrine are the criteria for decisions • Strong concern for doing the right thing by members at all levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deliberate and often protracted • “Rational” decision criteria are often given priority over professional judgement • People are simply one of many resources to be managed efficiently
Organization and process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hierarchical but simple • Most members are well trained, experienced and competent • Despite the ostensible formality of its structures, strong social capital oils the wheels for routine efficiency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hierarchical and complex • Volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity • Many members are unfamiliar with their function and have no reason to expect future employment in it • Political skills are needed to get things done

TABLE 6: Differences between the working environment in early-mid career and that at the top

At higher command levels and in the Defence bureaucracy, the professional issues are much more complex (see Table 2). This requires that leaders adopt a different style of influence to that which they may have used successfully earlier in their career. The “Captain-Coach” role must give way to a more complex set of behaviours, in which the senior officer is required to play a number of different roles, sometimes simultaneously.

The strategic-level career involves four main roles (see Table 7). Two of these – commander and senior bureaucrat – are “official”, in the sense that they represent a type of appointment, specified duties and obligations. The other two – tribal chief and builder/improver/change agent – are “unofficial”: although they involve functions to which all senior officers are expected to contribute informally, these roles are not listed on any formal organizational chart and have no “duty statement”.

	<i>Familiar</i>	<i>Novel</i>
<i>Formal</i>	Commander	Senior bureaucrat
<i>Informal</i>	Tribal chief	Builder/improver/ change agent

TABLE 7: The main roles of the strategic leader

What officers do in the tribal chief and builder/improver/change agent roles is essentially discretionary. They may choose to do much, or they may choose to do little; it largely depends on the individual and the notion that the individual has about their duties and professional obligations. Although what they do will often receive no official reward, it is likely to affect their standing with their peers, especially in terms of the other members of their “tribe”.

The role of commander and, to a lesser extent, that of tribal chief will be familiar to the career officer, because they are

essentially a professional continuation of earlier mainstream career roles. In contrast, the roles of senior bureaucrat and builder/improver/change agent will be much less familiar. Officers may think that they know what the senior bureaucrat role involves, because they have been middle level staff officers, but most subsequently find that they still have a lot to learn. Not the least of these learning requirements is the need to develop a working knowledge of the relevant staff function. This represents a different area of expertise for the career military professional. This applies even to ostensibly familiar fields like “personnel”.

Traditional military institutional culture does not value the development of specialist expertise outside the professional mainstream. In fact, officers can be “penalized” if they remain too long in a particular non-mainstream field, since this, at least in the eyes of career managers, can make that officer “less competitive” for future command. It is not surprising that many senior officers view such appointments with decidedly mixed feelings.

The factors that affect senior leadership behaviour in Defence, both positively and negatively, are well-captured in the following trio of interview extracts. These came from three leaders, “X”, “Y” and “Z”, all of whom once worked in the same Director General (DG)-level team at different rank/grade levels.¹⁴ We begin with X, a civilian public service executive, talking about how well Z, the most senior of the three, had performed in a key senior policy development role¹⁴:

Z was doing a vital job that few other people had been able to do well. But after only 18 months in the job he was posted to command [an Australian-based formation]. The reason given was that the CDF needed “well-rounded candidates for Chief of [...]”.

¹⁴ All are now engaged in different functions, and none were aware that the others were also being interviewed. In fact, it was a happy coincidence that all three volunteered to be interviewed.

Next, Y, the one-star who had succeeded Z:

I think that I am well equipped for this appointment but I was fortunate in that I took over from Z. He had set up an infrastructure to help get things done: a hand-picked staff, including experienced “old stagers”, all of whom had been well-briefed about what you needed to do to be successful in the bureaucracy. I’m now into my third year and this long tenure is really paying off. It takes 5 to 6 years to change things in Defence. Without continuity of direction, focus and leadership, it’s hard to achieve very much.

Finally, two-star Z himself:

I just did what I thought was sensible. I was fortunate in that I had served in Canberra before and I knew a lot of my civilian counterparts. I’d acquired a sense of how the public service works and thinks. I spent a lot of time talking to them, to find out their views and where they were coming from. But it was still hard work! What was frustrating was that many of the barriers to getting things done were actually within the system’s control. First, tenure: I was given only 18 months in the job. That is ridiculous. If you want people to be accountable for results, then for heaven’s sake leave them there for long enough for their accountability to become evident. Second, very few of my staff had been trained for their huge resource management role, because they were being career-managed as generalists. This meant that their career prospects plunged if they were not picked for command. I had a number of really useful officers working for me but then the “command list” came out and some of them saw that they were not on it. Within 6 months, they had all left. What a waste!

These extracts are revealing as much in what they do not say as in what they do. If Z really was “doing a vital job that few

other people had been able to do well”, why was he moved on after only 18 months in the job? Does Y’s being “now into my third year” make him unusual? Given that careful career development is a distinctive feature of the early and middle professional military career, why was that very few of Z’s staff had been trained for their resource management role? Why did not being on the command list have such an influence on the career decisions of so many of his subordinate officers? Above all, why does it take “5 to 6 years to change things in Defence”? What, if anything, is it about the organizational culture that contributes to this?

High job rotation among senior officers would be much less of an issue if they could rely on a cadre of much-less-mobile support staff officers who would be the repositories of technical expertise and corporate memory. But these staff officers are just as likely to be engaged in job rotation themselves, since they are subjected to the same up-or-out career development policy as their more senior colleagues, and are no more likely than their senior colleagues to have previous experience with in a staff function or the time to develop such experience.

These three long-established staffing practices – senior officer churn, staff officer churn, and a “generalist” model of career development – act as an “iron triangle” that inhibits innovation in key areas. While these policies have the worthy aim of ensuring the dominance of the warrior ethos in Defence, they also prevent the development of any substantial expertise outside this role. With almost all the key players in complex policy development continually in transit, it is near impossible to develop such expertise. Even Defence’s public service executives are highly mobile, in line with a generalist model of career development similar to that traditionally used by the Services. This wide-spread job mobility at the top is inconsistent with community practices: the Australian Defence Organization’s (ADO’s) senior leaders and their support staff officers are more than twice as professionally mobile as their counterparts in Australian business corporations.¹⁵

Many senior officers, however, do not see this as a problem, in part because they have become conditioned to continual job rotation, with many relishing the stimulus and challenge of getting to grips with a new job every two years or so.

Perhaps none of this would matter so much in a more stable world, but the contemporary military environment is evolving very quickly, in many unexpected and unconventional directions.¹⁶ Not the least of the issues involved is the consequence of the ADF's long-standing difficulties in managing its finances. There are now a large and increasing number of cheques and balances within the decision making process to ensure that public money is sensibly and properly allocated and spent. An often-depressing degree of "process" and bureaucracy surrounds seemingly even minor decisions at the senior leadership level.

As one rear-admiral despairingly remarked,

There is so much "stuff" that you have to deal with. Just getting things done on a day-by-day basis is indicative of important basic level of competence. Innovation, when it happens, is not so much the development of new ideas and novel approaches, but it often just a way of finding ways to get things done with less. This is not unimportant, but it's not genuine innovation.¹⁷

And a major general observed that

We bury our leaders in process. Very few have any significant "thinking time"; very few have the opportunity to engage with their peers and staff in creative thinking and to bounce ideas about how they can create greater leverage for and from each other. The more process you have to deal with, the less thinking space you have, and the more risk averse you become... [So] you've got to be passionate about something to try to change it in the Defence bureau-

cracy. Most see it as just too big to change. This is in stark contrast to the Defence Organization outside Canberra, where innovation and teamwork are admired and supported.¹⁸

Such organizational practices inadvertently constrain the pace of change by promoting a short-termist and incremental approach to strategic problem solving. As a consequence, the ADF is good at “managing today” but much less expert at “managing tomorrow”. There may be much good-intentioned talk of developing the right “leadership culture” but, judging from present practices, there is very little real understanding of what “a leadership culture” actually means.

Leadership, Influence and “Politics”

Another reason that the leadership function becomes increasingly complex as the individual’s career advances is because it increasingly involves the process of “politics”. “Politics” includes dealing with ministers and government, and influencing upwards and sideways within the military/Defence institution in situations in which you lack formal authority.

Dealing with ministers and government is, in one sense, simply a matter of using your professional skills to interact with people and agencies who are as interested in the good of the organization as you are. As such, this does not involve “politics”. However, especially in the current “global war on terror” political environment, many operational decisions have a political dimension and many senior officers are aware that they risk being drawn into such matters despite their best intentions. As one major general put it,

There are ethical differences between this and earlier career levels. We all would like to think that ethics were straightforward, structured, and pristine, but it doesn’t happen like this. At the top of the organization, ethical issues are cloudier in terms of

how to get the complete organization to do things. For example, in XXX, we were constantly under scrutiny to confirm that we use the correct level of force even in very minor contacts. I did not find this objectionable nor an impediment to commanding. Not only is it inevitable in the modern context where the media is all-intrusive, it adds a degree of civility to the conduct of operations and, by making the knowledge that this practice would happen widely known, it serves as a restraint on hot-headed behaviour at the very junior levels.¹⁹

This same officer went on to note that, as a consequence, “I spend a lot of time thinking about the ethical issues of the way I operate, both as an individual and as the commander of ZZ”.

The practice of organizational politics demands an ability to be influential even when you often don’t have organizational authority. For example, a major general explained that he spent a lot of time “securing money and jobs”, with the key activities being the ability to “influence upwards”, “get others to understand how they can benefit by helping you”, and “continual networking and positioning”. The defence organization is based on a complex network of organizational relationships and a multiplicity of agencies and stakeholders, each with its own priorities and professional views of the world. Senior leaders in such an environment may often have little formal influence over such stakeholders, so they have to find ways of steering decisions through to a satisfactory conclusion in the absence of such formal influence.

Like “giving a concert on the violin while learning to play the instrument”, organizational politics is something that many people have to learn on the run. In part, this is because the need to develop such skill often takes them by surprise, and because the whole notion of “acting politically” seems antithetical to professional codes that have been deeply embedded by the early professional experience.

Leadership without Easy Answers

One of the most important principles to grasp in the transition to senior rank is that you no longer have to be the “expert”. This can be somewhat confronting, because respect for the chain of command is so ingrained that the military officer attributes expertise with authority, and just assumes that the person in charge must be the “expert”. But effective strategic leadership doesn’t depend just on being good at getting things done and feeling that it’s your responsibility to “know the answer” for the majority of problems with which you deal. Just as importantly, strategic effectiveness depends on accepting that, at this level, you have entered the zone of “Leadership Without Easy Answers”.

Leadership Without Easy Answers is a “must-read” book by Harvard scholar, Ronald Heifetz.²⁰ He explains, with copious case studies and examples, how leaders can get things done in situations of strategic crisis and stakeholder conflict where doctrinal guidance and precedent are lacking and he demonstrates the futility – and the dangers – of assuming that leaders and leadership teams must continually be able to produce immediate answers to complex issues.

The reason why leadership at the strategic level is such a challenge for both leaders and followers, Heifetz argues, is because leaders *and* followers need to accept a different way of thinking about how “leaders” can help solve “problems”. His fundamental tenet is that leadership at this level generally requires leaders to begin, not by providing solutions, but by asking questions, even in situations where followers demand that leaders “show decisive leadership”.

As Heifetz points out, in a crisis we tend to look for the wrong kind of leadership. We call for someone with answers, decision, strength, and a map of the future, someone who knows where we ought to be going – in short, someone who can make hard problems simple. But many problems are not simple. Instead of looking for saviours, we should be calling

for leadership that will challenge us to face problems for which there are no simple, painless solutions – problems that require us to learn new ways.²¹

The capacity to ask the right questions within each service leadership team depends in part on those at the top having access to a diversity of views and professional opinions. In this regard, the lack of diversity in the executive teams at the top of each service can be seen as an important weakness. While the executive boards in business corporations usually comprise a range of people from different professional backgrounds in order to ensure that they are not blindsided by unexpected environmental factors, their military equivalents are probably the least diverse of any executive group in the country, comprising as they do people from a single age group, a common professional background, common career development experiences and a common gender. However intelligent their members are, it would be remarkable if they were able to collectively comprehend and debate major problems in terms of their full strategic, capability, political, technological and social ramifications.

This lack of diversity at the top occurs for two main reasons. First, the requirement for virtually all senior-level career development to be oriented towards the production of service chiefs and senior commanders ensures that the career development system operates as a tournament, and only those who most closely fit this profile will progress at each career stage.²² Second, officers with different career priorities, or with non-mainstream career interests, who may choose to opt out of the normal career progression, will find it very difficult when they want to re-enter the process. These “different career priorities” include, most obviously, female officers electing to put their career on hold while they raise a family. “Non-mainstream career interests” includes officers who want to pursue a particular non-warrior speciality, such as personnel management or acquisition. In both these examples – and of course there are many others – such people will be no longer available for future senior leadership selection.

This effect is exacerbated because those who fit these two examples will often decide to opt out comparatively early in their careers. Since they feel that they must make a choice, they often choose in favour of themselves, especially if they think that it is futile to do otherwise. But the real loss is to their service, because many may have made perfectly adequate senior leaders even without the traditional career development experience.

A special case of this relates to what Morris Janowitz called “the mavericks”.²³ Janowitz notes that a large number of major innovations within the military institution have come from the efforts of mavericks, whose careers lie on the margins of the profession, pursuing particular ways of thinking in the face of all efforts, overt and covert, to dampen their enthusiasm. Plainly, it is the mavericks who are most likely to ask the searching strategic questions, but if the service restricts the advancement of mavericks (as tends to happen in Australia, at any rate), few will get a chance to do so.

Issues in Developing a Strategic Leadership Culture

The Four Factors Applied to Strategic Leadership

For an organization to be effective, it must be led by people who are supported by appropriate leadership culture. And the leadership culture that is appropriate for the top levels of the organization will differ, at least in detail, to that which prevailed at lower levels of the organization. In this section, we began to explore what our full dimensions of leadership culture might look like – or perhaps might not look like – at the strategic leadership level.

In terms of **Leadership**, those at the top echelons of large organizations obviously must be good at the practice of leadership per se. They also need a sound grasp of the full range of professional issues with which they deal on a day-to-day basis. Superior performance in leadership will not compensate for inadequate understanding of complex professional issues (and the reverse is equally true: it is not enough for

those at the head of the organization to have detailed professional understanding; they must also be excellent leaders).

There is little doubt that those at the top of the ADF are superior performers in the arts of leadership *per se*. But, as we have seen, a high degree of job rotation, guided by a generalist career development model, impedes the extent to which those in the leadership team have this second string to their bows, in terms of their understanding of the complex professional and contextual issues that are important for strategic decision-making in their various functions.

Similar issues apply in regard to **Followership**. Most of those who report to and support the senior leaders are themselves being developed for senior rank. And in terms of the leadership-without-easy-answers approach, such subordinates may be even less inclined to ask the tough questions than their seniors would.

Since there is a need for appropriate career development for senior officers, we must look for solutions that are not dependent on throwing babies out with bathwater. As many studies across the last three decades have argued, it is possible for the military institution to continue to enjoy the benefits of generalist-oriented senior officer development by providing them with expert specialist support from their immediate reports.²⁴ One thing that was noteworthy about the Air Force's experience with improving its senior leadership culture was how few specialist senior personnel staff officers were needed in order to make a big difference to the performance of the personnel system.

In terms of **Institutional Architecture**, the complex organizational structure at the top of military organizations presents a novel challenge to most mainstream officers. So many agencies have a stake in many major decisions that steering through a policy or course of action usually requires careful and painstaking planning, execution and negotiation. This is all the more challenging because the informal network within the bureaucracy is as important as the formal network, and requires the same careful attention if policy and plans are to be progressed.

And whereas in the unit it can be assumed that most people think along the same lines and are loyal to the same values, this cannot be assumed the top of the organization. The diversity of views and values, and differing opinions as to priorities means greater complexity in plotting how to get a particular course of action or policy implemented. This feature of defence bureaucracies cannot be avoided, and simply underlines the need for leaders and support staff to have the skill and insight to deal with the consequences of such complexity.

In terms of **Social Capital**, we noted earlier that the cohesion and trust associated with membership of a common tribe facilitates trust, communication and speed of decision-making at the unit level. At the strategic level, tribalism continues to be influential, but in a more complicated way.

For example, the trust engendered by membership of one uniformed tribe tends to carry over into the other uniformed tribes. As an Air Commodore remarked, sometimes this helps the process:

It is much easier for the services to deal with each other than to deal with the public service. An important factor is the latent trust between individuals. Service people will implicitly trust each other, whichever service they come from and are dealing with. You are a brigadier and therefore you already have my confidence; you can *lose* my confidence but you don't have to earn it. A public service officer, on the other hand, has to win my confidence in the first place.²⁵

Conversely, tribalism can slow down decision-making. As a Commodore said,

Officers seem to be conscious of having two chains of command: the official one, which goes through to whoever their boss is, and the tribal one which goes through to the Chief of Service... The Services develop a "tribal voice" on almost all issues. Each recognizes the others' various interests. They will

negotiate and consult even when they don't need to. This is not so much an unwillingness to make decisions, as it is a symbolic demonstration of taking each other's views into account.²⁶

In principle, this is not undesirable, but it can become so when it inhibits officers from taking a counter-view in the interests of the broader corporate need. Those unwise enough to go out on a limb for corporate interests that are in conflict with tribal interests cannot expect such behaviour to go unnoticed – or, perhaps as one cynic put it, “to go unpunished”. It is not surprising that this tends to lead to conformity and conservatism; and there is another important subtle element that slows decision-making.

To recap, we have noted that the kind of “culture” in which officers work has a substantial influence on what they do, whether they know it or not. The leadership culture at the unit level contains many strong enabling factors to help leaders to lead. And, just as they should, most of these features also exist to support the performance of senior operational commanders. However, the leadership culture that tends to prevail in the defence bureaucracy contains dis-enabling factors that inhibit performance. An outstanding leader, with outstanding situational awareness within the bureaucracy, can overcome these dis-enabling factors, but this really just proves the point.

In summary:

- an enabling leadership culture is needed just as much at the top levels of the organization as it is at unit and command levels;
- the current leadership culture at the top levels cannot be described as “enabling”; and
- whatever its details should look like, it will be different to those in other professional military contexts, in only to balance organizational needs with organizational realities.

Table 8 sums up our discussion about the differences between leadership culture in units and leadership culture at the top.

	Leadership culture in units: Well-established and supportive	Leadership culture at the top: Still some way to go
Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Competent leaders, developed by relevant career development experience 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generalists, whose core expertise may bear little resemblance to the functions in which they are appointed to provide leadership • Lack of diversity risks conformity and “group think”, which makes the “Leadership Without Easy Answers” approach of asking questions less likely
Followership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Competent subordinates, well trained and experienced in the function 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As above
Institutional architecture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lean, focused, well-understood and reliable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complex, variable, poorly-understood, subject to “small-p” political influence
Social capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trusting, cohesive, speaking the same language, sharing a point of view 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sceptical, speaking in different languages, coming from different points of view and different sources of tribal loyalty

TABLE 8: Differences between operational-level and strategic-level “leadership cultures”

It is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss in detail what might be done to create an appropriate strategic leadership culture, but it is hoped that the reader will now have some notion of what it might be.

It Can be Done: the Air Force Experience

A few years ago, the Air Force took the initiative to develop its own form of strategic leadership culture. The process, which is summarized in Exhibit 3, “Senior Air Force Leadership Culture”, was not an easy one, but the then Chief of the Air Force considered to be imperative in terms of maintaining the institution’s long-term health.

This case study suggests that it is no coincidence that the development of an Air Force strategic leadership culture was closely followed by a marked improvement in the Air Force’s retention and recruitment situation, in contrast to the other two services.

Exhibit 3: The Royal Australian Air Force Strategic Leadership Culture

In recent years, the Air Force has been the best performing service in terms of recruitment and retention. Close examination of possible reasons suggests that it had much to do with changes that the Air Force has made to its strategic leadership culture.

The Air Force senior leadership team had a breakthrough a few years back when it started looking a bit more closely in the mirror. For example, instead of blaming other agencies for project delays, or the recruitment system for personnel shortages, it looked at what it was and wasn’t doing about such things. In essence, the then crop of senior leaders concluded, “we have seen the enemy and it is ourselves”. And without a lot of fuss, they began doing a number of things differently.

- First, Air Force senior officers analysed the quality of communication amongst themselves as senior leaders. When they did this, they identified that they were suffering from a phenomenon known as ‘Groupthink’. This is the tendency for members of the group to be more concerned over maintaining group cohesion and the *appearance* of solidarity rather than getting at the truth and tackling a solution that upsets the status quo.

Groupthink makes people reluctant to speak candidly for fear of rocking the boat or of endangering one's own standing and reputation within the group. When this was recognized, the Air Force senior leadership team took considerable pains to improve the quality, clarity and honesty of their internal communication.

- Second, Air Force ensured that staffing within key support functions had the same sort of features as those that are in place to assist commanders to perform well. In the personnel field, for example, Air Force appointed a DG who was not only from the mainstream career group (i.e., aircrew) but who had a solid background in personnel related functions. The DG was supported by mid-level subordinates with a similar career profile. It was intriguing to see how much difference this simple arrangement made to the general performance of the total branch.
- Third, the Air Force senior team developed an overarching strategic plan, with appropriate indicators on performance for each major support function.
- Fourth, when the Air Force recognized a problem, it began to do something about it. For example, in the late 1990s the ADF was having trouble retaining engineers. Air Force senior leaders talked to engineers about what the issues were and they developed and implemented programs to address the relevant issues. Result: no engineer retention problem, in contrast to Navy and Army who continued to have trouble in this regard.
- Finally, the Air Force improved top-down communication. It did this in a number of ways but a major feature was the Chief's practice of frequently visiting the troops, so that he could talk to them and, more importantly, they could talk to him.

Which of these was decisive? The answer is, of course, they all were. In strategic leadership and management, there is

very rarely ‘one big thing’ to do. Rather, there are a whole lot of comparatively little things which together are greater than the sum of their parts.

Of course, it is not all roses. Air Force senior leadership is not doing everything better or everything well. It still does a number of dumb things. But, at least in the personnel field, it does more smart things than the other two Services, who often seem paralysed by inaction on the personnel front in particular.

This greater competence in strategic people management might not translate into better operational performance in the short-term. All three Services are doing well on operations, not least because of the skills and professionalism of junior commanders and the rank and file. But in the long-term, if you are struggling in the war for talent, this will ultimately affect your ability to put the right numbers of people of the right quality into the field, not to mention having the right people in staff organisations to make strategic decisions across a range of complex functions in the difficult environment. And whatever the arena, not having the right kind of people to perform it will affect operational performance in all sorts of ways.

Among the many lessons to be learned from this case study is that the success of the change program had very little to do with either giving people new skills or simply of appointing outstanding individuals to leadership roles at the top of the organization. As we argued earlier, the military institution over-uses training and education as organizational development strategies, and this case study illustrates the point.

“It’s the Backswing, Stupid”

A leadership culture has the same kind of affect on organizational performance as a backswing has on golfing performance. Both provide the kind of sound structure from which good performance springs. Without a sound golf swing, it is difficult to score consistently well. Without a sound leadership culture, it is difficult for leaders to lead.

Over my long career as a golfer, I have observed two things about players who have erratic golfing performances (i.e., most players):

- First, they have terrible *backswings*. They never do it the same way twice except by accident. Most golfers are prone to all sorts of faults in their backswings: they don't use their feet on the backswing to move their hips and knees into position, or they don't cock their wrists enough, or they cock their wrists too much, and so on. The consequence is that they invariably put themselves in a physical position at the top of the swing that makes it difficult for them to execute the shot they need for the given circumstances.
- Second, when the inevitable happens and they slice or hook or duff, the average golfer invariably explains this in terms of the *downswing*. They will tell you they hit a poor shot because they didn't hold their head still, or because they started the downswing too early, or because they let their hands lead their hips, or for any one of a hundred other reasons. Rarely do these have anything to do with the real cause of the problem.ⁱⁱⁱ

Many readers will be well ahead of me here, and will have recognized the parallel between the diagnosis of a golf problem and the diagnosis of an organizational problem. The phenomenon is very similar in both cases:

- First, the reasons for deep seated organizational problems are invariably structural, rather than behavioural. That is to say, when a "problem" emerges in the form of unacceptable performance, the reasons will usually be at least as much about long-standing workplace organizational and social structural issues as they are about neglect or incompetence of those who happened to be in charge at the time.
- Second, the senior leaders who are responsible often do not see it that way. They will see the problem in terms of

ⁱⁱⁱ Golf is the ultimate demonstration that man is a slow learner.

delivery – that is, in terms of the downswing – rather than in terms of the backswing. Their focus will be on improving delivery, without consideration of the handicaps been placed on the delivery process by the flaws in the structural situation.

A long association with both golf and organizational diagnosis has taught me this fundamental truth:

If you have a sound backswing, or a sound organizational environment, you have a very good chance of performing well. Conversely, if you don't get the backswing right or if you haven't got the environment right, your chances of reliable performance are just about nil.

Conclusions

Consider the kaleidoscope. You put it to your eye and you see a certain pattern. Then you give it a shake; and the pattern changes. The bits of coloured glass are still the same bits of coloured glass; but the pattern is different. This chapter has tried to shake the leadership kaleidoscope and to present you with a familiar concept in somewhat different light. It will have achieved its aim if it makes you think differently about leadership, especially about the difference between leadership as it is practised at the junior and mid career levels (“leading people”) and leadership as it is practised at the more senior levels of your service (“leading the organization”).

Leadership is rarely easy, and clever institutions establish organizational and social environments that help leaders to get things done in challenging situations. We call such an environment a “leadership culture”.

In the first half of a service career most will operate with the help of well-established leadership cultures. These are all the more powerful for their robust but subtle ubiquity. As one's career advances, however, one is increasingly faced with organizational situations that are not supported by a well-established leadership culture. One of the tasks as a strategic

leader will be determining what is needed in this respect and then doing what is necessary to bring it about.

Between now and when in a senior leadership position, the ideas presented above can be used to study leadership with a more informed eye. Watch, listen, think, learn. Better to start learning now than to have to “give a concert on the violin while learning to play the instrument”.

In this respect, here are some things to look out for and think about as one’s career advances:

- Be alert to the factors in the organizational environment that make it possible for leaders to lead. Note in particular the social factors and the deeply-embedded career and cultural elements in the institution that underpin such environmental factors.
- Don’t just look at the obvious and the immediately visible. Look behind the visible things that leaders do, and note the structural network supporting them. Bear in mind the maxim that “It’s the backswing, stupid”.
- Do all you can to strengthen the social capital of the institution. Be alert to the value of social capital: just because you can’t measure or quantify it does not diminish its importance – if anything, the opposite is the case.
- Be aware of the principles derived from *Leadership Without Easy Answers*, especially that the senior leader must be as willing to pose questions as to find solutions, and to champion radical breaks with the past that will involve overcoming opposition by skilful professional politics.
- Start thinking about what you can do to improve your skills in exercising influence when you lack formal authority. Actively involve yourself in situations – often outside the service – where you can start active observation and practice of this key subtle skill.

- Work on your public speaking skills, especially on getting away from the lectern and its attendant “speech” notes.
- As you advance in seniority you will increasingly be confronted with ethical issues of leadership. The most difficult of these may be a situation where you will be risking your career to champion an unpopular course of action. Don’t be surprised when this happens.

Above all, do not lose sight of the essence of “leadership”, as expressed succinctly by an air vice-marshal:

Leadership is about the organizational power to achieve ends. It’s not about “leading” per se. The exercise of power involves appreciating and utilising a number of different sources of power, such as resources, connections, opportunities, and people who can help you, as well as your own formal authority, with the appropriate mix contingent on the situation.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER 6

Strategic Perspectives on Military Ethics Education in the Australian Defence Force

Jamie Cullens*

*When planning for a year plant corn; When planning for a decade
plant trees; When planning for life, train and educate people.¹*

Introduction

Ethical failures have occurred in Western militaries over the past few decades, and in the 21st Century they continue. The failures “have involved military and public service personnel of all age groups, all elements and without regard to religion, ethnicity, gender or any other criteria”.²

In recent Australian Defence Force (ADF) experience there are suggestions that some serious operational incidents have highlighted ethical problems (e.g., the 1996 *Black Hawk* disaster).³ The problems or dilemmas have ranged from Operation Morris Dance off Fiji in 1987, where an Infantry rifle company was ordered to load and unload their machine guns seven times in 24 hours as assessments were made as to how a heavily armed intervention may appear to Fijians; to Operation Lagoon in Bougainville in 1994, where the question asked was how “ethically sound is it for troops that have been deployed to establish a presence and create a deterrent be permitted to shoot in protection of life and property?”⁴; to current daily issues on operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor and the Solomon Islands. The ADF's current operational tempo with about 3000 personnel deployed on several operations will become busi-

* Disclaimer – This paper reflects the views of the author and not the Australian Department of Defence or the Australian Defence Force.

ness as usual and Australian forces will be involved in operations across the globe either independently or as part of a coalition. This means that Australians will often be in command. The fact that the ADF has performed to a high ethical standard on recent operations can be attributed to the quality of leadership, training and a degree of luck. It is also important to note that there have been only a handful of casualties during Australian operations since East Timor in 1999 and most of these have been training-related incidents. A higher rate of casualties would change many perceptions, lead to many more questions and enhanced media scrutiny, and perhaps also raise the number and nature of ethical dilemmas encountered by Australian forces. So how should the ADF educate its personnel to better equip them to handle these complex challenges?

This chapter examines the state of ethics education in the ADF but does not enter into a philosophical discussion about ethical theory. The St James Ethics Centre promotes the phrase “What ought one to do?” as the central question of ethics. The author asks whether the contemporary approach taken by the ADF in military ethics education is the right thing to do and suggests things that need to be done to develop better and more relevant military ethics programs.

Some Historical Context

In discussing where the ADF is at in relation to military ethics education it is important to understand where the nation has come from. During the period 1770 to 1930, the frontier wars in Australia between European settlers and Aboriginal peoples left perhaps 2000 Europeans and up to 20,000 Aborigines dead. The conflict saw many massacres and other atrocities conducted by both sides and the “black-white warfare was sporadic, barbaric and guerrilla in style”.⁵ The Europeans were predominantly police or settlers but from time to time para-military forces were involved. The nation’s military history suggests that Australian military forces have generally conducted themselves well in fighting overseas and, with exceptions, have generally “done the right thing” on mil-

itary operations and in training since the first deployment of the New South Wales contingent to the Sudan in 1885.

The exceptions, however, include the shooting and bayoneting of German prisoners at the Battle of the Menin Road on the Western Front⁶ in September 1917 and stories of atrocities against Japanese prisoners in the South West Pacific campaigns. Australia has also had its fair share of infamous commanders who are worthy of consideration in the military ethics education process and three of them merit highlighting as examples.

For example: Lieutenant Harry Harboard “The Breaker” Morant, was born in England and migrated to Australia in 1883. In South Africa (1901), he was commanding a detachment of the Bushveldt Carbineers at the age of 37 and was arrested and charged with the shooting of 12 Boer prisoners and a German missionary. He was tried by court-martial, found guilty and subsequently executed along with Lieutenant Peter Handcock. Debate continues today, supported by folklore and the popular film *Breaker Morant*, about whether he was just following orders and was made a scapegoat by the British. He is arguably Australia’s first war criminal.

During World War II, at a time of dire threat to Australia, Major General Gordon Bennett was Commanding the Australian Imperial Force in Malaya and Singapore in 1941 and early 1942. Following the Japanese invasion and subsequent surrender of the Allied forces, Bennett left his 8th Division after the surrender was signed on 15 February 1942, and returned to Australia in order to inform the Government of Japanese fighting capabilities. His Division went into captivity at Changi and many were involved in building the Thailand-Burma railway where they suffered appalling deprivations, disease and death over several years. The Royal Commission convened in November 1945 and was appointed to investigate matters relating to Bennett’s departure from Singapore and included the statement that “Whether in all the circumstances Major General Henry Gordon Bennett was

justified in relinquishing his command and leaving Singapore". The debate continues to this day as to whether Bennett had "done the right thing".⁷

Finally, Captain Duncan Stevens, Royal Australian Navy, was the Commanding Officer of the destroyer *HMAS Voyager* when it collided with the aircraft carrier *HMAS Melbourne* in February 1964. He lost his life along with 81 members of his crew. The subsequent Royal Commission found him to be abusive, a chronic alcoholic, and unfit to command. The investigations also revealed attempts by the Navy to engage in a cover-up campaign, and it cast unfavourable light on the behaviour of some senior officers. In his book on the disaster, the former executive officer of *Voyager*, Peter Cabban, remarked on the impact of the disaster on personal relationships in the Navy, "the scandal that followed placed loyalty, friendship and respect under sometimes unbearable pressure. Embedded in these conflicts was the ancient moral dilemma of having to choose between personal conscience and the common causes: the expendable individual against the greater good".⁸ To this day survivors of the disaster are still seeking compensation.

In addition to these individual examples, Dr. Bob Hall in his seminal work, *Combat Battalion*, has examined the ethical behaviour of an Infantry battalion on operations in Vietnam in 1969-70. He remarks that the war in Vietnam "placed young Australian soldiers in positions of impossible moral ambiguity and expected them to cope alone. Still, the number and extent of moral or ethical failures was probably no larger than in earlier wars".⁹ These examples serve to remind ADF personnel engaged in 21st century warfare that the ADF is fallible and that leaders at all levels need to remain vigilant in the complex environments in which they operate.

Contemporary Perspectives

Over the past two decades, the nature of ADF operational experience has raised ethical dilemmas for commanders and personnel as have the challenges in Rwanda, East Timor,

Afghanistan and Iraq. There was also extensive commentary in the media about the ADF's ethical challenges in the "Children Overboard Affair" in 2001 and it continued into 2007. Perhaps nowhere is the impact of an ethical failure better revealed than with the Canadian experience in Somalia in 1993. The Preface to the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia released in June 1997 stated in part;

"Systems broke down and organizational discipline crumbled. Such systemic or institutional faults cannot be divorced from leadership responsibility, and the leadership errors in the Somalia mission were manifold and fundamental: the systems in place were inadequate and deeply flawed; practices that fuelled rampant careerism and placed individual ambition ahead of the needs of the mission had become entrenched; the oversight and supervision of crucial areas of responsibility were deeply flawed and characterized by the most superficial of assessments; even when troubling events and disturbing accounts of indiscipline and thuggery were known, there was disturbing inaction or the actions that were taken exacerbated and deepened the problems; planning, training and overall preparations fell far short of what was required; subordinates were held to standards of accountability that many of those above were not prepared to abide by. Our soldiers searched, often in vain, for leadership and inspiration. Many of the leaders called before us to discuss their roles in the various phases of the deployment refused to acknowledge error. When pressed, they blamed their subordinates who, in turn, cast responsibility upon those below them."¹⁰

As a consequence of command failure in Somalia the Canadian Forces endured a "decade of darkness". The five-volume report resulting from the Somalia affair contains many leadership and ethics lessons that are applicable to all militaries.

In the Australian context, the Preface of the Inquiry into “The effectiveness of Australia’s military justice system” by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee of the Senate tabled in June 2005 included the following comments:

“A decade of rolling inquiries has not met with the broad-based change required to protect the rights of Service personnel.”

“This failure to expose such abuse means the system stumbles at its most elementary stage – the reporting of wrongdoing.”

“Complaints were made to this inquiry about recent events including suicides, deaths through accident, major illicit drug use, serious abuses of power in training schools and cadet units, flawed prosecutions and failed, poor investigations.”¹¹

Although this Inquiry was not on the scale or severity of its Canadian predecessor, there are some common themes. Both inquiries are good examples for study, reflection and debate because they can serve as vehicles for the discussion of military ethics challenges in the 21st Century. They also starkly outline the consequences of ethical failure.

The Senate report highlighted ethical areas of concern which needed to be addressed in the professional military educational environment. The volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity of our operating environment suggests we need to prepare our leaders for the challenges of the future by educating them in the ethical issues that have emerged in recent conflicts, deployments, and barracks incidents. The ADF recognizes that it can no longer afford to be reactive in this regard.

In January 2002, one of the first tasks given to the Centre of Defence Leadership Studies was to investigate a proposal from the Deputy Chief of Army that the ADF should establish some sort of research capability in military ethics, which

would focus on the importance of ethical decision-making in contemporary operations.

At the same time, Dr. Hugh Smith from the University of New South Wales prepared a discussion paper on the need to establish a centre for military ethics. The proposal recommended an Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA)-based centre with academic and military staff with a budget of over \$300k per year. The proposal did not receive widespread support at the time but the idea is still alive. Smith has more recently suggested that we need to continue to promote the awareness of issues in military ethics;

“What can be attempted is to create a sense among military personnel that ethical behaviour can and should permeate military activities, and that ethical behaviour results more from debate than diktat. This debate can take three forms. It must be personal i.e. within the thoughts and conscience of each individual. It must be between the members of the military profession in its broadest definition. And it must be between the military profession and the wider society.”¹²

In 2002, a Defence Department Deputy Secretary remarked that ethics were an issue in Defence and should be mainlined because they are underdone in professional development. As debate developed regarding an appropriate course of action, discussions with the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) confirmed that military ethics “were the ethos that binds the organization together” and that the topic needed to be built into the leadership development framework. The Secretary of the Department of Defence also believed that military ethics expertise should reside at the Australian Defence College (ADC). In July of that year, the ADC planned and hosted the first military ethics forum in the ADF. Speakers included the Anglican Archbishop to the ADF, the Inspector General and the Executive Director of the St James Ethics Centre. The forum attracted more than 50 people from 10 Groups in Defence. The attendees proposed that the Centre for Defence Leadership

Studies (CDLS) take the lead in developing military ethics programmes at the ADC and should continue to investigate the requirement for dedicated research in this field.

In August 2002, the outcomes from the forum were discussed with the Chief of the Defence Force who posed the questions “do we have a problem?” and “what is it that we would give up to fit military ethics?” into extant professional military education programs. In order to generate further debate on the development of military ethics education, CDLS then published a research paper “*Ethics in Defence: Organizational DNA*”.¹³ The paper concluded that the ADF could not justify a stand-alone centre at this stage but that it should establish a research officer position to further investigate the organizational requirement.

In 2003, CDLS delivered the first military ethics packages to the Australian Command and Staff College and the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies. Up until this stage, little was being done on a holistic basis in the ADF beyond the ab initio education at ADFA, the Service colleges and the various Service training institutions. The following year, the ADC cleared with CDF the military ethics topics for discussion by the courses during that year’s program. CDF directed that ADC hold off on the parachute battalion issues; the fire on *HMAS Westralia*; and, “Children Overboard” because of ongoing legal and media sensitivities related to the incidents and the forthcoming Senate Inquiry into Military Justice. These case studies were then delivered in 2005 and continue today.

Australian Defence College Programs

The ADC is the flagship joint educational institution in the ADF and consists of the ADFA, the Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC) and the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS). Education in the sphere of military ethics is a key component of the ADC focus on achieving the necessary balance of “how to think” and “what to think”. The ADC ethics programs are examined in some detail because they are setting the standard for the ADF.

Australian Defence Force Academy

The Charter of ADFA includes the requirement to provide midshipmen and officer cadets with military education and training for the purpose of developing their professional abilities and the qualities of character and leadership that are appropriate to officers of the ADF; and, a balanced and liberal university education within a military environment.¹⁴ The ADFA mission is “Best leaders for the ADF”. Cadets and midshipmen complete three and four year degrees in Sciences, Engineering, Humanities and the Social Sciences. In addition to the academic study there is an extensive common and single-service and military training program which includes weapons training, physical training, leadership and management training, military communication, defence studies and drill and ceremonial.

Recent suggestions from specialist staff at ADFA suggest that the teaching of ethics is not done well. Over the three-year standard undergraduate period, officer cadets and midshipmen receive about 18 hours of instruction on character and moral decision-making in a military environment. The curriculum development is haphazard and there are critical gaps in the program. Recent proposals include the requirement for a clear, coordinated, cross-disciplinary curriculum.¹⁵ The problem is exacerbated by a posting tenure of key staff of only two years so there is little time to build the corporate experience in such a complex field. There are also concerns about the self-awareness of the staff and their ability to teach military ethics. At the Academy, however, there is now recognition of a need for an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approach to military ethics education and a review process has commenced as of 2007.

Dr. Martin Cook highlights other problems associated with the delivery of ethics programs to cadets at the US Air Force Academy. He asks whether ethics is the province of the chaplains, the lawyers, the leadership trainers, the behavioural scientists, the character development centre or the philoso-

phers.¹⁶ He also argues the need for a core philosophy class for cadets. The debate has yet to reach this level of sophistication in the ADF.

On the academic side at the ADFA, Dr. Stephen Coleman, lecturer in ethics from the University of New South Wales, explains that there are three ethics courses taught by the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, two of which specifically focus on issues in military ethics. The three courses “Introduction to Military Ethics” in the General Education (GE) program, “Practical Ethics in the 21st Century” in the undergraduate program (which examines practical topics selected by the students themselves, which may range from abortion and euthanasia through to issues of truth in advertising and bias by the media) and “Legal and Moral Problems in International Violence” at the post-graduate level.

He points out “that military personnel are often required to make different types of ethical decisions. Some of these ethical decisions are reasonably straight-forward and are resolved without undue difficulty, but others are much more difficult. These more difficult decisions can be classified into two types; ethical dilemmas and tests of integrity. Ethical dilemmas are situations where a member of the military is faced with a number of options, often all of them bad, and the difficulty arises out of the fact that it is not obvious which of these options is the most correct from an ethical perspective. Tests of integrity are situations where a member of the military is faced with a decision where they know the ethically correct option, but there is considerable pressure on them (in one form or another) to choose the ethically wrong option.

While both types of ethical decision may be difficult for those directly involved, it is the ethical dilemma that is the main focus of discussion in courses taught by the University. Courses dealing with issues in military ethics focus primarily on practical problems faced by military officers and in the use of military force by sovereign states, with the GE course paying closer attention to issues likely to be faced by junior mil-

itary officers. The post-graduate course devotes more time examining issues of interest to higher ranking officers and public servants.

Topics examined in the GE course include; Just War Theory and ethical problems involved with humanitarian interventions; issues of weapons and targeting including collateral damage and discussion of permitted and prohibited weapons; ethical issues of military life like giving and following orders, problems of medical treatment in combat zones, and issues raised for military personnel by religious beliefs; ethical issues involved with prisoners of war, especially during the War on Terror; and ethical decisions faced by students during their time as cadets or midshipmen at ADFA.

The post-graduate course first examines the relationship between law, morality and politics, and then explores issues such as just war and self-defence; armed intervention in the affairs of other states (from assassination through to humanitarian intervention); laws of armed conflict; terrorism, the role of the United Nations, enforcement of law by international courts; and whether individuals, civilian and military, can conscientiously object to violence by their state.¹⁷ These courses commenced in 2006 and are proving popular with students.

Australian Command and Staff College

The ACSC program is discussed in detail because it is the jewel in the crown of ADF military ethics education and this is appropriate as the course members invariably go on to command most units in the ADF. The Staff College opened in 2001 and is the result of the collocation and integration of the previous three single Service Staff Colleges. It educates officers from Australia and 22 other countries at the Major (equivalent) and Lieutenant Colonel (equivalent) levels in a comprehensive 12 month course. Conducted in a joint and integrated environment, and promoting a vision of excellence in warfighting, the Course aims to develop future leaders who

can better contribute to Defence's warfighting capability. Graduates will be better equipped than ever before to meet the demands placed on them in an uncertain and rapidly changing world.

The unique military ethics program is conducted as a two-day workshop early in the year and as part of the command and leadership module. The workshop is unique for several reasons. First, it is conducted as a partnership with the St James Ethics Centre, a Sydney-based, independent, not-for-profit organization, which provides a non-judgemental forum for the promotion and exploration of ethics. The Executive Director, Dr. Simon Longstaff, is a moral philosopher who has been working with the Australian Defence College for five years and has built his military knowledge through working with other militaries in Asia. Second, the workshop uses a case study approach that includes presentations by the individuals, including many commanders, who were involved in the incidents in question. Third, students are encouraged to discuss in detail, under the Chatham House rule, ethical dilemmas that they have had to face in their careers. Some are administrative or of a barracks nature but increasingly operational ethical issues are emerging. This approach has proved to be a powerful learning medium and its success is supported by the workshop evaluation process.

The program uses some of the principles suggested by the Harvard Business School:

- Ethics is as much an attitude as it is a set of skills and knowledge;
- Outstanding leaders, organizations, and practice are emphasized;
- The focus is on decision-making with all its complexity and ambiguity, not on issues of ethics or social responsibility in isolation; and

- Early instruction is important to allow course members to reflect on issues throughout the year.

The Defence Values of *professionalism, loyalty, innovation, courage, integrity and teamwork* are used as the basis for discussion. Although the individual Services and the Australian Public Service retain their values, these specific Defence values were established to provide a common and underlying thread for all people working in Defence. Integrity is defined as “doing what is right”.

The program contributes to the development of operational and strategic leaders by:

- Recognition of the centrality of ethical values in the context of individual and organizational effectiveness and national support of the ADF;
- Recognition of the breadth of responsibility of the modern military, as well as the constraints and trade-offs attending the exercise of that responsibility; and
- Encouragement of reflection on the value and constraints in the course members own approach to military ethics.

Topics covered during the workshop include the My Lai massacre; the 1994-95 ADF Rwanda experience including the massacres at the Kibeho refugee camp; the 1996 Australian Army Black Hawk disaster which killed 18 aviator and special forces personnel; Operation Allied Force in the Balkans in 1999; command problems in the Army's parachute battalion in the late 1990s; the *HMAS Westralia* fire in 1998, which resulted in the deaths of four crew; the Royal Australian Air Force F-111 fuel tank de-seal/reseal program which maimed and killed many maintenance workers over 20 years; the 2001 “children overboard affair” during the Federal election; the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq; the apparent murders by US Marines at Haditha in Iraq; and, the Canadian experience in Somalia in 1993. In 2006, the program included a study of the Senate

report on the effectiveness of Australia's military justice system and a case study on the Navy Sea King crash on Nias in 2005 is being prepared. In 2004, the ADC delivered elements of these military ethics programs to the Singapore Armed Forces.

The theme of the workshop is taken from a statement made by Dr. Longstaff in 2002; "the truth about ethics and the human condition is that there is no prescriptive answer. It is judgemental and there are no assurances of certainty". The workshop aims to promote and enhance the ethical development of the course members as senior leaders through education, research and reflection. In terms of outcomes, it hopes to improve the understanding of the sort of command and leadership challenges that lie in the future.

With this in mind, the presenting teams offer little in the way of solutions but a great deal of material for reflection. A critical part of the workshop process is the active participation of the student bodies with their unparalleled collective experience. The presenting team recognizes that delivering workshops on military ethics is a tricky business and accepts that with an international audience some are bound to be offended. It is also recognized that the workshop will raise more questions than can be adequately answered in the available time. The workshop focuses on practical issues as opposed to debating abstracts. Many of the students struggle with the fact that so many of the issues are not black and white and there is always a handful that misses the point of the discussion. Although many contemporary issues are discussed the workshop is not interested in laying blame and James Reason's perspective is used as a guide:

"For those who pick over the bones of other people's disasters, it often seems incredible that those warnings and human failures, seemingly so obvious in retrospect, should have gone unnoticed at the time. Being blessed with both uninvolved and hindsight, it is a great temptation for retrospective observers to slip into a censorious frame of mind and to wonder at how these people could have been

so blind, stupid, arrogant, ignorant or reckless.....First, most of the people involved in serious accidents are neither stupid nor reckless, though they may well be blind to the consequences of their actions. Second, we must beware of falling prey to the fundamental attribution error (i.e. blaming people and ignoring the situational factors).¹⁸

The course members are also asked to write down a recent ethical dilemma that they have faced, either of an administrative or operational nature. Few struggle with this activity. They are then asked to discuss the nature of the dilemma with a colleague and debate some of the “shades of grey”. This has proved to be a challenging and successful exercise.

The 2007 ACSC course indicated that more time was required for discussing ethical dilemmas and this outcome supported perspectives from the 2006 course. The programs from both years included a former battalion commanding officer discussing his court martial which resulted from his attempts to “do the right thing” in tackling bashing and harassment issues in the unit; the former commanding officer of a Navy ship reflecting on his decisions during an on-board fire that killed four of his crew; the dilemmas faced by medical specialists serving in Rwanda in the most deplorable conditions; an examination of the consequences of the actions of Canadian soldiers’ murder of a civilian in Somalia; ethical intelligence and fitness for command; and, Australian perspectives on the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. Proposed changes for future years include increasing the time allocated to the workshop and including more syndicate discussion. The understanding of ethics could also be enhanced by offering a university ethics elective as an element of the ACSC program and the University of New South Wales is willing to engage in this process.

Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies

CDSS is the senior course at the Australian Defence College and it is charged with providing “officers of the ADF, the Australian Public Service and overseas participants with the

knowledge and skills required by commanders, strategic leaders and managers engaged in national security issues".¹⁹ The students are predominantly at the Colonel (equivalent) level. Early in the 12-month accredited study program, course members examine the moral and ethical imperatives that influence and drive strategic and operational decision-making. The Principal of CDSS, Dr. Alan Ryan, points out that much of this work is embedded within the course curriculum, but specific units of study address the ethical and legal aspects of military service in the 21st Century and those peculiarly Australian imperatives that shape decision-making in the security sphere. Course members are drawn from a broad professional and international spectrum so examining Australian issues sparks comparative debate and analysis amongst the students. A key issue that is examined is the extent to which ethics in a military environment are universal. The ethics component of the course is of a general nature and involves presentations and syndicate discussions. Ethical issues are also discussed through the medium of the Law of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law.

An additional area of ethics education is delivered to CDSS by the Myer Foundation through the one-day Cranlana Programme. This intervention provides the opportunity for the course members to participate in unique programmes of reading, study and discussion, directed at enhancing their understanding of the philosophical, ethical, and social issues central to creating a just, prosperous and sustainable society in Australia and beyond.²⁰ Course members address the "vision and perspectives of great thinkers of the past and present. These discussions help strengthen their decision-making and leadership roles and reinforce and enhance their skills in practical reasoning, analysis and debate".²¹ The writings for analysis and discussion include Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau and Mill. The syndicate exercise examines the concept of going to war for an idea and the concept is applied to the invasion of Iraq. Over the years, this program has been extremely successful and it challenges the students, amongst other things, to examine ethical decision-making at the strategic level.

The CDSS military ethics program could be further enhanced with the consideration of Australian case studies and discussions with strategic leaders who have had to tackle major ethical issues. CDSS students should also be encouraged to discuss ethical challenges they have faced in their careers and be given the opportunity to reflect on real-world ethical issues. In the CDSS electives program there is also the opportunity to include a detailed study of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* as developed by Dr. Martin Cook at the US Army War College.²²

The ADC has developed a comprehensive knowledge base in the field of military ethics. Indeed, some similar US institutions have remarked that the ADC is taking a bold and innovative approach to raising awareness of military ethics because the ADF is willing to debate contentious contemporary issues. It has also been suggested that the nature of Australian culture allows the ADF to examine sensitive and contentious issues in a way that other militaries are reluctant to consider.

The ADC firmly believes in Jonathan Glover's view that past disasters can be used to frame how we think about ethics. This is one reason why the program tends to focus on organizational mea culpas. The workshop process recognizes that much more is to be learned from organizational failures than organizational successes and this is particularly so for a high performing organization like the ADF. However, this approach was recently challenged by a distinguished Israeli ethics scholar who asked why the ADF did not place more focus on discussing "good" ethical examples rather than concentrating on failures. The Australian response was that most training in the ADF focused on the "good" examples and that exposure to Australia's proud military history was a key foundation of all ADF training. There are very limited opportunities to debate the "bad" issues in the professional military education continuum in a non-threatening environment but we are able to do this at length on the ADC courses.

The Right Approach?

In recent years, there has been considerable discussion at the executive level in the ADF concerning the future of military ethics education following an approach made to Defence by the St James Ethics Centre. In his 2004 proposal, Dr. Simon Longstaff called for more focus in the delivery of ethics education to the profession of arms:

“We are living in times when the ethical foundations for most institutions in society are being questioned. It is also clear that the consequences of failing to do this work can be catastrophic for individuals and organizations alike. As we have seen, political and military strategies can be severely compromised when ethical issues are not given adequate attention – in planning and execution. Indeed, the costs (in all senses) of ethical failure have the capacity to dwarf all others.”²³

The ensuing debate recognized the importance of military ethics education in the continuum of professional military education in the ADF. Senior Defence personnel agreed that the current approach was ad hoc but there was little agreement as to how to improve the situation. Some favoured the trial of a military ethics research position whilst others did not believe that the proposal should be supported because the case presented was not sufficiently robust. Another perspective from a three-star officer suggested that there was no evidence of contemporary ethical shortcomings in Defence. However, it was recognized that the nature of contemporary operations is placing increased ethical challenges on ADF personnel at lower rank levels and that although the ADF had done well to date, it needed to sustain and enhance its efforts in the delivery of military ethics education. It was further acknowledged that military ethics education is difficult and invariably sensitive work as would be expected when:

“War – the business of killing in the name of the state – is an activity where the very existence of

ethics is often disputed. Military ethics, some argue, is an oxymoron akin to military intelligence. There can be no ethics in war because the stakes are too high – the life and death of individuals and nations.....Good intentions may be morally bad.”²⁴

The veracity of these perspectives is further reinforced by comments from the evaluation of selected military ethics programs. In 2004 course members at CDSS commented on the requirement to further develop the military ethics programs in the ADF:

“Recent US actions in Iraq, among other things, reinforce my strong belief that commanders need to impose on their command, strong ethical “atmospherics” during military actions.” (Army Colonel)

“There is no excuse for us (the ADF) not to be full bottle on ethics. We should be, and I do not believe that we are as well-trained and versed in ethics as we should be. We have set ourselves up to be “right” and squeaky clean, well this is one of the prerequisites to that stance.” (Navy Captain)

“I am convinced that ethics is the foundation stone for our military officers. The toughest challenge at ADFA was not to motivate cadets, not the tertiary training, nor the basic skills training – it was the development of their character...I am reasonably confident that there are no serious and systemic ethical issues in the ADF although I do have concerns about the culture at Russell (ADF Headquarters) – particularly with regards moral courage.” (Army Colonel)

“One of the major criticisms from the “shop floor” is that the various ethics packages are “officer-environment based” and do not deal with realistic operational ethical questions that our soldiers (the young in particular) have to face (and have already faced) on the ground.” (Army Colonel)

The current approach to the delivery of military ethics programs could be summed up as some good ideas and appropriate intent but lacking in focus and cohesion. There is no agreement as to what is to be achieved by the various programs other than a rather vague notion of ensuring that the ADF has “good people” who will “do the right thing” when faced with an ethical dilemma. A 21st Century military has to do better than this.

Perspectives on Ethical Challenges from Strategic Leaders

It is also appropriate to reflect on a series of insights into ethical issues at the strategic level of Defence. The strategic leaders are the role models and set the standard as well as the vision for the organization. Dr. Nick Jans, a Visiting Fellow at the ADC, conducted a major study into the strategic leadership culture of the ADF in 2003. In this process he interviewed members of the Senior Leadership Group, the 250 or so one-star and above leaders of Defence. This series of comments is extracted from those interviews and they highlight some of the dilemmas faced by strategic leaders that are invariably common to most militaries and indeed many private sector corporations:

“The challenges for the future... include the politicisation of the Defence – at the top level of leadership, officers will find it difficult to remain apolitical: everything they do has political implications; the Minister is exercising a far greater reach and making political use of comparatively minor issues. The way to deal with this is to stay squeaky clean and above-board.” (Air Commodore)

“The organizations’ valued attributes include... Honesty: in the past, the ability to defer decisions and avoid action has been valued – this is wrong. We want people who are willing to own up to and concede their problems and mistakes, not those who spend time covering them up. This honesty factor

extends to personal dealings, including the willingness to confront underperformance.” (Australian Public Service)

“The expression “you can trust your wife with him” is a metaphor for “you can trust the institution to look after young Australians, in peace as well as in war”... I am apprehensive about what I see as a decline in this aspect of our values. I suspect that young officers and NCOs are not as diligent about this as they once were.” (Major General)

“It is a big challenge not to become politicised. I avoid this by ensuring that I operate within an ethical framework. The essence of this ethical framework is that I operate within the general goal of advancing national interests, and present the government with a range of options to address any particular issue, even when I know that they have already made their minds up about which option to choose.” (Australian Public Service)

“In many of these projects, I’ve got to see the department at its worst: lying, cheating, tricking. But it improved my informal influence skills. The Senior Executive Service is an unscrupulous crowd: they act in accordance with their values when times are easy, but when a lot of money is on the table the values slip away and they become economical with the truth and likely to play ministerial politics. There is always attention between serving the ADF and serving what the Minister wants to do. In this particular job you have to believe in what you are doing, otherwise the bullshit meter goes off the scale. Have to live what you espouse professionally.” (Australian Public Service)

“There are ethical differences between this and earlier career levels. We all would like to think that

ethics were straightforward, structured, and pristine, but it doesn't happen like this. At the top of the organization, ethical issues are cloudier in terms of how to get the complete organization to do things. For example, in East Timor we were constantly under scrutiny to confirm that we use the correct level of force even in very minor contacts. I did not find this objectionable nor an impediment to commanding. Not only is it inevitable in the modern context where the media is all-intrusive, it adds a degree of civility to the conduct of operations and, by making the knowledge that this practice would happen widely known, it serves as a restraint on hot-headed behaviour at the very junior levels. In modern operations, any abuse of force is immediately visible and communicated to the world, and your every move is scrutinised. But the commander cannot and should not try to cover every contingency: you have to accept that shit happens, and have plans for dealing with the consequences. The ability to handle the media is crucial." (Major General)

"I spend a lot of time thinking about the ethical issues of the way I operate as an individual and as the commander of the Special Forces. You get to know when you are being used, and this is the first sticking point in terms of ethics. The second sticking point is where we are asked to carry out actions that would place soldiers in harm's way." (Major General)

"A job tenure of 2 years for most 2 star appointments is just not reasonable. If you could just make that 3 years, it would have a big benefit in terms of corporate memory and continuity. Look at Training Command: more commanders, chiefs of staff and colonels in the recent past than you could shake a stick at. No wonder they have these "culture" problems at Army schools: the recommendations of the last board of enquiry are lost in corporate amnesia

and they have to relearn the same lessons over and over... Take Training Command's current problems with the suicide of that young soldier. There was a similar enquiry just 3 or 4 years ago, but it's been erased from the corporate memory by the continual churn of leaders. In that time, they have had more commanders and Commanding Officers' than you can poke a stick at; and the Commanding Officer of the Infantry School has probably changed once or twice in that time too. How can you have carry-through of recommendations in such cases?" (Major General)

"The Army is still very tribal: driven by fear and careerism. There is a reluctance to be outspoken and an unwillingness to push ideas, to a greater extent than the other two services. The attitude among senior officers seems to be "will I become the next senior leader?" rather than "what's best for the organization?" (Brigadier)

"It is risky in career terms at the senior level to be "innovative". For example, when X took over the Y function, he announced to his subordinates that the response for any policy initiatives was to be "yes unless it had to be no"; in other words, we would look for reasons why people *could* do things rather than why they *couldn't*. This announcement prompted a good deal of "sucking of teeth" from old-and-bolds who had been used to finding reasons why things couldn't be done rather than why things could be done. Amongst these people, there was a feeling of relief when X moved on. This illustrates the "bureaucratic culture" that prevails in Defence: where instructions are oriented towards the rogue 3 percent rather than the willing 97 percent; and where leaders are rewarded for saving money, and being safe, rather than innovating and getting things done." (Brigadier)

These comments suggest that ethical challenges exist at the strategic level of Defence and they are all about "shades of

grey". The challenges are common in the operational, bureaucratic and political dimensions of the profession of arms. The question then arises as to how the ADF educates its senior leaders in the handling of these ethical dilemmas. The stories reinforce the view that strategic leaders are dealing with ethical dilemmas on a daily basis and that our organizational performance suggests that in the majority of cases they are handled well. They also suggest, however, that many of these issues need to be discussed so as to contribute to the ethos of a learning organization.

What Ought the ADF to Do?

In some areas of military ethics education, the ADF is doing the right thing. Indeed in some respects, as the St James Ethics Centre points out, "the use of case studies, as the foundation for reflection, and in particular, the incorporation of the live testimony of those most intimately involved with the events in question – must surely rank as world's best practice in this area."²⁵ At the ADC, the military ethics programs are well established on some courses, but require more work in other areas. Across the ADF, however, the approach is more ad hoc. Other than at the University of New South Wales at the ADFA, there are no moral philosophers or ethicists involved in the delivery of military ethics programs. As a contrast, in the US, each military academy has teams of appropriately qualified professional developing and delivering programs. This is not to say that the chaplains and/or ethicists need to take over but rather that the delivery of the ethics programs requires a multi-disciplinary team that includes people with specific, recent operational experience.

The ADF with its permanent strength in 2007 of approximately 51,000 can and should develop a strategy for the delivery of military ethics programs at all stages of its single Service and joint professional military ethics programs. The resources required, when compared to the huge outlays on capital expenditure over the next decade, are miniscule. But an ethical failure could have drastic consequences and this is

clearly displayed in the Canadian experience in 1993. How individuals will behave under conditions of great stress, despite the extent and intensity of their training and the wealth of operational experience in the ADF, can remain a mystery. This aspect is succinctly and poignantly articulated by Toivi Blatt, who as a 15-year-old was forced to work in the Nazi concentration camp at Sobibor in Poland;

“People asked me, ‘What did you learn?’ and I think I’m only sure of one thing – nobody knows themselves. The nice person on the street, you ask him, ‘Where is North Street?’ and he goes with you half a block and shows you, and is nice and kind. That same person in a different situation could be the worst sadist. **Nobody knows themselves** (my emphasis). All of us could be good people or bad people in these (different) situations. Sometimes when somebody is really nice to me I find myself thinking, ‘How will he be in Sobibor?’”²⁶

It is worthwhile thinking of professional military education as a capability, just like the Joint Strike Fighter, Special Forces, or air warfare destroyers. Education in military ethics is fundamental to that capability. As such, the ADF needs to ensure that its people, and particularly its leaders, at all levels of the organization are ethically equipped for the operational challenges of the 21st Century. A recent claim by Dr. David Cox and Dr. Andrew O’ Neil suggests that leadership and “ethics should form the core” of professional military education. They further state that:

“For a truly professional military, ethics incorporate a fundamental set of guiding principles that go beyond the laws of war and international legal obligations. These principles provide an enduring moral compass that supports complex problem solving and effective decision-making that underpins operational success.”²⁷

Conclusion

The chapter has examined a broad range of issues and themes relating to the delivery of military ethics education in the ADF. The new military ethics programs at the Australian Defence College have been running since 2002 and when benchmarked with other militaries, it is apparent that the ADF has taken a bold and innovative approach which appears to suit the Australian culture. Time pressures should not be an impediment to the development of robust, intellectual programs that challenge how we think about ethics, and that meet the needs of ADF personnel at all levels of the organization. The central issues remain a lack of appropriate resourcing and a single Service, “ad hoc” approach to curriculum development with ethics. At a time when the ADF is espousing Network Centric Warfare and joint operations, we are not placing an appropriate focus on the development of military ethics programs that present our future leaders with the range of dilemmas that they will encounter in their careers, either on operations or in the staff. Professor Christopher Croker, during a recent visit to the ADC, reminded us that it is absolutely critical to consider the ethical consequences of Effects Based Operations and this is yet to occur in the Australian military educational context.

The issue of military ethics and moral decision-making is becoming more important given the nature of our operational environment. The most recent evidence comes from the alleged US Marines’ response to events at Haditha and in Afghanistan, and in the Australian context, with the imminent release of the Board of Inquiry into the loss of the Navy Sea King in Indonesia in 2005. Our sense is that students in the ADF’s professional military education system want to spend more time reflecting on the ethical dimensions of command and leadership decisions. This is a very positive development.

The programs at the ADC, which have evolved each year as a consequence of participant feedback, are displaying a degree of maturity. At an International Military Ethics Conference at

the University of Hull (June 2006), it was clear that despite the lack of resources dedicated to military ethics in Australia, our programs in many respects were leading edge. The focus should remain on operational issues and where possible, use should be made of Australian examples. It is also important to recognize that there “is no best single method of education and training in ethics. Debate, character development and leadership must all play a part”.²⁸

A critical component of ADC programs has been the willingness of individuals involved in the actual incident to talk under the provisions of the Chatham House rule, about their experience. This should continue and indeed be actively encouraged. The ADF is well ahead of our coalition partners in this regard.

The ADC believes that the case study approach, with the students doing the bulk of the work, is the most effective delivery method. This becomes particularly interesting given the international composition of the courses. Elements of ADC programmes have been exported to the Singapore Armed Forces and to military institutions in the US and UK.

The engagement of the St James Ethics Centre in the programs has been critical. It provides the professional philosophical balance to the practical military problems. It is important to note that unlike the United States, there are few Australians who are recognized as academic experts in the field of military ethics. Australia has been blessed with the luxury of being able to reflect and learn from the ethical failings of other militaries. It is important with our operating tempo to align and embed military ethics programs as a central component of all the ADF's professional military education continua. We see this work in part as a duty of care responsibility for the ADF. At least when something serious happens we will be able to show that we had a training/educational process in place. The feedback we are getting is certainly positive. We have had enough ADF incidents over the past few years to provide us with a solid base for reflection and we have people in the sys-

tem willing to talk about their experiences so the issues are really brought to life. The world press continues to highlight on a regular and immediate basis how important these issues are to the profession of arms. The organization is willing to debate the ethics of contemporary ADF issues and the theory and practice is mature. What is needed now is action to develop the organizational strategy, a modest allocation of resources and a continuing run of good luck on operations.

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C O N T R I B U T O R S

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G L O S S A R Y

ACSC	Australian Command and Staff College
ADC	Australian Defence College
ADFA	Australian Defence Force Academy
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADO	Australian Defence Organization
ANAO	Australian National Audit Office
CA	Chief of Army
CDA	Canadian Defence Academy
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
CDLS	Centre for Defence Leadership Studies
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CDSS	Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CLEs	Career Learning Experiences
CF	Canadian Forces
CFC	Canadian Forces College
CFLI	Canadian Forces Leadership Institute
CSC	Command and Staff Course
DAF	Dutch Armed Forces
DG	Director General
EU	European Union
GE	General Education
HELPEM FREN	Solomon Islands
HR	Human Resources
HRM	Human Resource Management
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
JSSC	Joint Services Staff College Course

LDC	Leadership Development Centre
MD	Management Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NZDC	New Zealand Defence College
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Forces
OPQ	Occupational Personal Questionnaire
PD	Professional Development
PDF	Professional Development Framework
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PMD	Professional Military Development
PME	Professional Military Education
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
TMT	Top Management Team
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States (of America)
WWII	World War II

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